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THE INF TREATY AND THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE

REPORT

BY

MAJORITY LEADER ROBERT C. BYRD

ON A

SENATE DELEGATION VISIT TO FIVE NATO COUNTRIES

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SENATE DELEGATION TO NATO CAPITALS

February 6–14, 1988

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FOREWORD

May 11, 1988.

From February 6–14, 1988, I led a bipartisan Senate delegation to five NATO capitals to investigate and discuss matters related to the INF Treaty. Accompanying me on the delegation were the leaders of the three committees with responsibilities for aspects of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, the committee with jurisdiction over the Treaty; Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services; Senator John W. Warner, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services; and Senator David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence.

The purpose of the trip was to hold consultations and discussions with government leaders, opposition politicians, and leading figures from academia and the media in key NATO countries, focusing on the INF Treaty and its significance for the future of the NATO Alliance. At the time of the trip, all three committees were in the process of holding hearings on aspects and implications of the Treaty. President Reagan signed the Treaty with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, on December 8, 1987, in Washington, D.C., and submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on January 25, 1988. Since the United States, in essence, negotiated this Treaty with the Soviet Union on behalf of the NATO Alliance, the Senate leadership deemed it important to seek directly European leaders' views and advice as an integral part of the process of reviewing the Treaty.

At the outset of the trip, the delegation attended the 25th annual International Wehrkunde Meeting in Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, the theme of which was "The American-Russian Disarmament Negotiations and their Consequences." At this conference, a sizable representation of officials from all NATO countries, as well as opinion-makers and outside experts, were gathered. Both Senator Nunn and I delivered addresses to that gathering, which are included in this report as Appendices A and B. The delegation had an opportunity to hear a variety of informed opinions as to the future security needs of and challenges for the Alliance. Following that conference, the delegation traveled to London, Bonn, Paris, Ankara, and Rome. In each capital, it met the head of state or of government. Additionally, it met with the defense and foreign ministers at each stop, opposition leaders, and opinion-makers, as well as with both foreign and American press representatives. A full listing of those individuals follows:

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OFFICIAL DELEGATION MEETINGS

Munich

Senators Byrd and Nunn addressed Wehrkunde Conference
Luncheon meeting with Dr. Willem Van Eekelen, Minister of Defense of the Netherlands and Chairman of the Eurogroup Defense Ministers

London

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
Defense Minister George Younger
Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs David Mellor
Former leader of the Social Democratic Party David Owen
Luncheon hosted by Ambassador Price, guests included Labour Party Leader, Mr. Neil Kinnock

Bonn

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Defense Minister Manfred Woerner
Minister of State Helmut Schaefer, Foreign Office
Mr. Karsten D. Voight, SPD, Bundestag Deputy; SPD Spokesman, Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr. Wolfgang Boetsch, CSU, Bundestag Deputy
Dr. Gerhart Baum, FDP, Bundestag Deputy

Paris

President Francois Mitterrand
President of the National Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas
Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond
Defense Minster Andre Giraud
Chairman of Military Committee of French National Assembly, M. Francois Fillon

Turkey

President Kenan Evren
Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz
Defense Minister Evran Vuralhan
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay
President of Turkish Grand National Assembly Yildirim Akbulut

Italy

Prime Minister Giovanni Goria
President of National Assembly Giovanni Spadolini
Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti
Defense Minister Valerio Zanone

Transcripts of various round table discussions and meetings the delegation had with the press are reproduced in the appendices.

The Alliance is currently enjoying the fruits of its steadfastness in pursuing a negotiated agreement on land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces. By following through on the 1979 dual track decision to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles while, at the same time, pursuing discussions of limits on those missiles, the Alliance has achieved a great victory. This victory was not achieved without considerable courage and the expenditure of political capital by leaders in each of the NATO countries. Through courage and farsightedness, NATO was able to reaffirm the principles that the Alliance will take whatever steps are necessary for its own security, and that its members will stand together in pursuit of these common objectives.

Inevitably, the attainment of the Alliance objective of total elimination of these systems through asymmetrical reductions opens the agenda for the next set of decisions which must be addressed. Therefore, this delegation focused on the challenges and decisions facing NATO in the post-INF era, rather than solely on the question of treaty ratification. The Alliance as a whole is to be commended for the victory in attaining the treaty, but this is not a time for excessive self-satisfaction or relaxation. Instead, a healthy period of reexamination, assessment, and planning for the Alliance future is in order. The leaders with whom the delegation met shared this view.

This Congressional delegation visited NATO capitals at a time of renewed debate and discussion regarding the Alliance's purposes and future directions. Although the treaty on Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) represents a victory for Alliance cohesion and steadfastness in pursuing a common policy, it also represents the end of a ten-year phase during which INF was at the core of Alliance efforts in arms control and force modernization.

At this time, the full Senate is considering the INF Treaty and it is hoped that this report will provide useful perspectives on the issues which form the larger international context for the accord. Finally, the delegation notes with appreciation the preparation of this report by Richard D'Amato, Scott Harris, and Wendy Deker.

ROBERT C. BYRD, *Majority Leader,*
Delegation Chairman.

INTRODUCTION

The delegation embarked on the visit with three objectives. The first of these was to receive firsthand the unfiltered views of the leaders of the alliance regarding the INF Treaty. Given the significance of this treaty for European security and for the continued unity of NATO, views of the European Allies constitute an important factor to be taken into account during the Senate's consideration of this treaty.

A second objective was to discuss, not only with government officials but with opposition leaders and private citizens as well, the impact of the treaty on the future of NATO. The Alliance will face crucial, and potentially controversial, decisions in the post-INF political and military environments. In the opinion of the delegation, it is important to begin now to consider these issues and to begin to formulate a common course. In particular, it is important that NATO identify a common set of objectives for the next round of arms control, particularly in the area of conventional arms reductions. Many useful suggestions in this regard were identified during the course of the delegation's discussions with European leaders.

The third objective of the delegation's visit was to explore with European counterparts their perceptions of the objectives and style of Soviet policy toward the West, particularly the impact of Soviet diplomacy on Western public opinion. Is there a generalized perception that the threat to Western security has diminished, or that NATO's strategy of deterrence based on the capability for flexible response is no longer widely supported?

In addition to the mission of listening to European views and learning about the trends of European public opinion, the delegation also conveyed to interested European audiences, in public as well as private sessions, a message concerning the U.S. commitment to NATO and the inherent stability of the American political system. Particularly in an election year, when the level of political rhetoric and debate could convey confused and conflicting images of the United States to Europeans, the fact that the Senate of the United States is a continuing body is worth recalling and emphasizing. Moreover, the members of the delegation focused on the essential facts that the INF Treaty is a victory for NATO unity and cohesion, and that, regardless of the debate over ratification which will ensue in the coming weeks, it is highly likely that the Senate will consent to the Treaty's ratification. For that reason, it is important for NATO to begin now to look beyond the specifics of the INF Treaty and to focus on future challenges.

A. CONTEXT: BACKGROUND THEMES OF THE VISIT

Several developments related either to the INF Treaty or to political trends in Europe occurred during the time of the delegation's visit. They provided important background themes, the essential context in which the discussions in Europe took place.

a. INF TREATY INTERPRETATION

Most visible of these background developments was the ongoing controversy over future interpretation by the executive branch of the INF Treaty, a controversy which stems from the efforts of the Reagan Administration to reinterpret the ABM Treaty in a manner different from its traditional interpretation. The possibility of delays in Senate consideration of the INF Treaty as a result of the dispute between the Senate and the Administration over whether Administration testimony as to the meaning of the Treaty would be authoritative and binding in the future received considerable attention during the trip.

Senators Byrd, Pell, Nunn and Boren engaged Secretary Shultz and Ambassadors Kampelman and Nitze in an extensive discussion of this issue in the weeks leading up to the delegation's departure, without reaching a final agreement. Nevertheless, the records of the negotiations on the Treaty were delivered to the Senate on February 5, 1988, and terms for access to the records had been arranged. Senators Byrd and Nunn alerted the Secretary in a letter on February 5, 1988; that due to the Administration's failure to provide any assurances with regard to future interpretation of the INF Treaty, consideration of the Treaty in the Senate could be delayed pending the outcome of the interpretation dispute. This letter was widely reported in the press, and the issue was frequently raised during the delegation's first few days in Europe.

Senator Byrd and Senator Nunn took the opportunity of the dispute to educate the European audiences on the role of the Senate in the treaty-making process in the United States. As part of this effort, they assured the European publics that this dispute would be resolved, that it was a procedural and Constitutional dispute which probably would have little bearing on the actual outcome (i.e., likely consent to ratification) regarding the INF Treaty, but that it was necessary to resolve the issue, especially as it relates to the instant treaty.

When, on February 10, 1988, the Secretary of State responded with another letter clarifying his position, Senators Byrd and Nunn indicated at a news conference in Paris that the response was generally satisfactory and that the possibility of a delay in consideration of the Treaty as a result of this dispute appeared to have been eliminated. The dispute makes it highly likely, however, that the Senate will address the issue during consideration of the Treaty, and Europeans should expect such an outcome. (For texts of the letters and the Senators' statement, see Appendix N.)

Despite the favorable progress toward resolving this dispute, the debate over treaty interpretation raises questions in the minds of many Europeans about the stability of the American system and the ability of the United States to conclude treaties in good faith. The delegation emphasized that this issue was not the result of any actions initiated by the Congress and that, moreover, it was the Congress which had resisted attempts by the Administration to reinterpret the meaning of the ABM treaty. The delegation also stressed that actions currently being pursued in the Senate should lead to a satisfactory resolution of this issue.

b. AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND THE DANGER OF "DECOUPLING"

The prospect of the withdrawal of a class of nuclear weapons from Europe has again raised anxieties about "decoupling" and the credibility of the American commitment to European security. While the Pershings and Cruise Missiles are often portrayed simply as a response to the SS-20 deployments by the Soviet Union, it is important to remember that they were also justified as part of the continuum of NATO's deterrent capabilities, a necessary rung on the ladder of escalatory options. Removal of this rung understandably creates uncertainties. This natural reaction is given increased impetus by the fact that, within the NATO countries themselves, significant political constituencies remain opposed to nuclear weapons and fearful of their continued deployment in large quantities in Europe. The Soviets, of course, seek to exploit these fears through a skillful propaganda campaign and a diplomatic offensive aimed at highlighting these fears. Soviet leaders seek to engage the Alliance in discussions on the remaining short-range nuclear weapons prior to addressing issues such as the imbalances in conventional and chemical forces. Added to this volatile mix of nuclear anxieties have been the confusing signals sent by Washington during the past few years concerning the nuclear guarantee and the United States' commitments to nuclear deterrence.

This concern has become more pronounced since the U.S.-Soviet summit at Reykjavik in 1986. The impression conveyed from that summit was that the United States was uncertain about the value of nuclear deterrence in the European theater, raising old fears of a "decoupling" of America and Europe, and fueling the arguments of those who believe that Europe should become a "nuclear-free zone." The denuclearization of Europe appears to be a high priority for the Soviet Union, which will miss no opportunity to exploit either division in the West or confusion on the question of nuclear deterrence.

The delegation took the opportunity to reaffirm the commitment to the NATO strategy of flexible response and to indicate that there is broad support in the United States and in the Senate for NATO and for the current NATO strategy. As Chancellor Kohl and others remarked during the visit, it has been the credibility of the nuclear deterrent which has been of central importance in breaking the cycle of wars on the European continent for the last 43 years.

Related to the question of American staying power was the perception that the United States may be considering the withdrawal of troops from Europe. Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci delivered an address at the Wehrkunde Conference with could have been interpreted as making just such a threat, resulting in newspaper headlines with an alarmist tone, such as "U.S. Warns of Troop

Pullout if Bonn Bars Nuclear Arms," which appeared in the *International Herald Tribune* (see Appendix C). While this characterization of the Secretary of Defense's remarks may be stronger than he intended, the theme of threatened U.S. withdrawal of troops from Europe in the absence of continued commitments to nuclear modernization continually reappeared throughout the next several days. It contributed more to European anxieties about American presence and commitment that it did to the rallying of opinion behind common security objectives. Such statements contain the danger of undoing much of the good that was done by Alliance solidarity throughout the INF negotiations. Moreover, since the remarks could be seen to be directed at particular factions within the Federal Republic, German sensitivities were somewhat aroused by this public brow-beating of an ally. Such apparent or misconstrued threats should be avoided as they are counterproductive, and the apparent use of them by United States officials can do our Allies a disservice.

Additional concerns in Europe could be found regarding the shifting priorities of the United States, particularly in light of the report *Discriminate Deterrence* recently issued by a Blue-Ribbon Department of Defense task force. The delegation pointed out that although this report has received considerable attention in Europe, it is not authoritative or representative of a consensus in the U.S. Senate.

C. MEETING THE SECURITY CHALLENGE IN AN ERA OF CONSTRAINED BUDGETS

Most of the major NATO countries, including the United States, will not be able to meet the goal of real increases in defense spending of 3% in the coming year. The United States has not met this goal for the past two years. Only Italy will come close to this goal. Turkey is making a positive effort but the Turks face the greatest requirements for modernization and must rely on security assistance from the United States and West Germany to meet their minimum security needs.

This fact is well understood in NATO, but the regularity with which the goal of 3% increases are missed suggests that this is no longer a useful yardstick for measuring Allied contributions to the common defense. It is unrealistic to expect Allied governments to increase dramatically the shares of government spending devoted to defense. This does not mean, however, that improvements cannot be made in the ways in which the money is spent or in the efficiency of expenditure. The delegation, and Senator Nunn in particular, urged the Allies to cooperate more effectively in an effort to "think smarter, not richer," in order to provide the types of conventional forces which the Alliance will require.

The importance of devoting sufficient resources to defense lies in the critical relationship between credible conventional defense forces and the nuclear option which backs up the conventional forces. NATO does not have as a goal matching the Warsaw Pact gun for gun or tank for tank. There is no need for that on the part of a defensive alliance. On the other hand, reliance on nuclear weapons as the exclusive deterrent to aggression raises deep concerns among publics in Allied countries and could be seen as lacking credibility by potential aggressors. NATO has established an official goal of having sufficient stocks to achieve the ability to defend NATO territory conventionally for thirty days, but only the United States comes close to meeting this objective among the NATO allies.

These issues of burden sharing, reduced funds available for conventional forces, declining or inadequate levels of assistance to the Southern Region countries, and inefficient expenditure of resources among NATO partners will confront the Alliance with major challenges in the coming years. They constitute an important backdrop to the need for progress toward conventional arms control and conventional force reductions in the coming months.

d. PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE

Considerable press attention was focused on the delegation's visit. Press events and public discussions with journalists and commentators were held at each stop. This afforded the delegation the opportunity not only to hear the views of knowledgeable observers of the European scene, but also to convey to European publics, through the media, messages concerning the role of the Senate in the American Constitutional system and the fact that the Senate is a source of stability and continuity in American policy.

The following sections describe the principal themes discussed in each country visited by the delegation, with a final section summarizing the findings and observations of the delegation.

B. Federal Republic of Germany

The delegation spent a fruitful day in Bonn on February 9, 1988, in discussions with leading figures in the Federal Republic, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, and other officials.

There is widespread agreement in the Federal Republic that the INF Treaty should be ratified without amendment. Despite initial doubts about the "second zero" of short-range INF missiles and reluctance to scrap the German Pershing I's, the Treaty has widespread support in the German government, in the opposition, and among the general public.

The issues foremost on the agenda in the Federal Republic concern the nature and scope of future arms control negotiations, the timetable for decisions concerning modernization, and bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and other NATO allies, particularly France. These issues are, of course, overlaid by the dynamics of German domestic politics, where the opposition Social Democratic Party is showing increased strength at the *Land* level and where tensions on these issues within the ruling coalition can be discerned.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

The themes which were examined during the meetings in Bonn were previewed in the speeches by Chancellor Kohl and opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Hans-Jochen Vogel at the

Wehrkunde Conference. Vogel, although carefully couching his words in terms of overall support for the Alliance, nevertheless raised a number of issues which clearly run counter to the consensus among NATO governments today and could presage future controversies in NATO. He indicated, for example, the SPD's support for *simultaneous* pursuit of negotiations to reduce the conventional force imbalance and further efforts to negotiate limits on short-range nuclear forces. This view is also shared by many in the ruling coalition.

In contrast to the apparent position of Dr. Vogel, officials in the Federal Republic expressed their opposition to the "Third Zero" of short-range land-based ballistic missile reductions. But a significant cleavage, not only within German opinion but also between Germany and the rest of the NATO Alliance, may be developing concerning the timing of discussions concerning the short-range systems. Both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher appear to favor beginning discussions on reducing the short-range nuclear systems deployed in Europe (most of which, of course, are deployed by NATO in West Germany and by the Warsaw Pact in East Germany) at the same time discussions on limiting conventional forces are undertaken, a position which appears to be in line with that outlined by Dr. Vogel at Wehrkunde. West German officials argue that the communique of the NATO ministerial meeting at Reykjavik endorses this concept. This view is not shared by the other NATO Allies. Even within Germany, the fear was expressed that undertaking such discussions could result in NATO facing a Soviet proposal for a third zero which would be hard to resist. It is likely that disagreements over the timing of discussions on further efforts to reduce short-range nuclear arms in Europe will characterize Alliance discussions in coming months. This issue could become one of significant dispute within the NATO alliance unless handled skillfully and carefully.

OVERALL SECURITY CONCEPT

The German officials with whom the Congressional delegation met placed a great deal of emphasis on the need for an overall concept of security to guide the Alliance in its force modernization decisions and in its arms control approach to the Warsaw Pact. While it would be possible to see this as an effort to delay tough decisions or to revisit decisions which the Alliance has already made, it can also be seen as a legitimate concern and one which the Alliance should take seriously. The Federal Republic can be expected to press this view in coming months.

As the Alliance struggles to define a common position for new talks on conventional stability in Europe, talks which may start later this year, it will be important for the Alliance to be guided by a common set of objectives and a shared vision as to the desired outcomes of the negotiations. It goes without saying that asymmetrical reductions in Warsaw Pact troops will be required, but in the absence of a common set of goals and a vision of the final outcome of the talks, the Alliance runs the risk that Soviet proposals which appear good on the surface could be used to great public relations effects in the West without an effective counter by NATO governments. This must be avoided, and, to that extent, the German emphasis on a strategic concept should be welcomed. Focus on the concept could have the additional benefit of providing the means by which the French can be truly brought on board an Alliance-wide position in the talks.

Officials in Germany, and Chancellor Kohl in particular, emphasized that NATO is about to enter into a contest of "religion" and psychology with the Soviet Union over the question of conventional force reductions, and that it is very important for NATO to seize the psychological initiative on these issues in the coming year. NATO should take advantage of the momentum generated by the INF agreement to formulate a proposal on conventional arms control which unites the West and challenges the Soviets.

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

The question of modernization of short-range nuclear weapons was one which arose at every session with German officials. Chancellor Kohl carefully skirted the issue of modernization in his address at the Wehrkunde gathering, artfully avoiding the use of the term. While the Congressional delegation strongly supports the Montebello approach to these issues and believes that all NATO Allies should fulfill their responsibilities within the NATO context, the delegation shared the view in Germany that modernization of short-range forces and the INF Treaty are *separate* issues which are not and *should not be directly linked*. The delegation shares the view of Defense Minister Woerner and others that the issues of nuclear modernization and the nature of the specific systems to be modernized are decisions which should be handled in due course as part of the Alliance's routine nuclear planning process. There is no need for a bruising public debate on these issues at the present time.

BILATERAL INITIATIVES

Concerning the initiatives with France and the formation of the Franco-German Defense Council and the jointly-manned brigade, the German government argues forcefully that bilateral initiatives with France are designed to bring France more fully into cooperation with NATO, and are not part of the creation of a rival force to NATO. German officials also express strong support for the efforts of the Action Committee for Europe and the strengthening of the European Pillar—and contend that France must be brought into these efforts. It is unlikely that the scope and extent of the bilateral cooperation will extend beyond the recently established single brigade in the near future, but it could be expanded in principle. The Germans, of course, wish to use the brigade as a device to draw the French more firmly into the forward defense concept of NATO as well. The delegation expressed, in general, its support for improved bilateral initiatives, emphasizing the importance of avoiding the creation of organizations competitive with NATO. German officials carefully noted that the forces committed to the joint brigade in no way would reduce the numbers of German forces committed to NATO.

SOVIET POLICY

The diplomatic efforts of the Soviet Union and the dynamic public relations offensive which Mr. Gorbachev is capable of mounting will doubtless be directed at the Federal Republic with special force in the coming months. Chancellor Kohl, in recalling the extensive efforts to block developments of the INF, which the Soviets encouraged in direct and indirect ways, noted that he has seen no deviation in the Soviet objective of isolating Germany and splitting it from the rest of NATO under the Gorbachev regime. While we are unlikely to see in the near future the spectacle of 300,000 demonstrators gathered on the lawn outside the Chancellor's office, as was the case prior to INF deployments, it is worth recalling that great political obstacles were overcome in successfully implementing the INF decision, and that future decisions may require commensurate efforts.

C. Britain

The delegation met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Defense Minister George Younger, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Mellor, and with the former leader of the Social Democratic Party (and former Shadow Labour Defense Spokesman) David Owen. In addition, a luncheon with Neil Kinnock and other leaders of the opposition Labour Party was hosted by the Ambassador.

The discussions in Britain centered on the security issues facing the Alliance in the post-INF environment, with attention to the themes which characterized discussions in all countries: maintaining the unity and cohesion of NATO; responding to the challenges of Soviet initiatives in all spheres, but especially in conventional arms control; pursuit of cooperative ventures with France without, at the same time, undermining the unity and cohesiveness of NATO; and modernization of remaining nuclear systems in NATO.

Strong support exists among officials in the British government for the ratification of the INF treaty without substantial amendments or reservations which would alter its fundamental character. Officials expressed satisfication with the manner in which consultations on INF had been conducted by the United States before the summit. The British, not unlike other NATO allies, had been concerned following the Reykjavik summit about comments made by President Reagan questioning the utility of nuclear deterrence and favoring a nuclear-free world, but, on the whole, these concerns appear to have been mollified. At bottom, the view was expressed that it would be a disaster if the INF Treaty were not ratified, if the word of the U.S. President in these matters could not be taken seriously.

Mrs. Thatcher, in particular, went to considerable lengths to express her own view that the nuclear genie could not be put back into the bottle, and that efforts to try to do so would be in vain. She stated that her preference is for a world free from war, not a world free from nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is nuclear weapons and NATO's doctrine of deterrence through flexible response that has preserved the peace in Europe.

Getting the French to act in support of the NATO Alliance, even if they refuse to rejoin the integrated military command, is an objective of British policy. The skepticism regarding the French-German brigade, which had been voiced earlier by Mrs. Thatcher, seemed to have been toned down during the visit of the delegation. Instead, Mrs. Thatcher and others emphasized that they welcomed French activities which could be seen as supportive of NATO's objectives. The British are opposed to the creation of multilateral organizations which could be seen to compete with NATO. For these reasons they did not support the inclusion of forces from other countries in the French-German brigade, and they also believed that the institutions of the Western European Union should be colocated in Brussels. Finally, the British expressed support for cooperative development of a stand-off missile by the United States, United Kingdom, and France rather than solely a bilateral British-French project. Again, the objective is to bring the French more closely into cooperation with NATO.

Mr. Gorbachev is viewed by the British government with skepticism and caution. While he can be seen as a reformer in the Soviet domestic sense, his foreign policy remains based on the military power of the Soviet Union and on efforts to drive a wedge between members of NATO, particularly between the United States and Europe and between the West Germans and the rest of NATO. Soviet arms control proposals will be couched in terms designed to have the maximum psychological impact on Western publics. It will be important to prepare appropriate responses, and to develop our own proposals which seize the initiative.

The British government is emphatic in stating its belief that discussions on limiting NATO's short-range nuclear forces should not begin until progress has been made on more pressing issues of chemical weapons and the conventional forces imbalance. The British also argue that modernization of short-range forces should proceed with no delays. It is possible to proceed in two separate boxes, one focusing on the agreements made at Montebello, and the other focusing on the current work of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, which is considering specific proposals which might be seen as implementing the Montebello and Reykjavik agreements by NATO. The British are unabashed in their willingness to press the Germans on the point of nuclear modernization, rejecting the German argument that negotiations on short-range nuclear forces can occur simultaneously with negotiations on conventional forces. The British government is also skeptical about the position of FRG officials that, once begun, the discussions on shorter-range systems can be limited to proposals for equal ceilings on each side rather than the Third Zero. In the British view, the entire Soviet approach is aimed at reducing the nuclear deterrent in Europe, and discussions on short-range systems are subject to manipulation for public impact. Therefore, they should be avoided.

While supportive of a START agreement at the earliest time feasible, the British are adamantly opposed to the inclusion of any third country systems under START ceilings until well after superpower arsenals have been reduced by fifty percent. They are also concerned that START counting rules for Trident missiles not have an adverse impact on the British Trident system.

D. FRANCE

During a two-day stop in Paris, the delegation met for an hour and a half with French President Francois Mitterrand, and had extensive discussions with Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, Defense Minister Andre Giraud, President of the National Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and Chairman of the National Defense and Armed Forces Committee of the National Assembly Francois Fillon. In addition, the delegation met for two hours in a round table discussion with French intellectuals and journalists on the range of issues confronting the Alliance. The transcript of that round table discussion is included in Appendix J. It provides important insights into the range of French views on the security issue.

The visit to Paris came at a time of important reassessment by the French of the state of the Atlantic relationship, and the delegation was given an articulate exposition of the various risks which the Alliance currently faces. The visit also occurred at a time when the French have undertaken historic initiatives with the Germans in cooperative arrangements in the military field. On January 22, 1988, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl strengthened their ties by forming a high-level military commission to coordinate Franco-German policies on defense and arms control matters. Second, the French responded enthusiastically to Chancellor Kohl's offer to form a Franco-German military brigade, composed of 3,000–4,000 troops. At the time of the delegation's visit, the planning for the brigade was proceeding smoothly. Despite initial reservations by other European NATO partners (primarily Italy and Great Britain), a growing consensus on the acceptability of the arrangement can now be discerned. The delegation repeated its view, expressed in Germany as well, that this is a generally positive development.

ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS SUPPORTED

President Mitterrand was emphatic in his support for the INF Treaty, and noted that he wasn't merely paying "lip service." He outlined his opposition in principle to the development of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, based on his belief that they weaken deterrence because they could lead an adversary to question one's resolve to use strategic weapons in response to aggression. He gave a spirited exposition on the need for a high level of deterrence—that is, unquestioned certainty in the mind of the adversary that any attack would meet with immediate and overwhelming response—and of the need for the adversary to fear such a response. Thus, his approval of the INF agreement, which he indicated he believed to be stronger than that of most European leaders, was based in part on his lack of enthusiasm for the doctrine of flexible response.

A corollary to the President's view in this regard in his relative lack of enthusiasm for modernization of short-range nuclear missiles and artillery. Mitterrand is thus more supportive of what appears to be the German government's position on this issue than are most other European officials.

Mitterrand favored a START agreement, but did not feel it made much of a difference, given the overwhelming size of the superpower's arsenals. On the other hand, he emphasized his conviction that the "most urgent priority" in arms control was to move forward on negotiations on *conventional arms reductions,* both to reassure Western publics and to indicate to the Soviets that we are watching them and will not let them go any further to tilt the balance in this area. Mitterrand said that, while "reductions of 50 percent (START) is a good thing, it doesn't diminish the risk, especially for Europe. It would be more important, more significant to see an agreement reached in the fields of conventional and chemical weapons." He emphasized that the Senate should be aware that the conventional arms reductions negotiations are the most important negotiations that can reassure America's European partners. And, like other French officials, he contended that short-range nuclear weapons should be separated from the conventional talks.

Foreign Minister Raimond observed that the major risk that must be understood is that of "precipitous" negotiations with the Soviets which further advance the Soviet goal of denuclearizing Europe. A specific manifestation of this problem could include being swept into negotiations which put irresistable pressure on the West to eliminate all ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles, i.e., the "third zero."

In Raimond's view, the very fact of having negotiated the zero agreement in the INF Treaty fits into the Soviet goal of denuclearizing Europe, a goal which is clearly a central objective of Soviet policies toward Europe. Thus, it is clear that Gorbachev's next focus will be to push for a third zero on the remaining nuclear missiles as the further expression of this policy.

Pressure for negotiations toward a third zero fits into the fundamental objective of dividing NATO, because the Soviets recognize the potential of the third zero to cause strains between Germany and the United States. (Indeed, the French noted that the "second zero" on shorter-range missiles embodied in the INF Treaty has already begun to produce tensions between Germany and the rest of NATO over modernization issues.) This does not mean, of course, that the INF Treaty is not valuable. Achievements such as asymmetrical reductions and verification breakthroughs are duly noted. The real question concerns the priorities of the United States subsequent to the INF accord. Minister Raimond listed conventional and chemical arms reduction talks, along with START, as the proper focus of the U.S. and the West for the present time.

Raimond identified a second risk which the West faces in the post-INF environment, and that is to confuse nuclear and conventional negotiations. The Soviets need a large conventional force to maintain their hold over Eastern Europe, and will try to mix conventional talks with those involving Western short range nuclear systems. The West must not permit such mixing.

A third risk is to negotiate with the Soviets against the pressure of deadlines. For instance, a good agreement on START, including subceilings, verification and other matters would be acceptable if reached this year, but it appears unlikely that such an agreement could be achieved. In no event should time deadlines force the West to agree to something which is not consistent with security requirements.

FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS

On the subject of French-German relations, President Mitterrand made several important observations. First, he stated that he has revised the De Gaulle Doctrine whereby French forces should not be east of the Hamburg-Munich line to avoid getting mixed up with NATO forces. Now, instead, French forces will be anywhere that there is a threat of war or a war. President Mitterrand stated, "I . . . don't like French forces integrated into the allied command but, if we see soldiers of a neighboring country threatened, France could not face dishonor and pull its forces out—the only possible course of action is to intervene." Thus, while France will not reevaluate its decision to avoid military reintegration into NATO, primarily because it does not want to be a prisoner of the decisions of the collective Alliance, these statements on French willingness to consider French security as linked inextricably to that of its neighbors represent a significant step in France's strategic thinking.

Mitterrand recalled that, as a young deputy only three years after the end of World War II, he had participated in symposia oriented at the integration of Europe and the importance of bringing Germany back into the European community. He felt that that challenge had been won. Frenchmen today, in opinion polls, rank Germany most popular, only behind a few French-speaking countries. He praised the Franco-German brigade and its importance in historic terms, and reassured the delegation that there was no intent on the part of France to use it to weaken Germany's place in NATO.

ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY

President Mitterrand praised Gorbachev's broad-mindedness and frankness, which had been demonstrated during his extensive personal dialogues with the Soviet leader. Mitterrand observed that it is irrelevant whether Gorbachev is "sincere." That is not the question. The question is whether a politician is behaving as if he were sincere. We have to create the conditions such that what is stated by a leader actually happens, to make it to his advantage to do as he says. Mitterrand evaluated Gorbachev as the manager of a revolution, not a revolutionary; a Leninist, not a Stalinist; and of the Andropov type, not a Brezhnev or Chernenko type. He is a realist. The challenge to the West is not to do those things which are in Gorbachev's interest only, but to work on areas where his interests and the West's converge.

While confident that adroit diplomacy and careful management of the public debate could easily counter the challenges presented by Gorbachev, French officials nevertheless counseled caution in dealing with the Soviets and expressed respect for Gorbachev's public relations skills. The key is not to pursue either extreme in interpreting Gorbachev: (1) assuming that he is simply a Machiavellian manipulator, and that nothing has changed, or (2) assuming that he is a genuine reformer and that everything has changed. The West must encourage the changes being undertaken in the Soviet Union, but keep a clear eye focused on Western security interests in negotiating with the Soviet leadership.

Finally, the underlying French concern is the effect that Gorbachev's seductive style is having on the West. Western leaders must be prepared to "go against public opinion, and convince the people" of where their real interests lie.

Foreign Minister Raimond observed that Gorbachev is an astute and dangerous manipulator of Western public opinion. He reiterated the French view that the period immediately ahead would be difficult and would present a number of risks and challenges to the West, in part due to the non-confrontational style employed by Gorbachev in pursuit of traditional Soviet foreign policy objectives.

FRENCH CONSENSUS

French Defense Minister Giraud reiterated many of the same themes expressed by other officials. Indeed, there is broad agreement in France on many questions related to security and to nuclear weapons. Of specific interest were Minister Giraud's comments that, with the march of technology, there was enhanced need for greater cooperation on a wider range of technical military matters among members of the Alliance. He specifically cited both French-British and French-American cooperation, in addition to the initiatives that the French were engaged in with the Germans. In Giraud's view, all of this must be pursued under the condition that such European cooperation not weaken, or appear to weaken, NATO. The effect of the INF Treaty on European security must be coldly analyzed, from a military perspective, and Minister Giraud reiterated the priorities outlined by Foreign Minister Raimond, i.e., support the efforts on START while avoiding the trap of discussions leading to a third nuclear zero prior to settling the serious imbalances which exist with the Warsaw Pact on conventional and chemical weapons.

The delegation was impressed with the creativity and seriousness of French thinking on security issues, and feels that the observations made in discussions in France added greatly to the delegation's overall understanding. Efforts to strengthen the European Pillar of western security, in which the French role will be critical, should be encouraged. The Recommendations and Declaration of the Action Committee for Europe (See Appendix O), the significance of which was emphasized by President of the National Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas and by Francois Fillon, merit careful attention in regard to these issues.

E. TURKEY

As a NATO ally which could be subjected to missile attacks from SS–20s based in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, Turkey has a special interest in the global elimination of long-range INF missiles and, like other NATO Allies, is supportive of the INF agreement as negotiated. Turkey has not had intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union based in Turkey since the Jupiters were withdrawn in the early 1960s. Removal of the INF missiles places all of NATO once again in this category.

Turkey shares an extensive border with the Soviet Union and Soviet ships must pass through the Bosphorus as they enter and exit the Black Sea. The geographical location of Turkey affords it a key role in the defense of NATO's Southern Region, and its contribution to the conventional defense of NATO is especially important. Therefore, while Turkey generally welcomes the INF agreement, the treaty will have relatively little impact on the Turkish strategic situation. From that standpoint, the need to modernize the Turkish conventional forces and to present the Soviet Union with a credible conventional deterrent remain high priorities, virtually unaffected by the INF agreement.

The high priority accorded conventional force modernization is understandable in view of the overwhelming Soviet advantage in the force balance opposite Turkey and in view of the extreme needs faced by the Turkish forces. In this context, the fact that security assistance to Turkey has, in the past two years, amounted to approximately half of what would be required to implement fully the conventional force modernization program identified by NATO as meeting Turkey's requirements has been a disappointment to the Turks.

The Codel met with a broad range of Turkish officials during its brief visit to Ankara. Despite the short duration of the visit, a full exchange of views was held on a variety of security issues, including but not limited to the INF Treaty and its impact on NATO.

As noted above, Turkish officials were unanimous in their support for the treaty, hailing it as a big step forward for the Alliance. At the same time, as was noted in other countries visited by the Codel, the treaty also removes one component of the Alliance's flexible response strategy. This means that it will be necessary to pay continued attention to the issues of modernization of the remaining conventional and nuclear forces. In Turkey, there is strong support for modernization initiatives in NATO, and the Turkish government can be expected to participate to the limits of its ability in these common efforts.

The Codel emphasized in its discussions with Turkish officials, including Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Necip Torumtay, an appreciation of the unique geographic situation of Turkey and of the efforts of the Turkish military to maintain its capability in the face of severe resource constraints. The military and intelligence-gathering functions which Turkey performs are important contributions to overall Alliance security.

Two issues which have been the sources of some problems were discussed in this regard: the continued deadlock on Cyprus and the continued presence of Turkish troops on the island, and the fact that the Side Letters to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) which had been signed in March of 1987 had not yet been fully implemented by Turkey.

With regard to Cyprus, Turkish officials were hopeful that progress could be made in the further reduction of Turkish presence on the island and in achieving a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Citing the recent meeting in Davos, Switzerland, between Prime Minister Ozal and Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, the Codel expressed its hope that the "spirit of Davos" could be extended in dealing with the situation on Cyprus. While reiterating the Turkish government's position that the proposals of the United Nations Secretary General should be accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, Turkish officials also expressed a willingness to pursue new avenues towards an accord, especially in light of the recent elections on Cyprus and the fact that the Greek Cypriots have elected a new leader. The Codel strongly encouraged further steps in the direction of a negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem.

The Codel also urged Turkey to end the delay in ratifying the DECA side letters, noting that nearly one year had passed since their signing. The Codel argued that ratification of the side letters would be in Turkey's interest and would send a positive signal to the United States about the continued close cooperation between the two countries. Prime Minister Ozal stated that he would, in fact, ratify the two side letters in the near future, as a symbol of his desire to continue to build upon and improve the extensive military and security cooperation between the United States and Turkey. [Note: Subsequently, on February 26, 1988, the Turkish government ratified the side letters.]

Immediately following the departure of the Codel, the incident in the Black Sea involving two U.S. warships and a Soviet vessel occurred. This incident points up the strategic importance of the Turkish Straits and the continued potential for conflict in this area. It reinforces the points made by the Turkish General Staff in briefing the Codel immediately prior to its departure.

F. ITALY

The Delegation arrived in Italy in the midst of a governmental "crisis" over the budget. Prime Minister Goria had resigned, and it was not clear that he would be asked to form a new government. Of course, these "crises" occur in Italian politics with some frequency, and they do not often result in major changes of direction in the basic course of Italian policy. (During the Delegation's stay in Rome, Goria was asked to form a new government by Italian President Cossiga, but that government was also short-lived.) In addition to its own governmental dilemmas, Italy also attended the European Community Economic Summit on February 12, 1988, which, after thirty hours of extremely difficult bargaining, produced an important agreement on the future economic structure of the Community. Despite these distractions, Italian officials were generous with their time and with their insights on the issues of concern to the Delegation.

The Delegation was able to draw some preliminary observations based on its visits to four NATO capitals prior to Rome and to share those observations with Italian journalists and academic experts at a meeting on February 12, 1988. The transcript of that session is printed in Appendix L.

The Delegation emphasized to Italian officials with whom it met that Italy's contributions to the NATO Alliance were not only recognized but deeply appreciated. Italy was the first country on the continent of Europe to accept the deployments of the INF missiles, thus relieving the Federal Republic of Germany of its fears of "singularity" in deployments and paving the way for the Netherlands and Belgium to accept deployments as well. At the same time, Italy has been strongly supportive of the efforts to negotiate the zero option, and is unreserved in its support of ratification of the Treaty.

At the same time, Italian officials recognized that NATO is at a moment when new challenges must be confronted and when NATO's cohesion will be tested. Foreign Minister Andreotti, who has served in the Italian government virtually throughout the entire history of NATO, argued strongly that NATO must formulate new approaches for the new contingencies which lie ahead, emphasizing at all times the unity and cohesion of NATO.

The theme of the need to focus on NATO unity and the security of the West as a whole was a constant theme in the remarks of Italian officials. For example, while not unduly concerned about the French-German brigade and efforts at improved bilateral relations, the Italians warned that such approaches could divert NATO members from the central task, which is common security. The Western European Union or NATO should be the focus of most efforts. Creating zones of "differentiated security" in NATO must definitely be avoided.

The Delegation members shared this view, and assured Italian officials that the United States was committed to a strong NATO and a unified Alliance. Senators Byrd and Boren, in particular, praised Italy for its willingness to step up to important Alliance decisions, citing not only the INF deployments but also areas not strictly related to NATO, such as the deployments to Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and intelligence cooperation.

Widespread consensus was noted among Italian officials regarding the priorities for arms control negotiations and the next steps which NATO should take in this regard. The START talks were accorded a high priority, to be followed by talks on chemical and conventional weapons. There was little support for beginning talks on short-range nuclear forces before the other talks had achieved results.

Italian officials were optimistic about the implications of the INF Treaty for future arms control negotiations, an attitude which in some ways paralleled the German views. They were pleased at the opinion expressed by members of the Delegation that the INF Treaty was likely to receive a favorable vote in the Senate. They regard the principles of asymmetrical reductions and *reductions* rather than *ceilings* as important milestones in the history of arms control, achievements which, in the words of Foreign Minister Andreotti, constitute a great landmark. The hope was widely shared that these principles could be applied in conventional forces talks as well.

The Italian officials also took a pragmatic approach to the question of nuclear modernization. Rather than press for any public or immediate decision at the present time, they counseled that modernization decisions should be taken when required and pursued in a businesslike fashion. There is no need, according to this line of thinking, for there to be a public crisis in the Alliance over these issues.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The delegation encountered a widespread consensus in the capitals visited on the essential course of Alliance policy. The need for continued unity and close cooperation was recognized and was evident in virtually every meeting with key officials. The delegation found general agreement on: (1) the need to explain effectively and persuasively to Western publics the goals and purposes of the Alliance, in order to maintain a unified front in the face of new and aggressive propaganda challenges from the Soviet Union; (2) the need to develop an agreed set of priorities and to take the initiative in dealing with Gorbachev and the new style of Soviet leadership; and (3) the need to increase cooperation and consultation, using the model of the INF Treaty as a good example for future efforts. At the same time, there was general recognition that the Alliance will confront new challenges in the coming years, and that difficult choices lie ahead.

a. FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST

The delegation was impressed with the sensitivity of NATO leaders to the need to inform and educate our respective constituencies in a comprehensive and persuasive fashion on the Alliance's priorities and strategies. It was felt that the efforts of the delegation in this regard would have a beneficial effect on public opinion in Europe.

Although it is too early to ascertain fully the impact of the new style of Gorbachev's diplomacy on public opinion in Europe, NATO leaders agree that this new style presents the West with a vigorous challenge. In the words of a French official:

> We are entering a difficult period. Western public opinion is susceptible to Gorbachev's charm and cleverness. We should not be afraid of going against public opinion. We must explain to the generally uninformed public where its interests lie.

A German official echoed this thought:

> The present East-West discussions are narrowed down to the issues of disarmament which, though important, are only part of the spectrum. We will deviate from the right course if we don't have a cool head about it. We should make good use of the time available, so we should make a common conception for the West; we should stabilize and strengthen NATO whenever possible.

Regarding Mr. Gorbachev, another German official commented:

> We should talk to him and base our readiness on the principles of concessions and counter-concessions, and not act like maniacs. Our policies must be right and we have to explain them to our people. We should make good use of the present year to launch a psychological offensive vis-a-vis the Gorbachev regime on the conventional side.

The delegation strongly believes that NATO's efforts in the field of public explanation and persuasion must be coordinated fully and pursued in conjunction with new initiatives in the fields of arms control and weapons modernization. The effort at public education and explanation particularly as it relates to the continued importance of nuclear deterrence should be afforded a high priority, and should be fully and carefully discussed at NATO's regular meetings.

b. RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY

On the narrow question of ratification of the INF Treaty, opinion was virtually unanimous that it should be approved by the Senate for ratification, and that failure of the United States to ratify could create a grave crisis in Western Europe and NATO. This view, shared broadly across the political spectrum and in virtually every country, prevailed despite a recognition that the Treaty creates new uncertainties and does not resolve many fundamental issues facing NATO.

Opinions varied on the handling of the negotiations by the United States and the adequacy of consultations with the Allies, but the overall assessment was that consultations between the United States and European leaders has been excellent. Potential criticisms of details of the treaty or of aspects of the inspection system were outweighed by the generally favorable view of the Treaty.

The final assessment was that, having persuaded public opinion to accept the deployment of nuclear systems in part as a response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20's, and having pursued the objective of elimination of those missiles in negotiations for over six years, it would be virtually impossible to convince the public that, at this point, those systems should remain in place and that the Treaty should be rejected.

Leaders also expressed some concern over the political momentum generated by the INF Treaty. In line with the concerns that the Alliance's objectives and policies be clearly communicated to the public, leaders left that the underlying security interests of the Alliance must be clearly articulated, and not lost sight of in the enthusiasm for negotiated arms reductions. In this regard, there was a clear consensus that arms control agreements, including a START agreement, should be concluded when issues in dispute have been satisfactorily negotiated, and should not be negotiated under the pressure of artificial deadlines. Likewise, when and if a *sound* agreement is in sight, there should be no delay in concluding it, since to do so is in our common interest. But the important thing is that it be a *good* agreement—not dictated by calendar deadlines or election year politics.

C. MODERNIZATION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS

The modernization issues which the Alliance faces have been under examination since the 1979 INF decision and have been intensively investigated since the Montebello meeting. The Montebello framework of reductions in total numbers of deployed weapons accompanied by modernization of those weapons remaining, continues to be operative. Specific choices concerning which systems to modernize and their precise numbers are not required at the present time. The military authorities of NATO are examining the required modernizations and will make their recommendations at the appropriate time.

There is no need to link modernization of short-range nuclear systems with the INF Treaty. The delegation believes that it will be necessary to modernize certain systems not prohibited by the Treaty, but these decisions are some months in the future and should not be at the center of our discussions of the Treaty at this time.

The delegation believes, based on its discussions throughout Europe, that those systems not covered by the INF Treaty which have longer ranges should receive priority consideration for modernization.

d. ARMS CONTROL PRIORITIES AND INITIATIVES WITHIN NATO

NATO leaders must proceed carefully and resolutely in setting priorities for arms control initiatives in the Alliance. It cannot be overemphasized how important it will be for NATO to coordinate its positions in such a way that fears of "singularization" (in, for example, the Federal Republic), or zones of "differentiated security" (in countries not in the Central Region) do not become serious problems for the Alliance.

The top priority for NATO at the present time should be to formulate a comprehensive and detailed proposal on conventional arms reductions for presentation to the Warsaw Pact later this year. A consensus must be built in the Alliance, and the task will be formidable. But the attempt must be made. The delegation believes that Europe would welcome thoughtful, vigorous American leadership on these issues.

The delegation also believes that negotiations on a chemical weapons ban must be pursued with renewed energy. The delegation was impressed by the seriousness with which the European Allies view the threats posed by the existing imbalances in chemical weapons favoring the Warsaw Pact, and agrees that this problem demands careful and thorough attention by the Alliance.

The delegation also believes that negotiations on further tactical nuclear weapons arms control should not be entered into until negotiations on conventional and chemical arms have shown results.

Progress toward a START agreement is broadly supported but, as was pointed out on several occasions, the issue of START is less immediately relevant to European security than are other arms control issues. European leaders would welcome a solid START agreement, but there is no urgent pressure emanating from Europe to reach one. Appropriate subceilings (an issue which could affect the British strategic forces) and verification procedures which are satisfactory are, of course, strongly supported.

e. BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

The general assessment in the Alliance is that bilateral arrangements such as those between France and Germany concerning the joint brigade are positive developments. This arrangement could help to place longstanding historical frictions in Europe further behind us. Such arrangements can complement rather than compete with NATO if pursued properly. A widespread consensus exists that military organizations competing with NATO are not helpful.

At the same time, efforts to strengthen the European Pillar of Western defense are being reinvigorated at the present time, and this must be viewed as a positive development. The delegation feels that mechanisms which could strengthen and enhance the Allied contributions to European defense must be encouraged wherever possible.

f. UNITED STATES POLICIES IN THE PRESENT PERIOD

In the months ahead, the United States must act with purpose and strength in facing the next round of challenges. The INF Treaty is a victory for Alliance solidarity, but it represents the beginning rather than the end of the effort to achieve lasting stability in Europe through negotiated arms reduction agreements.

In addition to the recommendations outlined above, the delegation feels that it would not be prudent at the present time to reassess the size of the American troop commitment in Europe.

The advent of talks on conventional forces and the post-INF political environment are likely to draw increased attention to the importance of the Southern Region in NATO's collective defense. Italy and Turkey, along with the other NATO members in the Southern Region, play a vital role in Alliance defense. Too ofen, their contributions have been underappreciated. The delegation welcomes the far-sighted action of the government of Turkey in ratifying the side letters to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement and the actions of Spain in renewing the basing arrangements in that country (while noting the regrettable decision to require removal of the F–16s from Torrejon.) It urges the administration to pursue vigorously the current negotiations with Greece on renewing the basing agreement with that country. Similarly, the delegation believes that the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing should remain deployed in Europe, and welcomes the Italian government's willingness to consider basing options. NATO should strive to achieve a cooperative solution to this matter as soon as possible.

APPENDIX A

REMARKS OF
U.S. SENATE MAJORITY LEADER
ROBERT C. BYRD (D-WVA)

FEBRUARY 7, 1988

WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE
MUNICH, GERMANY

Distinguished participants, 1988 promises to bring about a massive shift in the way most of the free world sizes up its own security. The sudden emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev -- and the prospect for sweeping reform in the Soviet Union -- has provoked great hopes, even among the most skeptical. With remarkable force and openness he has come more than halfway in the pursuit of arms reduction at a time when the Reagan presidency -- and his chief adversary -- is coming to a close.

The signing of the INF treaty last December has opened the door to new optimism -- new uncertainties -- and new risk. For NATO, the treaty is both a tribute and a test -- an invitation to fashion a stronger alliance among ourselves -- and a more pragamatic strategy toward the Soviets.

I come today to give an accounting of the ratification prospects in the United States Senate -- but more, to raise some crucial questions about the security of Europe and the United States beyond the INF agreement.

Given the nature of politics in America -- particularly in an election year -- the messages coming out of Washington are at times misleading. With the White House controlled by one party, and the Senate by another, the conventional wisdom is that the prospects for agreement on even the simplist issue is remote. But the truth is that, in the end, we manage to agree more often than not -- a fact explained less by goodwill than by the nature of our institutions.

In the case of treaties, the document bears the mark of the President and his diplomats. It falls to the Senate to scrutinize the document from the perspective of a nation divided by region and ideology.

By historic construction, the Congress is the people's forum and, in the end, the stabilizing force.

The INF treaty has been presented with a sense of urgency and promise. Given the tense and volatile relations between America and the Soviet Union since the War, it is hardly surprising to hear the echos of old fears and suspicions rise from the Senate debate. Both countries have been looking at each other down the same gun sight for too long to expect unanimous ratification. For all the attendant flourish, the final vote will belie our entrenched skepticism toward the Soviets.

Much of our apprehension can be laid to Mr. Gorbachev's stunning achievement in eclipsing his predecessors -- both in style and message. At times he seems to have almost mesmerized Western publics with the prospect of detente with his adversaries abroad and the trappings of glasnost at home. Compared with the heavy-handed leaders that have gone before, he cuts a dashing new figure -- even by the high art of image making in the West. American polls are now recording a trust toward this Russian leader where none existed before. Yet even those of us who have traditionally given our support to arms reduction pacts are still nagged by questions that must certainly move to the center of Senate debate.

Where is the evidence that a half-century of Soviet pursuit of dominance and control has been bridled? Who is to risk deterrence on the professed goodwill of a man only (three) years into power? What gives us to believe that he will have the economic endurance, or the political backing to turn glasnost into prosperity and stability? Glasnost should not be confused with freedom of the press or freedom of speech by Western standards.

We all understand the axiom that less distraction and tension from its traditional adversaries will allow the Soviets to reallocate revenues and attention from the military to domestic affairs. And that that, in turn, will further ease tensions with the West. Yet, if Soviet and Russian history is any guide, we cannot take much comfort that a leader with an ambitious reform agenda will also promote foreign policies that favor us as well. Nikita Khruschev was the last Soviet reformer of our time. But while he pressed for destalinization at home, he took the game of international brinkmanship to new limits -- at the Berlin Wall and Cuba's missile silos.

For now the implications for the West are very unclear should his domestic reforms work; and they are just as unclear if they do not. If they do, will Mr. Gorbachev's new power be turned to peaceful competition -- or a redoubling of the old policies of confrontation? If they do not -- and his mandate is narrowed -- will he be able to continue the bold initiatives toward the West that have so far defined his tenure?

These are the dark unknowns and the challenges that we in the United States and you in Europe must confront in the months ahead. Because it is our response that will be the measure of our common trust and our common bond for years to come. Let caution be the watchword.

Like it or not, we live in an age of instant perception -- as changeable and as powerful as the wind. He who masters the game of images -- the ability to turn 30 seconds of television into a global metaphor -- becomes a force of enormous magnitude. The very act of suddenly halting his heavily guarded motorcade to greet a crowd of Washington bystanders was a more lasting image than the actual signing of the treaty. It was Mr. Gorbachev at his theatrical best, playing to a post-war generation raised on the dream of detente -- a generation with no memory of a Berlin blockade or Soviet tanks in Hungary. No banging a shoe in anger at the United Nations. No clicking glasses with bearded revolutionaries. Merely the appearance of open friendship.

Mr. Gorbachev's mastery of style has no more brillant example than his seductive handling of the occupation of Afghanistan. History is pretty clear on the subject. The Soviet army invaded and carried on a scorched earth war against a nation with little more than courage to defend itself. After a decade, the Afghan people have refused to collapse. With public opinion mounting, casualty lists, and finances running against further engagement, Mr. Gorbachev is looking for a graceful way out. His hope is to make the Soviet withdrawal appear to be an act of generosity -- rather than a surrender. He will use the withdrawal to advance Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East. We should no more reward the Soviets for having failed to devour Afghanistan than NATO should thank Moscow for pulling back from your borders an excessive show of nuclear force aimed at intimidation.

While new style and the new substance are a welcome change from the brooding inflexibility that has marked Soviet foreign policy, in reality, they are in large measure due to the courage and the cohesion of the West. Without cocking our guns, we made the point that democracy's frontiers are worth defending. We proved that, together, we are the match for any aggressor -- that we are the only real foil to Soviet expansionism.

Witness the fact that the Soviets gave up far more to get a treaty than we did -- including on-site verification and dropping the linkage to SDI.

Their compromise does not mean that the treaty is not in the Soviet's interest, and will not be used to advantage in other maneuverings with the West. But neither does it mean that we cannot seize opportunities to test the Soviet willingness to compromise on conventional forces and further arms control.

In the end, it would be ironic, indeed, if we allow our brief victory to conclude that our adversary has abandoned its historic goals on the world scene. Rather, our course should be one of new initiative to constantly test the confidence and the willingness of the new Soviet leaders to expand the pace and the radius of peaceful coexistence.

As leaders, we must change the perception held by too many of our own peoples that Mikhail Gorbachev has pulled the West to the nuclear negotiating table. He may have won the battle of the briefing books during the long months of negotiations. He may have won the competition for headlines during his visit to Washington. But we must not let him walk away from the INF table with nothing more than a signature and a promise. Nor must we let the Soviets quit Afghanistan with a shred of honor or reward.

We cannot effectively deal with the Soviets until our people are convinced that the Western alliance must be united, strong willed and well-armed. We must sharpen the sense of need for continued deterrence in Europe. And we must test the Soviets with ever tougher initiatives for peace -- real peace, not the image of peace.

For doubters and supporters alike, the central questions in the Senate debate will not be so much the terms of the treaty -- but rather, the direction of NATO, the proper depth of our combined deterrence and, our ability above all and our will to sustain the doctrine of flexible response toward the Soviets.

These are both the questions and the challenges. If we cannot take our own measure, and give a response supported by our own peoples -- then the INF treaty will become less a breakthrough to a peaceful world than a footnote to a dangerous illusion of security.

Strategists speculate whether the West can keep our combined level of deterrence credible in the face of Soviet claims that NATO modernization circumvents the INF treaty and jeopardizes future arms agreements. They wonder whether we can sustain the political will necessary to keep the Alliance countries truely secure -- or whether we will be distracted by Soviet charges of "foul" as they continue to improve their own offensive capabilities.

I speak for the vast majority in the United States when I underscore our commitment to a strong European alliance -- in arms and men, as well as in words. It is never easy to convince people to pay the high costs for their national security -- to hedge against uncertainty in the future. But we have done it in the past, and we will do it in the future. Because America well understands that Europe is more than yesterday's home for so many of our people -- its security is our security as well -- and worth paying a great price to maintain.

I was born at a time when Woodrow Wilson proclaimed World War I the "war to end all wars." And I was a young man when Franklin Roosevelt galvanized a nation with his call to arms. A generation has come of age since America and Europe last fought side by side. That that generation has been spared the trauma of war is a credit to the trust and strength we have given on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the coming months, we have a number of opportunities to declare our unity of purpose -- not just to the Soviets, but to our own public.

Our defense ministers should vote to move ahead with the Montebello decisions during their NATO meeting in April. I would certainly support whatever funding is necessary in the American budget cycle this spring to move ahead the Montebello program without delay.

A strong Western agreement to keep American troops at their present strength would counter any Soviet disinformation campaign aimed at forcing fissure into NATO on the grounds that America is not a reliable ally. America has stood the test before and will not waiver in the future.

I welcome France's proposals for bilateral initiatives, so long as they remain within the NATO context, and are a means to strengthen the alliance -- not fragment it.

We should renew our support for joint maneuvers, combined brigades, the stationing of alliance troops across each other's borders, and the modernization of our conventional and tactical nuclear forces. Guns are useless without ammunition. Such cooperative measures serve the cause of military preparedness and visibly make the case that deterrence in this era is not a unilateral or obsolete issue.

The French and British nuclear arsenals should be kept separate from arms control talks between the U.S. and the Soviets.

Pragmatism underscores the truth that we have no satisfactory substitute for nuclear deterrence in the pursuit of peace, not the peace that comes with bondage -- which needs no deterrence -- but peace with freedom which does. As much as we all dream, we know we are still far from a time when the world is in perfect balance. We must still depend on the production and deployment of nuclear systems to remind would-be agressors that aggression, even by conventional means, will be answered with nuclear force.

But the most immediate challenge for the NATO Alliance is to take the initiative on conventional forces negotiations by presenting a full fledged reduction and constraints proposal to the Soviets this year. No matter how sincere may be the Soviets call for total nuclear disarmament, there remains the dark truth that their offense rests less on the bomb than on the foot soldier.

If peace ultimately rests on balance, then we must address the existing assymmetry on all fronts. The Soviets agreed to eliminate more of their medium range missiles, because they had more than we. So there is no reason why we should not ask that they respond with commensurate real reductions in the conventional threat. No other agreement would so bolster NATO's security interests. For many in the United States Senate and the tens of millions of Americans we represent, it is the natural preface to any agreement on long-range missile reduction.

The truth, however, is that we can mount no strong proposal on conventional arms without the support of our own peoples. Perhaps the most difficult task for Western leaders in the months ahead is to deflect the Soviet's attempt to play to our natural fear of nuclear arms, particularly among our youth. The entire West must come to understand that neither the denuclearization of Europe nor total nuclear disarmament will remove the threat of Soviet expansion -- but would, instead, increase it.

In the end, the fulcrum for peace is credibility. We must redeclare ourselves an Alliance -- not just in name, but in force. The Soviets must be convinced of our public support, the depth and flexibility of our armed response -- and our staying power. All of this is within our reach. If we do not grasp the moment, we risk failing the cause of our common security.

APPENDIX B

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Senator Sam Nunn
Speech to the Wehrkunde Conference
February 7, 1988

The American/Soviet Disarmament Negotiations And Their Consequences For NATO

I am honored to be invited to speak on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Wehrkunde. This distinguished audience is a testament to the prestige this conference has achieved over these many years under Ewald von Kleist's leadership. Our friend Ben Schemmer has written that people would *kill* to get invited to Wehrkunde. Once the audience is selected, however, the killing is over and the focus of Wehrkunde turns to ideas and dialogue to ensure that the horrors of war are never repeated.

One of the reasons Wehrkunde has become so successful is its tradition of encouraging high-level American participation. Wehrkunde underscores the point that NATO is indeed a *trans-Atlantic* alliance that works best when the United States and its allies are talking *to* each other, calmly and candidly.

Much of the credit for what has become the annual American pilgrimmage to Wehrkunde must be given to my good friends John Tower and Bill Cohen. John is here for the 23rd time. John has certainly put the Wehrkunde conference on the map in Washington. Bill Cohen took up the baton from John Tower after John left the Senate in 1985 and is here for the 10th time. Bill called me six times last week telling me my paper was late so I can assure you that he takes his leadership responsibilities very seriously.

The topic of this year's conference is "The American/Soviet Disarmament Negotiations and Their Consequences For NATO." This title appropriately describes the INF Treaty now pending in the Senate; first, because INF was a bilateral American/Soviet negotiation; and second, because the treaty for better or worse constitutes disarmament in the classic sense, that is, the complete elimination of entire classes of weaponry.

From one perspective, the INF Treaty represents the successful culmination of a long and arduous journey. The treaty is a triumph of Alliance cohesion and determination in which the NATO Alliance can justifiably take pride. It is a tribute to the Governments in the basing countries which displayed such resolve and courage in implementing the deployments in the face of widespread domestic opposition and skillful Soviet propaganda. The treaty also reflects the fruits of continuity in the United States between two successive administrations -- one Democratic, the other Republican -- which, with bipartisan support in Congress, stood steadfastly behind NATO's "dual track" approach. Finally, special credit must be given to our able negotiators, including Ambassadors Nitze, Kampelman and Glitman, who are with us today.

There are several positive features in this agreement. The 4:1 asymmetry in Soviet reductions versus U.S. reductions sets a useful precedent for disproportionate cuts in the upcoming Conventional Stability Talks. The agreement also breaks new ground in intrusive on-site inspections and cooperative measures for enhancing national technical means of verification.

While the Treaty codifies important achievements, we must view the agreement through a wider lens. To assess the full implications of the INF Treaty for NATO security, we must consider the broad strategic framework within which it will be implemented.

I believe that what Chancellor Schmidt said about SALT II in his famous IISS speech a decade ago applies equally today with regard to INF:

> The more we stabilize strategic nuclear parity between East and West ... the greater will be the necessity to achieve a conventional equilibrium as well.

When Chancellor Schmidt made that speech, the Soviet Union was only beginning to deploy the SS-20, and NATO of course had no Pershing II or Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. If the INF Treaty is fully implemented, we will return to that same zero/zero situation in terms of these specific systems. However, as Phil Karber has pointed out, we must consider what the Soviets have added in conventional and battlefield nuclear power in Central Europe during the last ten years.

- The Soviets have added more than 1000 artillery tubes, 900 tanks and 1500 armored personnel carriers;
- They have doubled the number of dual capable aircraft and doubled their range payload;
- They have gone from zero to over 1000 in nuclear-capable artillery.

Moreover, the net increase during this period in Warsaw Pact conventional weapons systems in the Central Region exceeds the total inventory of such systems in the five and a third divisions in Seventh U.S. Army today. Overall, the Warsaw Pact/NATO conventional firepower advantage has grown from 1.8-to-1 ten years ago to 2.2-to-1 today, an increase of almost 25%.

Viewed from this perspective, the INF Treaty must be regarded not as an ending, but rather a beginning. Deterring war and preserving freedom is not like building a dam. It is not something that stays put once you do it. -- What then are the consequences of the INF Treaty for NATO?

I am reminded of the story of the man who held a small bird behind his back with his fingers gripped tightly around the bird's neck. As the man prepared to squeeze the life out of the bird, he turned to a young boy and asked - Son, tell me, is the bird alive or dead? The boy, with considerable wisdom, replied - Sir, it's in your hands.

Whether history judges the INF Treaty to have made a positive or a negative contribution to the defense of Europe will depend ultimately on which road the Alliance chooses to travel at this critical juncture. One NATO road leads backwards down a slippery slope to European denuclearization, American disengagement, and Soviet domination. The other NATO road leads forward to the solid ground of solidarity, stability, and security. To paraphrase the young boy, the choice is ours. It's in our hands.

"Slippery Slope Road" Is Marked With Several Warning Signals

First warning signal: a growing nuclear allergy in the West. The rejection by many of our citizens of the basic principle of nuclear deterrence is the product not only of NATO's failure to educate our publics concerning the realities of the Alliance's declared strategy but also of considerable reckless rhetoric as to the alleged immorality of this doctrine.

Here in the Federal Republic, there is of course a special sensitivity to the nature of the nuclear weapons which will remain after INF is fully implemented. Many Germans have voiced their sharp disagreement with NATO's decision to postpone indefinitely any new negotiations on nuclear systems with ranges below 500 kilometers and openly question the need to go forward with the Montebello Decision on modernization.

As one who has long questioned the practicality of many of our short-range nuclear systems, I understand the salience of this issue here in West Germany. In an ideal world, NATO would have begun with negotiations on conventional armaments, chemical weapons, and battlefield nuclear systems, then moved on to intermediate-range and strategic nuclear negotiations only after an equilibrium had been established at these levels.

As we all know, however, this is not an ideal world, and we must speak in terms of reality. It is the awesome presence of nuclear weapons that underpins NATO's deterrence today, as it has since the dawn of the atomic age.

I believe that the modernization of our remaining battlefield and theater nuclear forces is a necessity. However, we must resist the temptation to use the INF Treaty as the pretext for reviving proposals for nuclear systems which could not pass muster before. We must not forget that every conventional platform and delivery system which is now given a nuclear role effectively removes one more weapon from NATO's conventional order of battle.

Tactical nuclear weapons serve valid deterrent functions. But as we conduct needed modernization in these forces, we must not give the impression that a "nuclear fix" is the answer to all of NATO's deterrent woes. Let me emphasize this point - our goal is to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, not to lower it.

Second warning sign on "Slippery Slope Road": changed public attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union. A poll last year suggested that while 55% of the German public thought the Soviet Union was a threat five years ago, only 24% think so today. Another poll shows that by an overwhelming margin, most Europeans think that the Soviet Union, and not the United States, deserves the credit for recent progress in arms control. Still other polls portray a growing skepticism in Europe of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to NATO. Fortunately, we as politicians realize that polls can quickly change.

When the United States puts new nuclear weapons into Europe, many Europeans fear that our intention is to confine a nuclear war to European soil and thereby decrease the likelihood that our central strategic forces would ever be employed. When the United States takes nuclear weapons out of Europe, many Europeans fear that our intention is to avoid a U.S. nuclear response to Soviet aggression and thereby decrease the likelihood that our central strategic forces would ever be employed. Some pundits have suggested that whether we are putting nuclear weapons in or taking them out, European ministries should save money by simply installing tape recordings that say, "the Americans are decoupling!" .

Over the years, European apprehension over American nuclear intentions has provided a growth industry for psychiatrists. But for every psychiatrist employed in Europe, there is another hard at work in America analyzing our apprehension over European commitment to the conventional component of flexible response. Occasionally, both groups of psychiatrists are dealing with the same problem, such as the state of shock many of us were in after the Reykjavik Summit.

While conceding that Reykjavik justified at least a few sessions on the psychiatrist's couch, I would counsel that our European friends should try to be a bit more reassured about U.S. willingness to shoulder nuclear responsibilies. To those who remain skeptical, I would point to Article XI of the INF Treaty, which provides for the establishment of a U.S. inspection camp right outside the gate of the Votkinsk mobile missile final assembly facility in the middle of the Soviet Union. The point of this inspection, I would remind my European friends, is to ensure that any missiles coming out of that gate are not SS-20s capable of hitting Paris, Bonn or London, but rather SS-25s capable of hitting New York or Washington.

My point is this: the United States is committed to the defense of Europe. As President Reagan said in 1981, "Europe's shores are our shores; Europe's borders are our borders." In the era of Gorbachev, NATO cannot afford public confusion and mistrust over this fundamental premise. It is not enough for NATO to be sure of our policies and our goals. We must be sure of ourselves.

Third warning sign on "Slippery Slope Road": U.S. and European fiscal and budget realities. Our failure to get our fiscal houses in order means that NATO will have to improve its defense capabilities without increasing the amount of money available for this purpose. It is possible that misplaced euphoria in the wake of INF could further erode public support for essential force improvements in Europe.

If the U.S. Congress perceives that the allies are going backward, rather than forward, in correcting glaring conventional deficiencies (what I have termed "automatic escalators") then the debate over U.S. troop levels in Europe will be revived. In the final analysis, the future of this issue depends on the perception that we are all equally committed to a credible conventional defense in accordance with NATO's flexible response strategy. That was the measuring stick when I introduced what in Europe is known as the "Bad Nunn Amendment of 1984." It remains the measuring stick today.

There can be more than one kind of slippery slope. There is a slippery slope that leads to denuclearization. There is another slippery slope that leads to a disillusioned America because of the absence of long-overdue improvements in NATO's conventional defense capabilities. The challenge is to avoid both slippery slopes and seek firm, level ground.

Fourth warning sign on "Slippery Slope Road": NATO's reluctance to think boldly in the area of conventional arms control. For too long, we have placed the highest priority in arms control on strategic forces -- where the balance is in rough parity -- while allowing ourselves to be content with a sterile, and increasingly irrelevant arms control approach with respect to conventional forces. One of the ironies in conventional arms control is that it was the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe -- and not the West -- that took the initiative in making far-reaching proposals, even though they enjoy a decided military advantage in this area. There are some recent indications that various allied positions on the new Conventional Stability Talks have begun to converge. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Alliance is capable of uniting behind a bold and innovative proposal.

Fifth warning sign on "Slippery Slope Road": a continuing failure of political will in getting the most out of our collective defense resources. One of the more frustrating realities of our Alliance is that even though NATO spends more on defense than does the Warsaw Pact, the Pact consistently produces more military hardware than NATO. In Tom Callaghan's phrase, the Alliance is headed down a path toward structural disarmament; that is, ever-higher-cost weapons leading to ever-smaller purchases of those weapons.

This problem has been compounded by our inability to translate innovative technological advantages to the conventional battlefield. As one cynic observed, if we can confine the next war to a laboratory, NATO will win.

The Road To Solid Ground is Clearly Marked

We are perhaps fortunate that the warning signs on the slippery slope road are so unmistakable. If we view these warnings as trends that need to be reversed rather than as milestones on a one-way road to our ultimate demise, NATO can persevere. There is another road NATO can and must follow: a road that leads to a strengthened deterrent and an improvement in our ability to safeguard freedom and preserve peace, a road that will ensure that the INF Treaty reinforces rather than weakens Western security.

I believe that the roadmap to firm, level ground requires a "three track" approach:

(1) revolutionary conventional force improvements;

(2) bold and innovative conventional arms control proposals;

(3) vigorous public education, including clear explanations of our military needs and our arms control rationale.

Track One: Improvements in Conventional Defense Capabilities

NATO's goal must be to reverse General Bernard Rogers' well known admonition that in the event of Soviet attack, NATO would have to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in a matter of "days, not weeks or months." I believe NATO should be able to defend conventionally for "weeks, not days."

There are a number of steps NATO must take if it is to get on the road toward achieving this goal. First, we must eliminate the automatic escalators - that is, the critical deficiencies in NATO's conventional warfighting posture which could force an early choice between surrender or escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. Among the most glaring deficiencies are our allies' low rate of sustainability in ammunition stockpiles and the inadequate number of shelters and refuel/reload capabilities for U.S. aircraft which would deploy to Europe in a crisis. Some, but not enough, progress is being made in this regard. Second, we must continue to pursue the Balanced Technology Initiative, which seeks ways to exploit the West's advantage in technology to render Soviet tank armies obsolete. Third, we must expand existing programs of Co-operative Research and Development. These programs, together with side-by-side testing of U.S. and allied weapons, can be a turning point in reversing the trend toward structural disarmament and in redressing the conventional imbalance.

Ambassador Abshire has recently outlined a number of other no cost or low cost steps for improving NATO's conventional defenses, including:

- A high-level NATO/Warsaw Pact net assessment to pinpoint specific conventional vulnerabilities;
- A thorough review of NATO's crisis management capability;
- A study of ways to correct NATO's vulnerability in the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) sector;
- New trade-offs with the allies; for example, the provision by the United States of less-preferred ammunition in return for consolidation of our allies' national logistics infrastructures and additional European efforts toward defensive terrain preparation;
- A renewed effort on armaments cooperation; and
- A mandate for longer-range discussions involving governments and industry for better use of defense resources.

These and other proposals for getting the Alliance — in Phil Karber's words — to "think smarter, not richer" deserve careful consideration.

Track Two: Bold and Innovative Conventional Arms Control Proposals

In formulating our proposal for the Conventional Stability Talks, we must recognize that the root of military instability in Europe lies not in the Warsaw Pact's modest numerical advantage in troops in the Guidelines Area. It lies in the Pact's capability for a potentially decisive short-warning attack against NATO. Our aim in conventional arms control ought to be identical to the aim of the Balanced Technology Initiative: to effectively deny to Soviet ground forces forward-deployed in Eastern Europe their ability to threaten NATO with a short-warning offensive capability. This necessarily entails reductions in Soviet tanks, artillery tubes, maneuver battalions, and the like, not just manpower.

I believe the goal of a stable, non-threatening conventional balance would be promoted by the negotiated withdrawal of about half of the U.S. and Soviet ground forces in the NATO Guidelines Areas or by reductions by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to common ceilings. Under either approach, we should be guided by the following objectives:

- withdrawal as complete combat units, including the appropriate slice of helicopter aviation assets;

- withdrawal of forces to beyond the "Atlantic to the Urals" region;

- withdrawal of equipment to distances that would equalize reinforcement times; and

- establishment of an intrusive verification regime to insure that those withdrawn units remain withdrawn, and to provide reliable early warning of Soviet mobilization of its ground forces.

Let me elaborate on each of these points.

Objective One: withdrawal of combat units. Verification is greatly simplified by the withdrawal of entire, discrete combat units -- divisions, regiments and battalions. Merely reducing, say, the number of tanks on each side to some common ceiling imposes much more difficult verification problems. The same applies to manpower ceilings -- as we painfully learned in MBFR.

Objective Two: units should be withdrawn from designated garrisons and reassigned to designated new locations in the rear areas. Withdrawal by units then enables one to monitor both the known site from which the unit was removed and the known site to which they have been relocated. If tanks and artillery pieces are simply withdrawn from front-line troops as part of an equipment reduction plan, and that equipment is simply scattered back into the Soviet Union, the likelihood of detecting a slow but steady drifting back of those weapons is remote.

Objective Three: units should be withdrawn to far enough distances that their return would be a difficult and time-consuming process. The objective of conventional arms reductions must be to achieve a stable balance at the inter-German border areas. Thus, potential reinforcements need to be based far enough away to insure the early detection by either alliance of a mobilization decision by the other side. With U.S. troops returned to CONUS, even if their equipment remains prepositioned somewhere in Europe, we are looking at 10 days to two weeks for their return -- at best. Thus we need to be sure that if withdrawn Soviet forces are not demobilized, they are at least relocated far to the east of the current Western Military Districts. Otherwise we may negotiate asymmetric force reductions that reduce the security of the Alliance.

Objective Four: open monitoring and challenge inspections. Clearly, if we must verify that units withdrawn to remote locations have not been returned either wholly or piecemeal, roving inspector teams, designed along the lines of our current Military Liaison Mission, and challenge inspections, designed along Stockholm (CDE) lines, must both be employed. Those inspectors must have much less restricted, routine access to forward garrison areas to perform equipment counts, and much better challenge access to potential hiding places, such as large warehouses.

These steps should, in my opinion, be complemented by far-reaching Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) to increase the transparency of the Warsaw Pact's military posture, increase the amount of warning available to NATO prior to a Soviet attack, and reduce the possibility of an inadvertent war should both sides decide to mobilize in a crisis. NATO's objective in the so-called CDE II negotiations should be to buy time for allied leaders to decide to react and to accomplish that reaction. To achieve these objectives, NATO needs to know about Soviet operational movements in peacetime and about Soviet operational readiness.

A word of caution is in order: Confidence and Security-Building Measures are not a panacea. Unless coupled with measures to shorten NATO's reaction to warning time, its mobilization time, and its reinforcement time, improved warning time is of marginal value. The well-established rule that the defense should prevail even if the attack-to-defense ratio is about 3:1 only works if the defending side detects the attacker's preparations, makes the correct decisions, gets its units to their correct wartime locations and digs in.

In formulating our position for CDE II, NATO should not be limited either in its imagination or its boldness. If the Soviet Union is prepared under the terms of the INF Treaty to allow Americans at Votkinsk and to open its SS-25 garages to overhead U.S. reconnaissance six times a year, then we should not shirk from proposing innovative schemes for on-site access to militarily significant nodes in the Warsaw Pact's mobilization infrastructure. These could include airfields, railroad yards or even headquarters.

The objective of efforts both on the arms control track and the force improvement track ought to be a stable, non-threatening balance of conventional forces in Europe. As in the case of the INF dual track, we should view each of these undertakings not as a mutually exclusive endeavor, but rather as parallel and mutually reinforcing tracks toward the same destination.

Track Three: Public Education

The first two tracks, taken together, are crucial to the structuring of the Alliance's response to Soviet invitations, offers, and propaganda. They also form the framework for my third track, a major public education program. We cannot generate the needed public support for a sensible approach to redressing the imbalance without a much better public understanding of these issues. We, the attendees at this Conference, have crucial roles to play in that public education process — we must all become more active and outspoken about the opportunities and the challenges facing the Alliance, about why we must do some things and must not do others.

Conclusion

Moving away from the slippery slope road and following the roadmap to solid ground will not be easy or quick. It will require alliance solidarity, public education, and bipartisan commitment throughout the alliance. But this is a road which must be followed.

Force improvements, conventional arms control, and public education must each be on the agenda for the forthcoming NATO Summit. In addition, the Heads of State should consider other essential elements of a coherent conceptual framework for ensuring allied security into the next century. The NATO Summit should be the occasion for a solemn reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to the Alliance in both its nuclear and conventional components. It should also be the occasion for a solemn reaffirmation on the part of our allies to take conventional defense seriously and to share equitably the burden of collective defense.

NATO has kept the peace for forty years because we have had leaders of vision. The Allied Heads of State who will gather at the Summit this spring will be judged against this high standard. While our values and our goals are constant, our challenges are new and we must think anew. The future of NATO is in our hands.

APPENDIX C

February 8, 1988

International Herald Tribune
Published With The New York Times and The Washington Post

U.S. Warns of Troop Pullout If Bonn Bars Nuclear Arms

By ~~Joseph Fitchett~~
~~International Herald Tribune~~

~~MUNICH — Defense~~ Secretary Frank C. Carlucci warned West Germany on Sunday that the United States might consider withdrawing troops from Europe if West German policies led to all nuclear weapons being removed from its territory.

Refusal to modernize NATO nuclear weapons in Europe, Mr. Carlucci told a conference of officials and military experts, would result in a de facto loss of nuclear deterrence. Then, he said, "I'd have to look at whether we should keep our forces here."

Other U.S. participants echoed the theme, suggesting that the United States would refuse to keep its troops in West Germany without tactical nuclear weapons to deter a Warsaw Pact attack on them.

Defense ministers from four other NATO countries at the meeting also pressed West Germany to agree to improve short-range nuclear missiles and artillery and to refuse to negotiate for their elimination in connection with the recent Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

The public pressure on Chancellor Helmut Kohl highlighted his political difficulties in getting support from within his own center-right coalition for reinforcement of the NATO nuclear arsenal and slowing the movement toward arms control.

U.S. congressmen at the meeting were surprised at the severity of Mr. Kohl's dispute with members of his own coalition as well as with the opposition. Several of the congressmen chided Mr. Kohl for what they saw as his loss of initiative to Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. Mr. Genscher advocates further nuclear disarmament in West Germany because, he says, it has been uniquely exposed to nuclear risks.

The U.S. secretary of state has been asked to testify in a dispute affecting INF ratification. Page 2.

"Reject existentialism and Genscherism," said William S. Cohen, a Republican senator from Maine.

Without criticizing Mr. Kohl by name, Richard R. Burt, the U.S. ambassador to West Germany, said that West Germans were succumbing to what he called, "a very counterproductive myth that West Germany has been singled out for Soviet nuclear attack."

Failure by West German leaders to combat this misconception, Mr. Burt said, was feeding pressures for denuclearization.

Controversy over the future of nuclear arms in West Germany has arisen following the INF Treaty, which eliminated two categories of missiles with ranges of more than 500 kilometers, an approach known as the "Double Zero" option.

Most of the remaining battlefield nuclear weapons of NATO are located in West Germany. Calls for a "third zero" to remove these specific weapons are coming from the opposition Social Democrats and also from many conservatives, who contend that West Germany has been left conspicuously exposed to nuclear risk.

Mr. Kohl formally rejected the "third zero" in a speech Saturday. He said that West Germany wants East-West negotiations on cutting the number of short-range nuclear arms to equality for Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. Currently, the Warsaw Pact has, for example, 1,300 short-range missiles, compared with only 88 Lance missiles deployed by NATO in Europe.

But Mr. Kohl also urged NATO to adopt what he called "a flexible negotiating approach" so that talks on cuts in short-range nuclear arms could start later this year without waiting for other negotiations to cut the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional troops.

Mr. Kohl refused to reply to repeated questions about whether his government was ready to proceed with NATO plans to deploy improved versions of Lance and other existing short-range nuclear arms.

Citing both these problems, Mr. Carlucci said that West Germany would bring about a "triple zero" result if it allowed an arms control debate to gather momentum, or if it blocked NATO plans to install new nuclear arms under a plan set by the alliance in 1983 at a meeting of foreign ministers in Montebello in Canada.

The Montebello plan, set up at a time when prospects were bleak for an INF Treaty, was a NATO program intended to remove many older battlefield nuclear weapons and replace them with a smaller number of longer-range nuclear arms.

Mr. Carlucci said NATO needed to equip itself with new Lance missiles, air-to-ground missiles, artillery shells, bombs and aircraft that could carry either nuclear or conventional weapons.

The European members of NATO, he urged, should recommit themselves to this program at the defense ministers' meeting in Denmark this spring, to demonstrate their "political will to ensure the survival of a common defense."

Most European officials at the meeting, the 25th annual gathering of the war studies group known as the 25th International Wehrkunde Encounter, joined Mr. Carlucci in pressing West Germany to adopt firmer policies.

This general position was adopted by defense ministers or other senior officials from Britain, Norway, Turkey, Italy and Spain. Arguing that West Germany could ease the worries of its citizens by determined government leadership, Defense Minister André Giraud of France said that Western nations should increase the range of their theater nuclear arms both "to address the understandable sensitivity of our German friends to nuclear risks and maintain deterrence."

February 9, 1988

Herald INTERNATIONAL Tribune
Published With The New York Times and The Washington Post

Nuclear Anxiety: NATO Seeks to Reassure Bonn

9 Feb 88 – I/Herald trib

By Joseph Fitchett
International Herald Tribune

MUNICH — A nagging German problem has re-emerged following the signing of the INF Treaty in December. It is the growing dogma among West Germans that they have wound up exposed to a unique and, therefore, unfair degree of nuclear risk among the NATO nations.

Short-range Soviet missiles, confined to a range of 500 kilometers (300 miles) under the treaty on intermediate-range missiles, are massively targeted on West Germany, partly because it is a front-line state and partly because NATO, restricted by the same range ceilings, has to put most of its remaining battlefield nuclear arms in West Germany, where they are liable to draw pre-emptive Soviet fire.

West Germans call their predicament "singularity," a word used by military experts to mean that a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is being singled out as a Western nuclear spearhead.

Even West Germans who have never heard the word are quick to feel anxiety, especially after the nuclear debates that sprang up around the deployment of longer-range missiles in West Germany in the early 1980s.

This mood, mixing fear with a feeling of being victimized, makes West German public opinion vulnerable to calls by the Soviet Union to eliminate all short-range nuclear arms.

That step, U.S. officials say, would lead the West toward denuclearization and the withdrawal of

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U.S. troops, who no longer would have nuclear weapons in their units to protect them.

Alarmed that West Germany may be losing its sense of direction, six Western defense ministers and numerous experts — from the United States, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and Spain — spent most of a two-day conference over the weekend trying to scold and coax West German leaders out of their belief that their country has been singularized.

"West German singularity is a myth," said Richard R. Burt, the U.S. ambassador in Bonn. "It is not based on military realities."

The Soviet nuclear threat, he said, is directed primarily at Western nuclear weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union — precisely the kind of weapons that are to be removed from West Germany under the INF Treaty.

Soviet planners will concentrate now, Mr. Burt said, on Britain, with its F-111 bombers and its nuclear submarines. France, even though its nuclear forces are outside the NATO command, will also preoccupy Soviet planners.

Lothar Rühl, the West German deputy defense minister, agreed that his country is not singularized militarily.

"We are a garrison state — with, for example, the largest peacetime British expeditionary force in history — because all the allies are sharing the risk of our inescapable geographic position."

They added that Soviet short-range missiles will be able to hit Norway, northern Italy, eastern France and even eastern Britain.

The U.S. defense secretary, Frank C. Carlucci, in concluding remarks at the meeting, the 25th Annual *Wehrkunde* Conference, said that "singularity has really been a rationalization for getting us to the third zero."

The third zero would be another East-West arms accord scrapping all short-range nuclear arms in the way that two categories of missiles were reduced to zero in the INF Treaty.

Mr. Carlucci's view was echoed by some West Germans.

"It's a perversion of a Helmut Schmidt idea to spread the domestic political risk of undertaking U.S. nuclear deals that are liable to backfire," according to Karl Kaiser, a leading West German diplomatic analyst who often advised Mr. Schmidt, the former chancellor and leader of the Social Democrats.

After President Jimmy Carter embarrassed Mr. Schmidt over the neutron bomb, first insisting that West Germany publicly ask for it and then abruptly canceling the program, Mr. Schmidt insisted that West Germany would only deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles if two other continental allies also accepted the missiles.

"But that ploy on missile basing has been stood on its head now to mean the idea of West Germany becoming singularized as a target," Mr. Kaiser added.

The idea of singularity has acquired a tenacious political life of its own in West Germany, surprisingly with equal vigor on the right wing of German politics.

"It may be psychological, expressing Germans' historical reflex of feeling victimized, but the phrase and the idea are becoming obsessions as Germans hear them not only from the left, where you'd expect antinuclear propaganda, but also now from the German right wing," said Joseph Joffee, foreign editor of the Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper.

"There's dangerous intellectual convergence on this issue between the German left and part of the conservative right."

A conservative wing of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party feels angry and betrayed that it was unable to find support in the Reagan administration or among European allies to prevent the INF Treaty from removing all the missiles in those categories from West Germany.

As they started to speak publicly about the threats to Germans, analysts say, these conservatives, who traditionally campaigned on pro-American themes of NATO solidarity, discovered that it was popular on the right, as the German left discovered in the early 1980s, to emphasize national concerns as a vote-getting theme.

West Germany's predicament enjoys considerable sympathy in allied countries.

Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, the ranking Democrat on the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, acknowledged that "in an ideal world, NATO would have begun negotiations on conventional arms, chemical weapons and battlefield nuclear weapons, then moved on to intermediate-range weapons."

Mr. Nunn was referring to the NATO decision at the so-called Montebello conference in 1983 that short-range nuclear arms — to which West Germans are now objecting — were becoming obsolete. NATO therefore decided to replace them with fewer longer-range nuclear weapons.

Those NATO arguments, publicized at a time when NATO was deploying the INF missiles that are now being scrapped, are haunting West Germany. On the one hand, disarmament proponents want to get rid of the short-range weapons, as NATO suggested. But NATO as a whole wants to put a few new short-range weapons in West Germany — as NATO also had decided.

APPENDIX D

Statement by government spoKesman Friedhelm Ost
(Federal Press Office, February 9, 1988)

Chancellor Helmut Kohl met today with a group of American Senators for a detailed exchange of views. The Senators involved were: Robert C. Byrd, Senate Majority Leader, Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Pell, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, David L. Boren, Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and John W. Warner, Senate Minority Leader and member of the Armed Services Committee.

The meeting focused on security matters as well as on disarmament and arms control subsequent to the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. The Chancellor reaffirmed Bonn's interest in continuing the ongoing process of improving East-West relations in all areas. In this connection he reiterated his wish to the U.S.-Senators to conclude ratification procedures as fast as possible and thus pave the way for entry into force of the INF-Treaty. The Chancellor reaffirmed that the agreement was in the interest of western security and, as such, in the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany.

He said that the members of the Western Alliance were now called upon to continue to develop a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. He noted that Bonn would be intensively involved in formulating this concept.

At its meetings in Reykjavik in June and then in Brussels in December last year the North Atlantic Council decided that it would be necessary as part of this concept to bring about tangible and verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet land-based SRINF, i.e. systems with ranges of less than 500 Kilometers. This would be done in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons.

In this situation the Federal Government does not see any need for an isolated decision on modernization or non-modernization of individual nuclear systems at the present time. It is felt that decisions of this kind can only be made on the basis of the comprehensive concept yet to be developed. In this process the Alliance will have to define the overall future structure of its nuclear potential, including nuclear systems with ranges of less than 500 Kilometers.

Nuclear systems the Alliance considers indispensable in order to preserve the credibility of its deterrent strategy as the result of a comprehensive strategic and arms-control-related assessment of this kind will, of course, have to be kept effective.

In this connection the Chancellor reaffirmed Bonn's position that a balanced ratio of nuclear and conventional forces is needed in Europe now and in the future for the security of the Alliance and, as such, for the security of Europe. Under present conditions nuclear weapons were indispensable for effective deterrance. He said that this joint position of the Alliance was reaffirmend by WEJ member states last October in the "Platform of European Security Interests". The Chancellor once again rejected the denuclearization of Europe as proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev. This, he said, was not in the interest of Alliance security and was, thus, not negotiable. The Chancellor said that this was why Bonn rejected a third zero solution in the area of nuclear systems with ranges of less than 500 Kilometers. He noted that Bonn was convinced that effective deterrance was not credible without nuclear systems on the territory to be defended.

APPENDIX E

Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540

Translation - German

SOURCE: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 13-14, 1988, p. 1.

Gorbachev's Effect in the West

For the American Senators who are readying themselves for the debate on ratification of the Soviet-American treaty to eliminate ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, the question of what effect this disarmament agreement will have on the deterrent capability of the Western Alliance and its internal solidarity will have to be seriously examined alongside discussions of the treaty contents and, especially, the reliability of verification regulations. What can be seen at the present time is a serious difference of opinion as to how the security of the Alliance is to be guaranteed after the treaty goes into effect and its provisions are being carried out.

Remarkable is the extent to which the Federal Republic of Germany is inclined to draw more and farther-reaching conclusions from this one disarmament agreement, which, as is generally known, affects only about three percent of the world powers' total nuclear arsenal, than her NATO partners consider acceptable. Nowhere can the effects of Gorbachev's policies of readiness to negotiate and détente in Central Europe be better observed than in the area of future NATO planning, although, aside from this very limited missile treaty signed in Washington, there has not been one single concrete change in the threat to the West.

While, because an important part of the American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe will have been eliminated, the allies see increased urgency in getting on with modernization of shorter-range nuclear weapons, which was already decided in 1983, the Government in Bonn is pressing for a "comprehensive NATO armament/disarmament plan" before it enters into any deliberations concerning new weapons projects. And, for all that, the shift of emphasis from purely tactical to longer range weapons and better distribution of bases among the Alliance partners had been decided back in Montebello in Canada to serve as a counterweight to the reduction in the total number of American nuclear warheads in Europe — a reduction that has long since taken place. But the battle over deploying the Pershing II and cruise missiles in response to Soviet deployment of the SS-20 seems to have taken all their /i.e., Bonn's/ available energy. Even today, any reference to courage shown in the rearmament conflict is sufficient to allay suspicion of harboring blanket reservations about the need for deterrent nuclear weapons.

Instead of talking about modernization, the Administration in Bonn would rather lead negotiations to reduce the number of remaining short-range nuclear weapons, and, in line with what they imagine should be NATO's future disarmament schedule,/they insist that/ such negotiations ought to be at the top of the agenda, if possible; in any event, before the close of planned discussions concerning the establishment of conventional stability in Europe. This particular fancy has raised vigorous allied opposition, because, in the opinion of the other Western NATO partners, Europe's remaining nuclear weapons are not to be touched so long as the Soviet capability to attack Europe has not been eliminated. The danger seems all too great that a third zero solution proposed by the Soviets would prove irresistible under public pressure.

Such fears are not wholly without justification in view of the obvious timidity with which German politicians are handling the topic of nuclear weapons these days. Aside from the German Minister of Defense, who will become NATO's General Secretary about mid-year, and thus no longer has to pay any attention to domestic clamoring, apparently no one dares speak out in favor of the allied desire for modernization. What is really alarming in this situation is that the public's aversion to nuclear weapons is simply taken as a given, is openly discussed and — even Franz Josef Strauß is no exception — no one feels any obligation to take charge of molding public opinion in any way. The German military sees itself in the unhappy position of having been left pretty much in the lurch by the politicians and of having to defend itself against cheap accusations, as if it were just another self-centered lobby group.

The Bundeswehr leadership, which under the present Administration, has been fighting — so far unsuccessfully — against a sizable curtailment of defense budget growth, considers itself isolated because the very same political camp from which it normally draws its support has jumped on the old war horse "Isolation" /"Singularisierung," a neologism expressing both the special status of West Germany in NATO and the German belief that they are the main, indeed, the only, European target in Soviet gun sights/ and ridden off to tilt at the windmills of the alleged concentration effected by the INF Treaty of nuclear risk on Germany and the Germans. This claptrap, although easy enough to refute as far as its objective contents go — the bulk of Soviet nuclear weapons are aimed at all of Western Europe, not just the Federal Republic — has a dangerously spiralling effect in the present climate of détente and loosening of Western emotional ties, and it is no surprise that although it originated in conservative CDU circles, it has been taken up by the other end of the political spectrum as well. It fosters latent doubts about American guarantees to the Alliance, as well as the necessity for such, and it threatens to undermine the confidence which, in spite of frequent misunderstandings, has, up till now, been the foundation of NATO relations.

No one will argue that the Federal Republic does not occupy a special position within the Alliance. NATO's chief forces are located on its territory and, in the event of an attack from the East, the conflict would probably be concentrated there. As West Germany has herself voluntarily foregone nuclear weapons, it would probably be allied nuclear warheads that would fall on her territory, if the situation ever deteriorated to that extent. The idea that Germany would become the theater of operations — on which modern conventional weapons would wreak just as much devastation as nuclear ones — properly viewed, goes back to German demands that their territory be defended as far forward as possible, on the boundary between the two Germanies. This is still the prevailing dogma, and no one has yet proposed deviating from it. It serves primarily as a deterrent to war, much as does the threat to use nuclear weapons, and it has proved itself, inasmuch as there have been no wars in Europe for decades because the risk to an aggressor would be unthinkable.

At the present time, the German Chancellor is obviously at pains to placate public opinion in the Federal Republic and, at the same time, maintain good relations with its allies. In expectation of American pressure for modernization of nuclear weapons, he announced a Washington visit even before a meeting of NATO heads of state planned for early March, so as to drum up sympathy for Bonn's shilly-shallying. It would be hard to refute his argument that the Bonn coalition needs calm because of the elections, and that, in view of the hostility of the SPD to nuclear weapons, a coalition change would really create problems for NATO. Nevertheless, this does not settle the lack of agreement in the basic consensus concerning the role of nuclear weapons.

It is most certainly not sufficient to view these weapons as indispensable for deterring an attack from the East; readiness to keep them up-to-date and to suit their effect to developments in conventional warfare is also required. If greater conventional stability could be achieved, especially by reducing Soviet offensive potential, reduction of nuclear deterrent capabilities to a minimum could be considered; to dispense with nuclear weapons completely is out of the question, because, among other things, as the American Secretary of Defense recently pointed out at the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich, denuclearization of Europe would, perforce, cause the Americans to review the necessity for their military presence in Europe. Not even the present Administration in Bonn can set itself against this insight in the long run.

C.K.

SOURCE: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, no. 32, February 9, 1988, p. 3.

POST-INF TREATY NEEDS

25TH WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE IN MUNICH

Following the conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty to abolish ground-launched intermediate missiles in ranges of between 500 and 5500 km, a whole series of requirements will arise, if NATO deterrent capabilities and the effectiveness of its Flexible Response Strategy are to be guaranteed. There is hardly a dissenting voice to heard from among the military or the defense ministers concerning these needs, but there certainly is from the politicians, as the latest Wehrkunde conference in Munich last weekend showed.

C.K. Before the round of talks between deputies, officials, officers and military experts, American Secretary of Defense Carlucci emphasized the continuing readiness of the United States to maintain the European nuclear guarantee, even after the INF-Treaty goes into effect and its provisions are carried out. Carlucci classified the future strategy of "Discriminate Deterrence," recommended by a group of experts from the present American Administration, with Flexible Response, and warned about giving the impression during discussions that there was no longer a close, integral relationship between short, long, and strategic range nuclear weapons following the INF Treaty. This might otherwise mislead Soviet planners into drawing false conclusions.

Indispensable Modernization

To maintain the effectiveness of Flexible Response it will be necessary to maintain levels of both conventional and nuclear forces. Carlucci called "indispensable" the early modernization (decided on back in 1983) of those nuclear systems deployed in Europe and unaffected by the INF Treaty, and this modernization is linked to a decrease in their number. As concrete goals, the Pentagon Chief named a (wider range) successor to the LANCE missile, renovation of nuclear artillery, and improvement of the penetrating capabilities of dual application aircraft. Carlucci intends to accelerate progress of talks about these at the next meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in April. In addition, the American Secretary of Defense considers strengthening of conventional defense through closer cooperation and elimination of obvious weak points just as urgent, and he called to mind several American postulates, which have as yet met with little response in Europe, such as the elimination of various false deployments and a build-up of ground reinforcements in critical zones.

Shilly-Shallying in Bonn

The present coalition Government in Bonn is finding it difficult to comply with the demands being made by the U.S., the dominant NATO power, and its more important allies in NATO. It views itself as being under heavy pressure, both from the public and from the political parties, to proceed as quickly as possible on the disarmament course intimated in the INF Agreement, and to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in Central Europe as much as possible, or, preferably, to eliminate them all together. Pressure in this direction is coming not only from the Social Democratic opposition, but from the parties in power as well. Chancellor Kohl is trying to get out from under, as much as he can, and avoid, for the time being, any discussions about modernizing nuclear weapons, not least of all because of the elections.

Kohl conceded in his address to the Wehrkunde conference that, in the long run, the Alliance could in no way do without nuclear weapons, and he objected strongly to a third zero solution for nuclear missiles with ranges under 500 km. In agreement with his Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, he made a plea not to wait until a conventional disarmament agreement had been reached to negotiate concerning short-range nuclear weapons. With reference to the topic of modernization, Kohl stated his objections to taking isolated decisions about individual weapons systems, thus seeming, without actually mentioning it, to be in agreement with the position taken by CDU/CSU Bundestag chairman, Degger, who insists at every available opportunity that modernization can only be begun after working out a comprehensive NATO armament/disarmament plan.

Against Relinquishing Nuclear Weapons

In numerous votes the conference participants expressed their concern that in the shadow of the INF Treaty, public aversion to nuclear weapons, especially in West Germany, could get out of hand, if the officials responsible failed to make adequate attempts at persuasion. French Defense Minister Giraud called increasing the range of nuclear short-range missiles a necessity, even taking German fears into account, and warned against expected Soviet attempts to denuclearize Europe by propagating still more zero solutions. This would call both the nuclear and conventional military presence of the Americans into question, he said, something even France considers indispensable.

Sharply contradicted from several quarters was the widespread argument in Bonn, according to which the double zero solution for intermediate range missiles would lead to the "isolation" of Germany because only Germany would remain within range of nuclear short range missiles. American Ambassador Burt said that this was a myth that had no correspondence whatsoever to reality, because other parts of Europe could be struck by Soviet aircraft and long-range missiles just as easily. He stated further that this particular myth was threatening dangerously to become a received idea. Of course Germany was in a special position, both because of its geography and because of its decision not to have any nuclear weapons. NATO had always taken this into account by front stationing of alliance forces on the inner German border. British and Dutch speakers argued that every nation was in a special situation and had to cope with special threats.

Senators on a Fact-Finding Mission

In addition to the usual guests, there was a delegation of American Senators at the Wehrkunde conference this time, led by Democratic Majority Leader Byrd and Nunn, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. The delegation is visiting the capitals of Europe to sound out opinion on ratification of the INF Treaty and to give the allied peoples Congress's assurances of continued American obligation to the defense of Europe against Eastern aggression. Before the conference itself, Senator Byrd emphasized that, as far as ratification itself was concerned, the details of the agreement were much less in the foreground than the question as to how it would affect future NATO solidarity. In his opinion this solidarity would be made most effectively clear if the NATO defense ministers would make, without delay, the necessary resolutions to adapt and renovate the NATO nuclear weapons remaining in Europe.

In agreement with Senator Nunn, who presented detailed thoughts on the matter, Byrd sees another means of keeping the initiative by making a bold and comprehensive proposal at the MBFR follow-up conference in Vienna for conventional disarmament in Europe and a reduction in Soviet invasive potential. In a discussion on the sidelines of the conference, both Senators said they had been especially impressed by the unanimous comments of numerous partners warning of the consequences of non-ratification of the Treaty and who had pointed out that refusal to ratify would elicit confusion in the stationing countries as well as resistance to any further cooperative work.

Translated by
David Skelly
CRS - Language Services
February 26, 1988

APPENDIX F

EUROPEAN WIRELESS FILE

FEBRUARY 12, 1988

BYRD SAYS INF TREATY WILL STRENGTHEN ALLIANCE

STORY: EU5110212 DATE: 02/12/88

SLEU5110212 BT*EUR511 02/12/88
BYRD SAYS INF TREATY WILL STRENGTHEN ALLIANCE
(TRANSCRIPT: BYRD NEWS CONFERENCE 2/10) (3,750)

PARIS -- FOLLOWING IS A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF THE NEWS CONFERENCE HELD IN PARIS ON FEBRUARY 10, BY THE MEMBERS OF A CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION HEADED BY SENATE MAJORITY LEADER ROBERT BYRD. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION INCLUDED SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL, CHAIRMAN, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE; SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE; SENATOR DAVID BOREN, CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE; AND SENATOR JOHN WARNER, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS ON THE RECORD.

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SENATOR BYRD: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THANK YOU FOR BEING PRESENT AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE. AS HAS ALREADY BEEN INDICATED, YOU KNOW THE IDENTITIES OF THE SENATORS HERE. LET ME JUST ADD THAT IT IS A BIPARTISAN GROUP, REPRESENTING THOSE CHAIRMEN AND RANKING MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES WHICH HAVE PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER THE INF TREATY, AND ANY TREATIES THAT MAY FOLLOW-ON, SUCH AS THE S.T.A.R.T. TREATY. THE COMMITTEES REPRESENTED ARE FOREIGN RELATIONS, ARMED SERVICES, AND INTELLIGENCE.

WE HAVE ELECTED TO MAKE THIS TRIP TO EUROPE DURING THE BREAK IN OUR WORK IN THE SENATE FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. FIRST OF ALL, WE WANTED TO GET BACK FROM THEM THEIR ATTITUDES, THEIR VIEWPOINTS WITH RESPECT TO AN INF TREATY, A S.T.A.R.T. TREATY, AND ALSO TO FIND OUT WHAT THEIR ATTITUDES ARE TOWARD THE NEW DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE, HOW WE ARE TO ACCEPT THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE CHALLENGES THAT ARE BOUND TO FOLLOW ON. WE ALSO CAME -- AND WE DO HERE NOW AS WE HAVE BEFORE -- TO GIVE ASSURANCE THAT NO MATTER WHAT TREATY WE MAY BE ENTERING INTO -- AND I DON'T HAVE ANY DOUBT, I DON'T HAVE ANY SERIOUS DOUBTS, THAT THE INF TREATY WILL BE RATIFIED -- AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO EUROPE WILL BE UNSHAKABLE, UNCHANGED AND UNDIMINISHED. AND WE WANT TO ASSURE OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS OF THAT BECAUSE OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTEREST WILL BE AS STRONG AS EVER. AND WE'RE ENCOURAGED HERE AS WE FIND IN TALKING WITH THE LEADERS OF FRANCE THAT THEY SEE THE NEW, DYNAMIC, AGGRESSIVE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS WE SEE IT: AS ONE THAT IS STRONG, AND THAT OFFERS OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS CHALLENGES, AND THAT WE MUST LISTEN NOT ONLY TO THE RHETORIC BUT PAY ATTENTION TO THE RESULTS. BECAUSE IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS NOT THE RHETORIC BUT THE RESULTS WILL COUNT. AND WE'VE GOT TO REMEMBER THAT WE CAN BEST MEET THE CHALLENGES AND THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT COME BY WORKING IN A COLLABORATIVE AND A COORDINATIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE FASHION WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, SUPPORTING THE ALLIANCE ALWAYS.

IN THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTS MAY COME AND PRESIDENTS MAY GO. ELECTIONS MAY COME AND GO IN AMERICA, BUT THE UNITED STATES SENATE WHICH IS MADE UP OF DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS STAYS ON AND ON. AND IT HAS AN EQUAL PART WITH THE PRESIDENT IN THE MAKING OF TREATIES BECAUSE THE SENATE MUST RATIFY A TREATY BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE. AND SO THAT COMMITMENT IS THERE AND WILL REMAIN THERE WHETHER THERE IS A DEMOCRAT OR A REPUBLICAN IN THE WHITE HOUSE AFTER THE NEXT ELECTION. AND OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED WHEN WE WORK TOGETHER AND COLLABORATE IN OUR PLANNING SO THAT OUR DECISIONS ARE COLLECTIVE DECISIONS AND OUR EFFORTS ARE COLLECTIVE EFFORTS BECAUSE ONLY AS A UNIFIED ALLIANCE CAN WE IMPRESS UPON ANY ADVERSARY THE FACT THAT IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE TO TAKE THE RISK OF ATTACKING ANY MEMBER OF THAT ALLIANCE. AND ALSO WE'RE HERE TO SAY THAT WE VIEW WITH OPTIMISM AND ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTHUSIASM EVEN THE INDICATIONS THAT THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS ARE COLLABORATING AND THINKING IN TERMS OF MUTUALLY WORKING TOGETHER AND PLANNING TOGETHER FOR THEIR MUTUAL SECURITY. AND WE'D LIKE TO SEE THIS EFFORT CONTINUE AND GROW. WE WANT TO LEND OUR SUPPORT TO IT AND WE HOPE THAT IT IS SOMETHING THAT WILL TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AND WE DON'T SEE IT AS ANYTHING THAT WILL FRAGMENT IT OR THAT IS MEANT TO. AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN COULD AS WELL BECOME A PART OF IT. NOW, WE'LL TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q: THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE COMMITTEE BUT IT HAD GOTTEN STOPPED IN THE PROCESS. DO YOU KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED WITH THAT LETTER, IF IT HAS BEEN SENT?

SENATOR BYRD: I'LL CALL ON SENATOR NUNN TO RESPOND TO THAT, BUT MAY I SAY THAT I HAVE JUST WITHIN THE LAST TEN MINUTES SEEN A COPY OF IT.

SENATOR NUNN: IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THE LETTER HAS BEEN RECEIVED. I GOT A PHONE CALL ABOUT AN HOUR AGO WHILE WE WERE MEETING WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTER FROM MY STAFF AND I WAS INFORMED THAT THE LETTER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY SENATOR BYRD'S OFFICE AND MY OFFICE. THE LETTER HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE NEWS MEDIA. WE HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO STUDY THE LETTER AT GREAT LENGTH BUT OUR INITIAL REACTION IS POSITIVE. WE'VE GOT A STATEMENT HERE JUST IN CASE THE QUESTION CAME UP AND LET ME READ IT TO YOU. IT'S A VERY BRIEF STATEMENT AND WE'LL GIVE IT OUT FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT. NOW I THINK THIS STATEMENT IS ON BEHALF OF SENATOR BYRD AND MYSELF. (SENATOR BYRD INDICATES ASSENT.) "THE LETTER FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ PROVIDES IMPORTANT ASSURANCES WITH REGARD TO KEY PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST GOVERN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN THE TREATY PROCESS." (NOT JUST THE INF TREATY, I'M ADDING THIS, BUT ALL TREATIES.) "WHILE THERE ARE SOME ASPECTS OF THIS UNDERSTANDING WHICH

MAY REQUIRE FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN THE COURSE OF THE SENATE'S ACTION ON THE INF TREATY, THE LETTER ENABLES THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TO RESUME HEARINGS ON THE TREATY NEXT WEEK WITH THE ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES," AS WE HAD PLANNED.

SENATOR BYRD: LET ME FOR MY PART SAY THAT I AGREE WITH SENATOR NUNN. I THINK THIS IS A POSITIVE RESPONSE. WE VIEW IT AS SUCH AND WE'RE GOING TO GO FORWARD ON THAT POSITION.

SENATOR PELL: I WOULD LIKE TO ADD MY OWN WORD OF SUPPORT AT THIS EFFORT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT.

QUESTION: (PARTIALLY INAUDIBLE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER THE SENATORS AGREED WITH RECENT REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER THATCHER CHARACTERIZED BY THE QUESTIONER AS "CUTTING REMARKS" CRITICIZING THE FRANCO-GERMAN BRIGADE AND OTHER ASPECTS OF FRANCO-GERMAN DEFENSE COOPERATION.)

SENATOR NUNN: WELL, OF COURSE, OUR PREFERENCE IS FOR THERE TO BE A MULTILATERAL APPROACH IN NATO. WE HAVE HISTORY TO CONSIDER. AND I BELIEVE THAT CONSIDERING HISTORY AND CONSIDERING WHERE FRANCE HAS BEEN THAT THIS IS A VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. I THINK THAT IT IS A BILATERAL EFFORT, BUT I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES WILL CERTAINLY BE KEPT INFORMED, AND I WOULD HOPE THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE. I BELIEVE THAT WE'VE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS IN RECENT YEARS, INCLUDING THE AMERICAN PURCHASE OF THE MULTIPLE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT FROM THE FRENCH. THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS AND OTHER NATIONS HAVE SEVERAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS THAT ARE ON-GOING. WE ARE WORKING CLOSER AND CLOSER TOGETHER IN OUT-OF-AREA PROBLEMS INCLUDING SOME CLOSE CONSULTATION REGARDING THE PROBLEMS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. YOUR DEFENSE MINISTER GAVE AN EXCELLENT PRESENTATION AT THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE THE LAST WEEKEND IN MUNICH THAT DEMONSTRATED THE FRENCH CONCERN NOT JUST ABOUT CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT THE MUCH BROADER ARRAY OF CHALLENGES TO THE WEST. SO MY OVERALL REACTION IS POSITIVE. WE TOLD OUR BRITISH FRIENDS THAT OUR REACTION WAS POSITIVE TO THE GERMAN AND FRENCH BRIGADE AND TO THE JOINT COUNCIL AND WE HOPE THAT NATO AND THE MILITARY CIRCLES OF THE ALLIANCE WILL BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED AND THAT THIS WILL ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE WEST.

SENATOR BYRD: SENATOR PELL WOULD LIKE TO ADD SOMETHING.

SENATOR PELL: I WAS JUST GOING TO ADD WE HAD A PRIVATE MEETING WITH MRS. THATCHER A FEW DAYS AGO AND I DO NOT RECALL ANY CUTTING REMARKS THAT SHE MADE CONCERNING THAT BRIGADE.

SENATOR WARNER: IF YOU GO BACK IN HISTORY, OF COURSE PRESIDENT DE GAULLE TOOK FRANCE OUT OF THE MILITARY CHAIN OF NATO. AND THAT OF COURSE IS TO BE CONTINUED AS THE PRESENT POSITION OF FRANCE. BUT, NEVERTHELESS, THERE SEEMS TO BE AN EVER-INCREASING PERIPHERAL TYPE OF WORK BETWEEN THE FRENCH MILITARY AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO. AND I BELIEVE, I JOIN MY COLLEAGUES, THAT THAT'S IN THE BEST INTEREST OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

SENATOR BOREN: SENATOR BYRD, IF I COULD ADD JUST ONE WORD. I THINK WE ALL SHARE, AS YOU CAN TELL, A VERY POSITIVE OUTLOOK ON THIS COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. WE'D LIKE TO SEE COOPERATION EXPANDED BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. WE WERE ASSURED TODAY THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT IN NO WAY COMPETES WITH NATO. IT IS NOT MEANT TO BE HOSTILE TO NATO OR TO BE FRAGMENTING. I DO THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT AS THIS COOPERATION PROCEEDS THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO GIVE THESE ASSURANCES AND TAKE STEPS WHICH WE COMPLETELY ACCEPT THAT THEIR INTENTION IS NOT TO IN ANY WAY COMPETE WITH NATO. AND I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE GOVERNMENT HERE TO CONTINUE TO SEND

THOSE SIGNALS TO THE BRITISH AND TO US AND TO OTHERS. BUT WE TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD AND WE THINK THIS IS A VERY, VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF HOLDING EUROPE TOGETHER.

Q: SENATOR BYRD, YOU SAID THAT YOU HOPED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN SHOULD BECOME PART OF THIS?

SENATOR BYRD: WELL, YES, WE SEE STRENGTH IN UNITY. AND WE SEE OUR OWN INTERESTS INVOLVED AS WE SEE THESE TWO POWERS APPARENTLY COMING TOGETHER AND WANTING TO COLLABORATE IN THEIR OWN MUTUAL SECURITY AND IN THE SECURITY OF EUROPE. WELL, WE'RE VITALLY INTERESTED IN THE SECURITY OF EUROPE. WE'RE VITALLY INTERESTED IN COLLABORATION NOT ONLY BETWEEN THESE TWO GREAT COUNTRIES BUT WE'D LIKE TO SEE GREAT BRITAIN. WE WANT TO BE A PART TOO. AND WE CAN DO ALL THESE THINGS, WE THINK, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NATO, NOT SOMETHING THAT WOULD FRAGMENT IT.

SENATOR BOREN: SENATOR BYRD, COULD I ADD ONE POINT TO THAT? I THINK THAT WE WANT TO BE CLEAR WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT FORMING ANOTHER MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATION THAT WOULD COMPETE WITH NATO. I DON'T THINK THAT'S THE MEANING AT ALL. IT'S SIMPLY A MATTER THAT WE DO NOT VIEW THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY OR THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN TO BE SOMETHING IN ANY WAY THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL OF US IN NATO AND THAT PARTICIPATION CAN BE IN MANY WAYS. IT CAN BE COMMUNICATION, IT CAN BE GIVING A BLESSING TO THOSE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS, EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THEM. AND I THINK THAT'S THE WAY IN WHICH WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THIS KIND OF INVOLVEMENT. WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE CREATION OF ANY KIND OF A FORMAL ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD BE MULTILATERAL.

SENATOR NUNN: WE HAVEN'T BEEN INVITED TO THAT BRITISH-GERMAN (SIC) PARTY YET SO I DO THINK IT WOULD BE PRESUMPTUOUS OF US TO RESPOND ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON IT. I THINK THAT THE ESSENCE OF WHAT WE'RE SAYING IS IT'S A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. AND I THINK THAT WE OUGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION OF ENCOURAGING IT.

SENATOR WARNER: I'D LIKE TO COMMENT ON OUR MEETING THIS MORNING WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. AS YOU KNOW, WE'VE BEEN TRAVELING AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRAVEL. WE'VE MET WITH MRS. THATCHER, YESTERDAY WITH KOHL, AND OF COURSE TODAY FOR OVER AN HOUR WITH THIS DISTINGUISHED PRESIDENT. THE IMPRESSIONS I GAINED IN THE EXCHANGE THAT THE TWO OF US HAD WAS THAT HE WAS VERY PRAISEWORTHY OF THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL, NAMELY THE INF TREATY WHICH THE MAJORITY LEADER INDICATED WILL HOPEFULLY SOON BE RATIFIED BY THE SENATE. BUT THEN ON INTO THE S.T.A.R.T. AGREEMENT, HE RECOGNIZES THAT THAT IS STILL IN NEGOTIATION BUT UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PRESIDENT REAGAN PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. IF THE RIGHT AGREEMENT, WHICH IS CORRECT IN THE SECURITY INTEREST NOT ONLY OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT OF OUR ALLIES, CAN BE REACHED DURING THE BALANCE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TERM, THERE ARE CLEAR ADVANTAGES IN PASSING THAT MILESTONE. AND HE ALSO WAS, I THINK, IN MY OBSERVATION, VERY PRAISEWORTHY OF THE CONSULTATIONS THAT GO ON REGULARLY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE IN THIS VERY, VERY BROAD SPECTRUM OF ARMS CONTROL. AND HE EXPRESSED, OF COURSE, AS WE DO, THE HOPE THAT THERE WILL SHORTLY BE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THAT'S A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO US IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, TO OUR NATION. AND WE'RE HOPEFUL THAT THOSE TALKS CAN GET UNDER WAY PERHAPS THIS SUMMER OR EARLY FALL.

SENATOR BYRD: LET ME ADD THIS, THIS FINAL NOTE IF THERE ARE NO

OTHER QUESTIONS. I'VE BEEN REASSURED AS I HAVE GONE ABOUT VISITING THESE NATO CAPITALS. IS THERE A QUESTION FIRST? ALL RIGHT.

Q: (PARTIALLY INAUDIBLE QUESTION HAVING TO DO WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S REPORTED RESERVATIONS ABOUT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND GERMAN CALLS FOR REDUCING NATO'S SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES.)

SENATOR NUNN: I WOULD ANSWER BY SAYING THAT I STILL BELIEVE IN THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE. AND I BELIEVE IN THE COUPLING OF THE CONVENTIONAL POSTURE OF NATO TO THE THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE, TO THE STRATEGIC DETERRENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I BELIEVE THAT THAT IS A DOCTRINE THAT NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED. I BELIEVE PARTICULARLY THE CONVENTIONAL COMPONENT OF THAT NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED. BUT I THINK ALL OF THOSE ELEMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE ESSENTIAL.

I DON'T BELIEVE THE STATUS OF THE SHORTER-RANGE WEAPONS IS ANY DIFFERENT NOW THAN IT WAS PRIOR TO INF. AND I DON'T BELIEVE IT'S ANY DIFFERENT NOW THAN IT WAS PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING IIS AND THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. AFTER ALL, WE HAD A PERIOD OF TIME FROM THE EARLY '60S UP UNTIL THE MID '80S, A 20-YEAR PERIOD, WHERE WE HAD NO INF IN TERMS OF THAT RANGE MISSILE IN EUROPE. AND YET WE HAD THOSE SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS. NOW, I AGREE WITH SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS I HEARD TODAY BY THE FRENCH PEOPLE THAT WE VISITED WITH. AND THAT IS THAT THE EMPHASIS ON MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR THEATER WEAPONS SHOULD BE ON THOSE LONGER-RANGE SYSTEMS THAT ARE ELIGIBLE UNDER THE INF AGREEMENT, RATHER THAN ON THOSE EXTREMELY SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS LIKE NUCLEAR ARTILLERY. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE NATO PRIORITIES SHOULD BE A STAND-OFF AIR-DELIVERED WEAPON THAT WILL STRENGTHEN THE OVERALL DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION THOUGH, I STILL BELIEVE IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. I THINK IT'S A SOLID THEORY AND I THINK OUR CHALLENGE IS TO MAKE SURE THAT WE CAN IMPLEMENT IT. I WANT TO SPEAK ONE OTHER WORD ON THE ALLEGATIONS THAT GO AROUND IN EUROPE PERIODICALLY ABOUT DECOUPLING, MEANING TAKING AWAY AMERICA'S NUCLEAR GUARANTEE TO NATO. WHEN WE PUT MISSILES IN EUROPE, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO SAY THE AMERICANS ARE DECOUPLING. WHEN WE TAKE THE SAME MISSILES OUT, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO REPEAT, AMERICA IS DECOUPLING. SO, WHETHER WE'RE PUTTING MISSILES IN OR TAKING MISSILES OUT, THERE ARE ALWAYS CRIES THAT AMERICA IS DECOUPLING. I SUGGESTED SOMEWHAT FACETIOUSLY THAT THE MINISTRIES IN EUROPE COULD SAVE TIME AND MONEY BY SIMPLY HAVING A RECORDING TAPE THAT WHETHER WE'RE PUTTING MISSILES IN OR TAKING MISSILES OUT THAT SAID THE AMERICANS ARE DECOUPLING.

LET ME SUBMIT TO YOU THAT THE ULTIMATE ACT OF COUPLING IS TAKING PLACE UNDER INF. WE HAVE A TEAM OF AMERICAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INSPECTORS THAT ARE GOING TO BE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE HEART OF THE SOVIET UNION, A PLACE CALLED VOTKINSK. THEIR JOB IS GOING TO BE TO STAND OUTSIDE THAT FACTORY AND EVERY LARGE OBJECT THAT COMES OUT THAT COULD BE A MISSILE, THEY'RE GOING TO INSPECT IT. AND THEIR DUTY WILL BE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE MISSILE THAT COMES OUT IS AN SS-25 WHICH COULD STRIKE THE UNITED STATES, RATHER THAN AN SS-20 WHICH CAN ONLY STRIKE EUROPE. HOW MUCH MORE EVIDENCE OF COUPLING DO YOU WANT? NOW I MUST CONFESS THAT, SINCE THAT SS-25 CAN HIT NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AND ATLANTA AND THE SS-20 CAN ONLY HIT PARIS AND BONN AND LONDON -- EUROPEAN TARGETS -- I EMPHASIZE THIS POINT MORE IN EUROPE THAN I WILL IN AMERICA, BUT IN EITHER PLACE IT IS AN ACCURATE PORTRAYAL OF WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE THE ULTIMATE ACT OF COUPLING.

SENATOR BOREN: ALSO, IN SUPPORTING THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE, WE CERTAINLY ARE NOT EXPRESSING OUR DISBELIEF IN THE

ULTIMATE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AS WELL. THERE IS NOTHING INCONSISTENT ABOUT SEEING THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND STILL BELIEVING IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, BECAUSE OF ALL PLACES WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND IN EUROPE FROM THE PAST DEVASTATION AND LOSS OF LIFE THAT CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH ARE MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED TODAY THAN THEY WERE AT THE TIME OF WORLD WAR II, AND THE FACT THAT WE HAVE SUCH A DESTABILIZED BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NOW BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES POSES A REAL THREAT TO OUR PEOPLES. AND I THINK IT'S SOMETHING WE NEED TO STOP -- HAVING OUR HEADS TURNED TOTALLY BY THE NUCLEAR ARGUMENT. WE NEED TO START EDUCATING OUR OWN POPULATIONS ABOUT THE DANGER OF THE DESTABILIZING IMBALANCE IN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES. AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHY WE NEED TO START FOCUSING MORE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, BRING THE OTHER SIDE TO THE TABLE, TO MAKE SURE THAT WE DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE. LET US NOT JUST NEGOTIATE ABOUT AREAS WHERE WE HAVE ADEQUATE DETERRENCE TO PREVENT WAR. LET'S START NEGOTIATING ABOUT THOSE AREAS OF A CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE WHICH ARE A GRAVE THREAT TO ALL OF OUR PEOPLES WHERE WE SHOULD BE INSISTING ON CHANGES FROM THE OTHER SIDE.

SENATOR BYRD: AND MEANWHILE THERE MUST BE A NUCLEAR ELEMENT IN THE SPECTRUM OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IF IT IS TO BE CREDIBLE.

Q: (PARTIALLY INAUDIBLE QUESTION ON SENATOR NUNN'S POSITION ON IMPLEMENTING THE MONTEBELLO DECISION.)

SENATOR NUNN: WHAT I SAID WAS, I BELIEVE, THAT THE MONTEBELLO DECISION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT, BUT WE HAVE HAD SUGGESTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN GERMANY, THAT SINCE THE INF TREATY THERE WERE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THAT THAT NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSED. AND I BELIEVE THAT SUGGESTION IS A LOGICAL SUGGESTION. I THINK IT IS IN ORDER, AND I THINK THE AMERICANS AND OUR OTHER ALLIES SHOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS HOW WE STAND ON MODERNIZATION IN A POST-INF ENVIRONMENT. ONE OBVIOUS EXAMPLE, THE PERSHING IAS, WHICH THE GERMANS HAVE VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO RELINQUISH AT THE FINAL STAGES OF THE INF AGREEMENT AFTER IT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED BY THE SUPERPOWERS -- THOSE MISSILES WERE PART OF MONTEBELLO. SO OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE THINGS THAT YOU NEED TO REVISIT IN TERMS OF UPDATING. BUT I STRONGLY BELIEVE IN MODERNIZATION. I THINK AS LONG AS YOU HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS LONG AS YOU HAVE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, YOU HAVE TO KEEP THEM UPDATED FOR SURVIVABILITY PURPOSES, FOR SAFETY PURPOSES, AND FOR EFFECTIVENESS PURPOSES. BUT, YES, I'D BE WILLING TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ABOUT HOW WE GO ABOUT THAT MODERNIZATION IN A POST-INF ENVIRONMENT, AND I WOULD REPEAT THAT ONE OF THE THINGS I HEARD ECHOED TODAY AND STATED TODAY OVER AND OVER AGAIN WAS THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPHASIZING THE LONGER-RANGE SYSTEMS AS OPPOSED TO THE VERY SHORT-RANGE BATTLEFIELD ARTILLERY-TYPE SYSTEMS. AND I THINK THAT IS A POINT WELL MADE, AND I WOULD AGREE WITH IT.

Q: (PARTIALLY INAUDIBLE QUESTION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.)

SENATOR WARNER: I'D LIKE TO LEAD OFF ON THAT. THE MOST APPROPRIATE FORUM, OF COURSE, HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. IT'S THE 23-NATION CONFERENCE OF WHICH FRANCE IS A MEMBER. HOWEVER, BEFOREHAND, IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF THAT FORUM AS WELL AS THE WHOLE WORLD FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK THAT WILL HOPEFULLY BE ADOPTED AND USED AS A GUIDELINE DURING THE COURSE OF THAT CONFERENCE. WE WERE ASSURED WHEN WE MET WITH MANFRED WOERNER YESTERDAY -- TO BE, AS YOU KNOW, THE SECRETARY GENERAL -- THAT THAT WORK IS ON-GOING IN NATO AND IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THERE WOULD BE SOME PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF IT HERE EARLY, AT ABOUT THE TIME OF THE SUMMIT MEETING, THAT IS, THE NATO SUMMIT MEETING. SO GOOD WORK IS GOING ON

ON THAT IMPORTANT QUESTION RIGHT NOW.

PRESS SPOKESMAN: SENATOR BYRD, DID YOU HAVE A FINAL REMARK?

SENATOR BYRD: WELL, I JUST WANTED TO SAY ONCE AGAIN THAT I'VE BEEN VERY MUCH ENCOURAGED BY OUR VISITS HERE. I VIEW THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION REPRESENTED BY MR. GORBACHEV AS A LEADERSHIP THAT IS VERY AGGRESSIVE, HAS SELF-CONFIDENCE, IS SELF-ASSURED, BUT ONE THAT RECOGNIZES THAT IT HAS GREAT PROBLEMS. AND I THINK THIS NEW LEADER IN THE SOVIET UNION RECOGNIZES THAT HIS PREDECESSORS USED THE WEAPON OF THREAT -- THEY THREATENED. AND I THINK HE RECOGNIZED THAT THAT DIDN'T WORK AND THAT THAT WAS INDEED UNIFYING THEIR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. AND SO NOW THE NEW LOOK SEEMS TO BE INSTEAD OF THREATENING THEIR ADVERSARIES, COMFORTING THEM, COMFORTING THEM. AND I THINK WE HAVE TO BE JUST AS CAREFUL AS WE LISTEN TO THE NEW APPRCACH WHICH WE LIKE. EVERYBODY LIKES TO GO TO SLEEP. DON'T WORRY ANYMORE, JUST BE COMFORTABLE. EVERYTHING IS GOING TO BE ALL RIGHT. THERE IS A NEW LOOK, THERE'S A GREAT CHANGE, THERE'S A GREAT SHIFT. BUT I THINK THAT I FIND HERE, AND AS I'VE TRAVELED IN OTHER COUNTRIES HERE IN EUROPE, I FIND HERE AN ATTITUDE THAT IS ONE THAT IS JUST LIKE MINE. LET'S BE READY TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES, LOOK FOR THE OPPORTUNITIES, BE READY FOR THE CHALLENGES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WORK TOGETHER, KEEP THIS ALLIANCE STRONG, REMEMBERING THAT WE HAVE TO ARRIVE AT OUR DECISIONS COLLECTIVELY. WE HAVE TO INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS COLLECTIVELY TO IMPROVE OUR DEFENSES AND THEN WE'LL BE READY FOR THE OPPORTUNITIES. AND THOSE WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE TAKE THE RISK AND MAKE A MISTAKE WILL NOT DO SO BECAUSE THIS ALLIANCE IS GOING TO BE STRONGER RATHER THAN WEAKER AS A RESULT OF THE TREATY WE'RE ABOUT TO RATIFY. THANK YOU.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

NNNN
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STORY: EU5120212 DATE: 02/12/88

SLEU5120212 ET*EUR512 02/12/88
DECEMBER U.S. TRADE DEFICIT FALLS, BUT '87 A RECORD (690)
(ARTICLE ON U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE FIGURES)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE DEFICIT IN DECEMBER WAS THE LOWEST MONTHLY DEFICIT IN 11 MONTHS, BUT THE DEFICIT FOR 1987 AS A WHOLE WAS THE HIGHEST ON RECORD, ACCORDING TO THE LATEST FIGURES RELEASED BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

THE 1987 TRADE DEFICIT TOTALED 171,200 MILLION DOLLARS, AS IMPORTS CLIMBED 10.7 PERCENT AND EXPORTS WERE UP 11.5 PERCENT FROM 1986 LEVELS, THE DEPARTMENT REPORTED FEBRUARY 12.

THE DEFICIT FOR THE YEAR WAS UP 9.6 PERCENT FROM THE 156,156 MILLION DOLLARS REGISTERED IN 1986, WITH 59,800 MILLION DOLLARS -- OR 35 PERCENT -- OF THAT TOTAL REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES' BILATERAL TRADE DEFICIT WITH JAPAN.

WHILE U.S. IMPORTS CONTINUED TO INCREASE DESPITE RISING IMPORT PRICES, EXPORTS ALSO CLIMBED SHARPLY IN 1987 AND WERE UP FOR THE FOURTH CONSECUTIVE MONTH IN DECEMBER.

THE DECEMBER DEFICIT TOTALED 12,202 MILLION DOLLARS, A 1,000-MILLION-DOLLAR DROP FROM NOVEMBER'S 13,218-MILLION-DOLLARS. THE DECLINE WAS ALMOST TOTALLY ATTRIBUTED BY THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT TO AN INCREASE IN EXPORTS, AS IMPORTS DIPPED A MERE 13 MILLION DOLLARS FROM THE NOVEMBER LEVEL.

MONTHLY U.S. TRADE DEFICITS HAVE NOW DROPPED IN FOUR OF THE LAST FIVE MONTHS. THE OCTOBER DEFICIT WAS 17,631 MILLION DOLLARS, WHICH

APPENDIX G

DEMOCRATIC RADIO ADDRESS

February 13, 1988

MAJORITY LEADER ROBERT C. BYRD
(FROM ROME, ITALY)

THIS IS SENATE MAJORITY LEADER ROBERT BYRD. 1988 PROMISES TO BRING ABOUT A MASSIVE SHIFT IN THE WAY MOST OF THE FREE WORLD SIZES UP ITS OWN SECURITY. A NEW ARMS CONTROL TREATY -- THE INF TREATY IS BEFORE THE SENATE. PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY AND IN EUROPE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT IT MEANS TO THEIR FUTURE. FOR THAT REASON, I LED A BIPARTISAN DELEGATION THIS WEEK TO 5 NATO COUNTRIES TO RAISE SOME CRUCIAL QUESTIONS, AND TO PLEDGE TO EUROPEAN LEADERS THAT AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO NATO IS UNSHAKABLE, UNCHANGED, AND UNDIMINISHED.

THE SIGNING OF THE INF TREATY HAS OPENED THE DOOR TO NEW OPTIMISM -- NEW UNCERTAINTIES -- AND NEW RISKS FOR NATO. THE TREATY IS AN INVITATION TO FASHION A STRONGER ALLIANCE AMONG OURSELVES -- AND A MORE PRAGMATIC STRATEGY TOWARD THE SOVIETS.

WE WERE HEARTENED TO FIND THAT NATO LEADERS VIEW THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP WITH A HEALTHY DOSE OF REALISM.

MUCH OF THEIR SKEPTICISM -- AND OURS -- CAN BE LAID TO MR. GORBACHEV'S STUNNING ACHIEVEMENT IN ECLIPSING HIS PREDECESSORS -- IN STYLE AND MESSAGE. AT TIMES, HE SEEMS TO HAVE ALMOST MESMERIZED WESTERN PUBLICS WITH THE PROSPECT OF DETENTE WITH HIS ADVERSARIES ABROAD AND THE TRAPPINGS OF GLASNOST AT HOME. AMERICAN POLLS ARE NOW RECORDING A TRUST TOWARD THIS RUSSIAN LEADER WHERE NONE EXISTED BEFORE. YET, THERE ARE SOME OF US WHO ARE NAGGED BY QUESTIONS:

--WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE THAT A HALF-CENTURY OF SOVIET PURSUIT OF DOMINANCE AND CONTROL HAS BEEN BRIDLED?

--WHY SHOULD WE RISK DETERRENCE ON THE PROFESSED GOODWILL OF A MAN ONLY THREE YEARS INTO POWER? GLASNOST MUST NOT BE CONFUSED WITH FREEDOM OF THE PRESS OR FREEDOM OF SPEECH BY WESTERN STANDARDS.

THE INF TREATY IS, IN LARGE MEASURE, DUE TO THE COURAGE AND THE COHESION OF THE WEST. WE PROVED THAT, TOGETHER, WE ARE THE MATCH FOR ANY AGGRESSOR -- THAT WE ARE THE ONLY REAL FOIL TO SOVIET EXPANSIONISM.

WE KNOW THAT OUR ADVERSARY HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS HISTORIC GOALS ON THE WORLD SCENE. SO, OUR COURSE SHOULD BE ONE OF NEW INITIATIVE TO CONSTANTLY TEST THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP UNDER GORBACHEV.

THE LEADERS WE CONSULTED THIS WEEK AGREED THAT NATO HAS A TWOFOLD TASK: FIRST, TO FASHION SOUND SOLUTIONS FOR OUR COMMON DEFENSE AND OUR COMMON APPROACH TO A SKILLFUL PROTAGONIST: SECOND, TO PERSUADE OUR PEOPLES OF THE REALITIES WE FACE. OUR MESSAGE MUST BE CLEAR AND CONSTANT -- ARMS CONTROL IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF. IT IS A MEANS TO AN END. THE END BEING A MORE SECURE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

I WAS BORN AT A TIME WHEN WOODROW WILSON PROCLAIMED WORLD WAR I THE "WAR TO END ALL WARS." AND I WAS A YOUNG MAN WHEN FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT GALVANIZED A NATION WITH HIS CALL TO ARMS. A GENERATION HAS COME OF AGE SINCE AMERICA AND EUROPE LAST FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE. THAT THAT GENERATION HAS BEEN SPARED THE TRAUMA OF WAR IS A CREDIT TO THE TRUST AND STRENGTH WE HAVE GIVEN ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC.

IN THE COMING MONTHS WE MUST DECLARE OUR UNITY OF PURPOSE -- NOT JUST TO THE SOVIETS, BUT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE.

WE KNOW WE ARE STILL FAR FROM A TIME WHEN THE WORLD IS IN PERFECT BALANCE. ALTHOUGH NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE, NATO MUST SOON OFFER A STRONG PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTROL.

IN THE END, THE KEY TO PEACE IS COHESION. WE MUST REDECLARE OURSELVES AN ALLIANCE. THE SOVIETS MUST BE CONVINCED OF OUR PUBLIC SUPPORT, AHE DEPTH AND FLEXIBILITY OF OUR ARMED RESPONSE -- AND OUR STAYING POWER.

THE LEADERS IN EUROPE WITH WHOM WE MET SHARE OUR CONCERNS: THEY ARE REALISTIC ABOUT MR. GORBACHEV AND THEY WELCOMED STRONG AMERICAN LEADERSHIP OF THE NATO ALLIANCE. WE PLEDGED TO THEM OUR SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE COMMON DESTINY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA -- FOR EUROPE'S SECURITY IS OUR SECURITY.

THANK YOU. MAY GOD BLESS YOU.

Appendix H

Morning Press Conference with American Journalists based in London

February 8, 1988

Reporter: (question inaudible)

Senator Nunn: ... I think European countries would join with them and I hope that when they feel that it is appropriate America will be consulted and asked to join on some weapons, and we have all sorts of cooperative projects going on now under the program Senator Warner and I sponsored. We have American money being put up for research and development. Any country can join in by sharing. We've got some projects where two countries have joined in; we've got some projects where three countries have joined in; we've got some projects where six countries have joined in. The effort is to get research projects started on a joint basis, so that then the flow from that will be procurement. The ultimate payoff will be at the procurement stage which you'll have a very hard time reaching unless countries join together in the research stage of a project so I don't see the French and Germans getting together on the system and they asked us to consult with them and I think we'd be well advised to do so and I would hope they would have other countries, too. But the standoff weapon for aircraft, I think, in the post-INF environment would be one of our top priorities in NATO.

Reporter: What if we move the question just a little bit broader and out of pure weapons cooperation and into just the fact of the German brigade and in a larger scale cooperation because I think you'll hear some from this from Mrs. Thatcher, who's been stressing constantly in the past couple of weeks, the concern about the potential erosion to NATO. That everything should be done in the NATO context....

Senator Nunn: I think it would have been a wonderful theory if the French had subscribed to NATO for the past twenty-five years. But the French have been ordering a la carte for a long time, from the NATO menu, so I think anytime the French begin to work with Germany or work with Britain or work with America on the joint projects, and we're beginning to, that's a step forward. We're purchasing the multiple subscriber equipment from France. I think that's a step forward. I think the French are improving in terms of their NATO cooperation, and I don't think it's going to be a radical kind of thing or it's going to be evolutionary.

Senator Boren: It's a matter of balance.

Senator Nunn: That's right.

Senator Boren: It's a matter of balance. Right now it represents a step forward in terms of cooperation. I think it's healthy, I think from the start we want to encourage broadening the cooperation. I don't think it's out of balance at this point, I think Mrs. Thatcher's statement is not totally without foundation either. Hers is a concern to keep in mind as this cooperation grows, but I hope to see the cooperation broaden, well, to include other NATO countries.

Reporter: Do you realistically have any notion of the French rejoining the military command?

Senator Nunn: I don't think that is in the cards anytime soon, but I think there is a lot more cooperation now than there has been in the past. Much more. I think if you measured French overall cooperation with NATO now in the military circles, it would have shown up significantly over the last decade. And I believe the French and Germans working together, particularly in the post-INF period, is important for the confidence of the Germans and I think that's an important part of NATO.

Senator Warner: The role the French will play in the conventional arms control talks will put their initiation in the future. There's been some thought that they may not have been in favor of these talks going ahead and indeed, we reconstructed our approach to go to the 23 nation forum to include the French. As you know, the mandate must come out of the CSCE. Assuming those steps take place, much can be determined as to the French attitude from how sincerely they participate in these talks.

Senator Boren: John, I think the French, too, are pretty clear and realistic about Gorbachev's aims, the transparent aims are trying to split the alliance. I think the French are very sensitive to that, and I think the French would regard their steps of cooperation with Germany, not as any kind of a move to in any way divide the allies, but to strengthen, in essence, put more glue on a relationship with a neighboring state and I think that's a healthy aim, but I think it grows out of French realism about Gorbachev's aims in Western Europe.

Senator Nunn: Sometimes it's painful to declare, but occasionally the French are right.

Senator Byrd: I think that's a good distinction, you know, between fragmentation of NATO and cooperation and coordination among our allies, and I'm encouraged by this, what I see as this strong indication that this kind of joint perception of the dangers that confront Western Europe and this kind of coordination, cooperation, working together encourages me.

Reporter: The other side of this is that the British, and the Italians, and Dutch are extremely suspicious of the Germans and the French. Is this a good by-product? If that is what is happening.

Senator Nunn: Well, it depends on what you compare it to. The status quo in NATO is what Tom Callaghan has accurately described as structural disarmament. We're going slowly but surely through unilateral disarmament because the cost of weapons systems is going up so much per unit. All of us are trying to buy our weapons on a unilateral basis. So, if you compare the beginning of cooperation with the French and Germans, and perhaps with others, to the continued slow erosion of NATO's ability to procure weapons systems in an efficient manner, which is essential if you are going to have conventional components, otherwise you slowly and surely deteriorate your conventional position, you rely more and more on the early use of nuclear weapons and you have less and less political support for that theory. So, you've got a NATO slowly becoming more and more dependent on the early use of nuclear weapons and you've got our publics, at a more rapid pace, developing a nuclear allergy. So, I think we have to make some bold changes in NATO, and I think those who advocate a standstill status quo, everything is going to be all right theory, don't speak for me. I think we have got to make some changes. I think NATO is sound politically and sound economically, but we've got to try and make it sound militarily, and it can be done, if we'll all put aside some of our own pride and begin to cooperate more. So, when two countries begin cooperating, I'm not going to be the one to criticize them.

Senator Pell: I think that the striking thing, too, is France and Germany....when you think of the history involved. I know we had some friends whose grandfather was killed in the Franco-Prussian war, their father in WWI, their son in WWII. And when you have that traditional enmity between two of the strongest partners in NATO, those two most antagonistic partners getting together, that is a very....

Senator Nunn: We had a witness before our Committee the other day, who said in their opinion, based on historical perspective, some Europeans want the German army to be strong enough to repulse the Soviet army if it invades but not strong enough to take Luxembourg. So, I mean, there's a lot of history here. It goes back, and we Americans are not privy to all that history. Sometimes, that's a disadvantage, but I think if we look to the future, it may be an advantage. We've got to get past some of these historical fears and really realize that the challenge is ahead. .

Reporter: Is the U.S. commitment to Europe based on current troop levels or is there potential for reducing those levels?

Senator Nunn: Well, I think the troop levels, the American troop levels serve two purposes. One purpose is to join with our allies in providing a viable and credible conventional defense. NATO's declared policy is to be able to fight conventionally for thirty days. We've never been able to do that. And there are a lot of reasons for that, but we can't carry out that part of the declared policy. As l as there is hope of moving to that policy and as long as the allies are making progress in that regard, I think the American troop presence is a very important part of that viable conventional defense. And I think, if those things continue to occur—increased capabilities and taking the thirty day commitment seriously—then I would say the troop levels ought to remain where they are. On the other hand, the second purpose is to connect American conventional with American nuclear. That is what we call coupling, as you all well know. That coupling is also very important. I don't see anything that would disturb that coupling function. But I do see if we are not going to have a credible defense, a thirty day defense capability, then we have to ask ourselves a question over a period of time and we started asking this about three or four years ago. Why should Americans spend $100 billion a year for instance, on forces in the United States to come over here and augment in a war if, when they arrive, the allies are out of ammunition? Why should we have 1500 of the best aircraft in the world and the best pilots in the world ready to come over and come to the relief of Europe under conventional attack if, when they arrive, they don't have minimum essential facilities. They can't refuel, they don't have shelters and so forth, so, it's not a matter of pulling forces out, it's a matter of whether those forces are really contributing to the first purpose which is the thirty day defense.

Now, if we conclude that, at least speaking for only myself, if we conclude that the NATO allies are going strictly to a tripwire—that is, only having American forces there for the purpose of coupling to the nuclear—then we have to take that into account and at that stage, you have to adjust your levels. But as long as our allies are willing to move forward to a viable thirty day counter-capability, now in accordance with NATO's own policy, then I think our troop levels should remain where they are.

Senator Warner: May I add one observation? You will soon learn of the coming budget for the Department of Defense and Senator Nunn and I, perhaps others, have been briefed on it. For the first time, gentlemen, we will be taking end strength cuts in our troops. Upwards of 20,000 troops will be eliminated from our overall force structure. So far as I have been able to determine, none of those individuals will come from the NATO commitment directly. It seems to me that points up again, the emphasis that we place on the present force structure in the light of the negotiations that are going on and the sensitivity to those negotiations of maintaining our commitment in Europe.

Senator Pell: I would add here, it would seem to me that there is a sense of disappointment among some of us in America, the fact that Europe has not contributed more and you have the traditional statistic that you know as well as us, that they spend about as half as much as we do in proportion to their GNP and one's conscious of that, we'd hope that they would do better, and I think there will be continued pressure on them to do better in that regard, and you also know that the statistic, that the NATO countries, minus the United States, still have more productive ability and more population than the Warsaw Pact countries including the Soviet Union. We are always conscious of that and there is this sense that they should fill up their socks to do more.

Senator Boren: I think the bottom line we go back to though, and again it stresses what Senator Byrd said about continuity in the beginning, the fact that we are having an INF treaty does nothing to change what American policy has been before we had an INF treaty. In other words, INF is a victory you might say, for NATO unity. It's only because we deployed the Pershing II that we were ever able to get an INF agreement. We were able to remove a class of weapons that were, you might say, exclusively posing a threat to Europe. They didn't pose a threat really to us, to a large degree, but that doesn't, just the fact that we won a victory for Europe through NATO unity, and I think that's the way we have to look at it with the INF. It doesn't change any of the conditions that caused us to have the troops, where they are, or to commit our nuclear deterrent, as we have always committed it to the defense of Europe. Those two fundamental cornerstones remain exactly in the same place that they were before we ever started Pershing II deployment and forced the Soviets into the INF agreement to get rid of the SS 20's. We're back to where we were; it's never changed and I think people talk about a pre-INF world and a post-INF world and so on. The fact is that American policy in terms of true presence and strategic deterrence—commitment of our strategic nuclear deterrence—is exactly the same....it's just as Senator Byrd's fond of saying—the Senate's been here 200 years. Well you can say this policy has been here for, I don't know, decades now, and it is still exactly the same policy and this continuing legislative body reaffirms it.

Senator Warner: In the past year, we have had a very high profile military situation in the Persian Gulf. When the American people first observed that, it appeared we'd go it alone, the United States. But then, gradually, the British and the French forces came in and now other forces....and American people are recognizing in these far flung areas of the world, that indeed, our allies do come in and share the responsibility and share the risk and I think this has an indirect support on what we continue to do in Europe.

Reporter: Could I ask if you're concerned in the way that the Germans seem to be increasingly isolated over strategy in the arms control talks, because they are taking such a strong position over what should happen next, on the short range weapons?

Senator Nunn: Well, I'm concerned and I think that there is a difference of opinion in the German government itself and certainly in Germany. I think that's one of the reasons that the French and the Germans are moving closer together and that is one of the reasons I am not willing to criticize that at this date. I think it may be good for both countries and for NATO overall. That's also a reason I think we ought to calmly and cooly assess the Montebello decisions, and see if there's any adjustment that needs to be made in the post-INF environment, and emphasize to our people in Germany and in Europe that we're really talking about upgrading and making more survivable the systems that are there. Making more survivable the systems that are there already makes the nuclear situation more stabilizing, not less. We need to assess very carefully some of the real short range systems that essentially are artillery systems, as to how many we need. We don't need to go in there and double and triple the number of short range systems that we have now. We need to emphasize the longer range systems that are permitted in the INF treaty and we need to emphasize survivability.

Senator Boren: Also, we need to project the image, again, I mention the conventional that we are—there has been some image given that there might be a rush or some sort of hasty push toward a START agreement. I think all of us hope for a START agreement at some point in time, but I think all of us realize that there should not be undue haste for an agreement, just for the sake of reaching an agreement. And again, instead of projecting the image of undue haste toward a START agreement, we must emphasize conventional arms control negotiations and get those negotiations going in earnest.

One of the things we will do in the Intelligence Committee is assess for verifiability of the INF and report our findings to to Senator Pell's Committee and to the Senate. At this point, I have no reason to believe that it our assessment will not positive. We're in the middle of our study. We will also assess the verifiability of the INF treaty in a START environment. That will be a second question that we will ask. And I will not prejudge what the answer to that very difficult question at this time.

Senator Warner: There's some thinking now that the START effort could take advantage of the considerable progress concluded under the Ronald Reagan Administration and that the formal treaty, which would require additional work, would pass on as a responsibility of the next Presidency. One of the reasons for that, is the rather byzantine and complicated course that the conventional talks are now embarked. Those talks are tied up in the CSCE where there could be linkage to human rights issues and so forth, before the mandate emerges enabling the 23 nations forum to get started. If you look at these time tables, and overlay on that, a very fierce American political presidential scene in conventions and the like, it's beginning to appear that concluding a START treaty will be difficult.

Senator Nunn: It's how it appears on the Republican side, John.

Senator Warner: This is just a marginal victory that will....

Reporter: Actually, on that point to what extent do you think the debate over INF might be a political hot potato, since we have both parties here?

Senator Warner: I might add that I have had the privilege of travelling with our distinguished Majority Leader, here, beginning in '85 when we went to Moscow to visit Gorbachev. He has consistently said that these are matters which really rise above politics and it doesn't make any difference who is President. If they're in the national security interests of this country, then they should go forward. So, if I may be presumptuous, Bob, I think it's always been your thought that the timing, the consideration of these treaties is a matter of supreme national interest, and partisan politics, certainly at your level of leadership, would not be a factor.

Senator Byrd: With the support at this point of both Republican and Democratic members of the Senate, I can't see how it could become a partisan issue and it certainly ought not be.

Reporter: Could you say the same about START?

Senator Byrd: START is going to be much, much more complex, difficult, and dangerous than INF. For years they have been talking, and finally, they have an INF agreement. START is going to involve verification procedures that will be big league compared to the verification procedures in connection with the INF Treaty. If I were to say anything with respect to START, it would be go slowly, slow down, and I would be concerned, and I think the American public would be concerned, perhaps European publics would be concerned, if it appeared that we're in a pell-mell rush to get a START agreement this year, that there might be some appearance or suspicion of political expediency involved. I would hope that we would proceed slowly, cautiously and see how we get along with the verification procedures. We are going to be on the INF Treaty for a while. I have no doubt whatsoever, barring the condition that I have laid down earlier, that we'll do the INF treaty, but when it comes to START, that is something else. If we are not careful, it could give the impression of making too much haste in order to get an agreement before there is a change in administration.

And I think this is something we ought not be partisan about. I'm doing everything that I can to avoid any appearance of partisanship when it comes to matters that affect the security interests of ourselves and our allies. And we certainly need to do a lot of consultation with our allies. We haven't done enough. We've not only been confused with respect to what happened at Reykjavik, but I don't think there has been enough consultation and I would hope that we would look at this thing very carefully and take the time to be sure that we are right. The mix is extremely important when we talk about the various weaponry that is going to be involved in the START agreement. I can understand how the Europeans are concerned about where we are from time to time, but we are also concerned, and I share Sam Nunn's emphasis. Let me simply say that I am concerned about the talk of the elimination of 300 nuclear weapons. After all, we've got 300,000 men there too, and it's not just Germans who would be dead; we'd have Americans dead if anything ever happens, if the Warsaw Pact countries and/or the Soviet Union were to attempt to make a sudden surprise attack there. It seems to me that having those theater nuclear weapons , is a warning that any surprise attack is going to result in pain, on the other side as well.

Reporter: To go back to the pace of the START, would you accept a Vladivostok-type weigh station?

Senator Byrd: Let me phrase it this way. I don't think that we ought to be in too big a rush. I would hope the observer team, which was created by the United States Senate at my suggestion, would very closely monitor the talks, any talks, with respect to START. And Sam Nunn is on that team, Claiborne Pell is on it....

Senator Warner: I'm on it also.

Senator Byrd: John Warner is on it. You have a very good cross-section of the committee that handles jurisdiction. Sam, do you or Claiborne or any others wish to add anything?

Senator Warner: I would simply add that under the direction of the President, a great deal of valuable work has been done. We see it now in START and indeed it is there. It is there in INF and it is there in START. And I think it would be in the best interest of this country that progress not be lost. For the next President, who would not necessarily be bound to every term of it, such a legacy would set before the world, the framework of what has been achieved to date, and what remains to be done. So its essential, in my judgment, to preserve the contribution to the START process by this President, as he departs office.

Senator Pell: And I'd like to add two points. One is, I agree completely with John Warner. There is a certain momentum here that we want to capture; and at the same time, we have recognized that it would take as much as a year or more for the next Administration to ready the deal, the negotiations. How do we capture that momentum if we don't achieve an agreement? I, for one, would like to see such an interim agreement, but a START looks dubious. Secondly, with regard to INF, we hope, by the end of the month, that hearings would be completed. Most important, we will hear from the Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn's committee, and the Intelligence Committee, Dave Boren's committee, as to their views on the military impact and the verifiability of the treaty. And if they concur, we will then be in a position to recommend to the Senate toward the end of March, the treaty for debate. That's our goal that we hope to achieve.

Senator Boren: Claiborne, we will probably be able to report to you on verification. We'll have about two more weeks of meetings after we return to be able to....we go back to the point and this will have some bearing on START that we feel obligated in looking at verification under INF. We are not only looking how the verification would be sufficient today, with an INF treaty by itself, but would it be effective also, with a START agreement in place as well. When you look at purely INF environment, that debate is not as important as it might appear on the surface the Soviets have the incentive to cheat with 10,000 strategic warheads that could easily be retargeted against Europe. So, I think it's not nearly the same kind of argument and importance as it is if you have START agreements that significantly reduce the numbers of all sytems. Cheating with 100 or 200 or 300 hidden missiles, it becomes far more significant under START. It will require upgrading our national technical means of verifications as it may be unlikely that onsite inspection rights established under START will be effective in detecting covert deployments of Soviet missiles. Even with suspect site inspections, it is unclear how effective on site inspection can ever be in detecting cheating.

Appendix I

Evening Press Conference
After Meeting With Prime Minister Thatcher

London, England
February 8, 1988

Senator Byrd: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attendance here this evening. This group of Senators is made up of the chairmen of the Senate committees that have jurisdiction over the INF Treaty: Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell; Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn; Intelligence Committee, Senator Boren; and ranking member on the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner. It is our goal during this time that the Senate is not in session to visit five NATO countries, England, Germany, France, Turkey, Italy. The purpose is to see and hear what these countries have to say about the INF treaty—where do we go from here; hear their views with respect to START, with respect to modernization of tactical nuclear weapons, the third zero option and so on. Also, we want them to understand that there is a commitment on the part of the U.S. to NATO and that we intend to stand by that commitment. Also, we must be wary of what we perceive as a new leader. We must remember that the substance may differ from what we hear. In other words, is it the same type of leader, is it the same goal? While it may be a new type of leader, the goals remain the same. We've got to keep our eye on the ball.

We are ready for your questions.

Reporter: Senator Nunn, Senator Byrd, will you be delaying the approval of the INF while this dispute with the administration continues on whether the administration's testimony is authoritative or not? Is this really a dispute over the ABM treaty making INF hostage to the narrower or broad interpretation of that treaty?

Senator Nunn: The second answer is unequivocally no. The INF treaty and the ABM treaty are two different treaties. The difficulty arose when the Administration reinterpreted the ABM treaty. They set forth several different premises that applied to all treaties. So the only link between ABM and INF is the link that was created on the reinterpretation which set forth various rules for the Senate's role in how it relates to the executive branch and the overall advice and consent to the ratification process. So, those declarations caused us to ask questions that have to be asked for any important treaty. The first question—how long the delay? I don't know why the delay should last more than a day or two in terms of the Armed Services Committee. And that may not delay the overall treaty. The Foreign Relations Committee has primary jurisdiction of the treaty. We are not going to pass the treaty out of our committee. We're going to hear from Administration witnesses and the only delay is a delay until we can hear from the Secretary of State. We thought we'd solved the problem with a letter that had almost been agreed on. It had never been completely agreed on. That broke down and now we have to ask the questions in some hearing forum . But I would hope it could be resolved in a day or two. If not a day or two, certainly within three or four days. In the meantime, we're not going to hold up the hearings. We're simply going to concentrate on outside witnesses rather than government witnesses until this can be resolved.

Question: Just to follow up on that, do you feel you have to go into the whole negotiating record?

Senator Nunn: Well, we've already got the negotiating record. There were really four different points that we were negotiating with the State Department and Secretary Shultz. One of them was the negotiating record and what the definition was. That was solved the day before we left. We now have the negotiating record. We have a definition that both the legislative leadership at least on the Senate side and the executive branch through the State Department have agreed on. So, that is not a problem any more. We do have the record and we will be going through that negotiating record. I personally think it would be much better if we did not have to even go through a negotiating record because I think you should be able to completely believe what the executive branch testifies to as to the treaty and what its meaning is, but again that's been forced on us by some of the statements and premises that were the heart of the ABM reinterpretation.

Question: Some press reports on Mr. Carlucci's remarks in Munich....the Germans seem to assume if you update the short range nuclear weapons you somehow will be able to reach the Soviet Union. Surely no weapons in the maximum range of 300 miles, 500 kilometers, would be able to reach the Soviet Union. In what way would you actually update or modernize a short range nuclear weapon?

Senator Nunn: Well, one thing, you would like to make it more survivable. The other way you would like to make any weapon, you have to strive for more accuracy. So the updating of the Lance, for instance, which is perfectly legal under the INF definition, has been agreed to at Montebello. That was a decision taken in 1983 by the Alliance. There were other decisions made at Montebello where actually the result was a reduction of some 1400 weapons with a pledge by the NATO alliance to update the other weapons. And so I think we ought to be talking about modernization not as a nuclear buildup, which it's not and should not be, but rather a continuation of keeping our weapons effective. You always have to have an upgrading of nuclear and conventional systems. You can't fight with the same kind of aircraft that you had in World War II. You can't use the same kind of technology that you used then in the conventional field, neither can you in the nuclear field. I do not like to see, however, a discussion that appears to be occurring, and I do not believe Secretary of Defense Carlucci intended for his statement to be interpreted the way it has been. I believe that he is as much in favor of modernization as all of us are here, but it seems to me that the connection was made that if we completely denuclearize Europe that we are going to possibly see the withdrawal of American forces. I don't know where that comes from because I have not heard any government that is advocating the denuclearization of Europe. There may be a few groups, there may be a few opposition people in some countries, so I don't think that conversation is very helpful to NATO at this point and I'm sure the Secretary of Defense did not intend it to come out that way.

I believe we ought to be focusing on what NATO agrees on. I think we've agreed on INF. We agreed on a two-track system, and that two-track system has now produced a treaty. I think we ought to be talking about NATO 's deficiencies which are primarily conventional and if I had to assign any priority, the conventional side and the conventional credibility increasing, our conventional credibility, is in my view on the front burner. That ought to be the top priority of NATO.

Boardman from Turkey: How does Turkey fit into all this?

Senator Byrd: How does Turkey fit into all this? Turkey is a valuable NATO ally. Turkey is a valuable democratic friend. It's a democracy and it adds great strength to NATO. I think Turkey certainly has a right to hear what we have to say about the INF treaty. It may have questions about the treaty. We want to know what Turkey thinks. How do the Turks view not only the INF Treaty, but START? How would they view the need for the reduction in conventional forces? So, it seems to me that with a very valuable ally in NATO, we would certainly want to hear what they have to say. We can't visit all of the capitols of all of the NATO countries. But certainly we feel that we ought to visit these five. I don't think we see Turkey enough as far as I'm concerned. They may not be as involved in this particular question as are Bonn and London, but they're an important ally.

Senator Nunn: If I could just add that the SS-20 going to zero affects Turkey. Turkey is a front line state. We forget that many times; in addition to Central Europe, we have other front line states. Turkey is certainly one of them and one of the most important. Removing that threat is of interest to the government of Turkey and we'll be interested in their reaction.

Question: Could I get back to what Senator Nunn was saying a moment ago about tactical battlefield nuclear weapons. Would I be right in interpreting his remarks to mean that while we'd like to see them modernized, you would not want to give that such high priority if there is strong resistance in Germany. I understand that you're going on from here to Bonn, will your judgment on that be much influenced by....over there?

Senator Nunn: I think we ought to consider the Germans' sensitivities. I think we ought to consider modernization as an essential element, but I do not believe we ought to appear to threaten or be demanding. I think a collective decision has to be made about what kind of modernization. My own priorities on modernization would be the longer range systems that are permitted by the INF treaty, and I particularly want to emphasize that a standoff weapon carried by aircraft is in no way barred by the INF treaty. I have always thought that there was a limited utility, but an important one for shorter range systems, and I believe that we ought to be striving for survivability there. I think we ought to be very conscious of the fact that those shorter range systems inevitably are viewed by the host country as something they want to look at carefully before deployment. So I think we ought to consider what the Germans think, and I don't think we ought to be in a threatening mode. I believe we ought to make the decision collectively about how to modernize, but I do believe we must modernize.

Senator Boren: I could add one point to that. I think what Senator Nunn has said underlines another concern we all have and that is one of the gravest threats we face. I think sometimes the peoples of the western democracies do not realize this imbalance in conventional forces. I think it's extremely important that we continue to increase our conventional strength and that we also put the highest priority on trying to get the Soviets to the bargaining table in an area in which they have very clear superiority—conventional forces. I think sometimes that with all of our discussion of nuclear treaties and nuclear agreements, we forget to put the emphasis on the conventional threat that faces us and we should be putting more emphasis there.

Senator Nunn: I think that's one of the things valuable about the INF treaty. It does set the precedent for asymmetrical or disproportionate reductions. General Secretary Gorbachev said in a speech in Czechoslovakia about a year ago that the side that had the largest number in conventional arms should build down, rather than the side that had the fewer weapons building up. I think we ought to challenge him in that and hold him to his general statement by proposing that we either have a dramatic reduction on the Soviet forces with some reduction in the U.S.forces or that we seek common ceilings. So conventional arms control ought to be on the front burner. I think we should tell the Soviets that we're going to give them a chance to produce a conventional balance in Europe to ease the reliance of NATO on the early use of nuclear weapons, because if the conventional threat is reduced then we can have a much better and more stable policy. We're also giving them a chance to save a lot of money. They are going to get to save a lot more money than we are. I think that ought to be an enticement to the Soviets because they are going to have to reduce a lot more than we are to get that kind of balance.

Senator Pell: I'd like to add here that we are working together as three committees. The Foreign Relations Committee will not report out the Treaty unless and until the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees have assured us that from the viewpoint of weaponry and viewpoint of verification that the treaty is in order. We are working in partnership and travelling that way. I would also add in supplementary response to the question about Turkey that there is no sentiment against any nation that's not included; we wanted to come to the nations we have scheduled and there are just six days and six countries to visit.

Senator Warner: I'd like to add the following. This is a bipartisan delegation and we've just finished a fascinating one hour meeting with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, during which time I gained clear impressions that she was highly supportive of the President of the U.S. in his efforts not only on the INF agreement, but also the manner in which he is directing the negotiations on the START agreement. We covered certain specifics on that. My impression is that clearly there's no feeling here in Great Britain that we are rushing to a START agreement. The President is pacing this in a careful way to get precisely an agreement that's in the best interest of all of our NATO allies, and there was emphasis placed on improvements in the consultative process between the U.S. and Great Britain and our allies, certainly since Rejkavik. I come away with very positive impressions from the Prime Minister that the ongoing negotiations with START are being conducted in a manner that is consistent with the security of our NATO allies as well as the U.S.

Reporter: Mrs. Thatcher is always supportive of the President of the U.S. and she's not always so keen on what some people consider to be real cooperative efforts in Europe. Sometimes we have the impression that she isn't so keen on those efforts because she fears she will be seen by the U.S. as undermining the Atlantic alliance in some sort of way. And I think Senator Nunn is of the opinion that quite often people can....this sphere in a rather exaggerated fashion. Would you say that that exaggeration was so?

Senator Nunn: Just this morning I gave my own view that the German-French cooperation is welcome. Obviously we all would like to have the French be a part of NATO rather than ordering, as I term it, a la carte from the NATO menu, but the French have been much more cooperative in recent years. On the discussions between the British and the French on the standoff weapons, I welcome those things. I hope it can be the first step towards a broader partnership—the first step towards a multinational kind of approach. But I believe those things are positive. I got the impression, for instance, that Defense Minister Younger welcomed those kinds of moves and that Mrs. Thatcher was not adverse, but was rather watching this with a great deal of interest.

Question: Senator Nunn, about conventional force reduction being on the front burner, there are many of us who would rather expect before long that Mr. Gorbachev come forward with a proposal that asymmetrical reductions.... Do you and your colleagues have any thoughts as to which segment of western forces....

Senator Nunn: My own preference would be that if you are going to have a U.S. Soviet negotiation, then of course you would be talking about a reduction of Soviet weapons vs. U.S. weapons and Soviet divisions vs. U.S. divisions and that would have to be very asymmetrical. I've suggested before and I repeat, something like a 50 percent cut in the U.S. vs. a 50 percent cut in the Soviets. That would mean they would have to reduce approximately 15 divisions to 2. That would change dramatically the possibility of a surprise attack or a massing of forces. Now there's another route to go, that is, to talk about the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and I think the way to go if you are talking in that direction is something like a common ceiling. That would take Secretary Gorbachev up on his premise of having equal ceilings and having the side ahead reduced. I'm not wedded to one approach or the other. I think NATO is behind the game, so to speak. I think NATO really needs to bear down and get a joint proposal that we can agree with. I believe that proposal serves two purposes. Hopefully we can arrive at some kind of real reduction in conventional forces and that's where the big money is. I don't think either side is going to save a lot of money on nuclear reductions....it's conventional forces where the big money is. If the Soviets really want to improve their economy, they've got to lower the percentage of GNP spent on forces. The way to do that and the way to produce stability in Europe and ease anxiety in Europe is to have that kind of reduction.

Reporter: In your opinion, modernization of nuclear weapons should not be....

Senator Nunn: We've always had the plan for air-based and sea-based cruise missiles. We already have some sea-based cruise missiles so you are not talking about a new element that has been added, you are talking about a continuation of the plans that were already underway that are in no way barred or impeded by the INF treaty. Now obviously if we get a START treaty, it will be a different situation. Frankly, the military utility of an INF treaty in the long run depends on having a START treaty to follow on; otherwise you don't have any limits on these other forces. So the way to get at those forces is to have a START treaty which is being negotiated now. I hope we can arrive at that. I hope we do it in a careful way. I'm not in any rush. I think we should do it on the basis of merit and not on the basis of any arbitrary time frame. Senator Byrd made that point and continues to make that point on which I agree.

Senator Byrd: Also, the Soviets might offer an asymmetrical proposal. It can be asymmetrical and still not be in the security interests of the alliance. How asymmetrical is it? I think we have to be very careful as we approach an historic agreement. I hope we won't let the momentum and euphoria that result from the INF agreement sweep us pell mell into agreeing to something in the long run simply because its asymmetrical. The Soviets have a lot more weapons than we have. The Soviets have a lot more conventional weapons than the alliance has. They can afford for it to be asymmetrical. What is the mix? What are the verification procedures? What are the sublimits? I hope that we will be careful as we go forward talking about the START agreement. We all favor a START agreement, but let's wait and see what's in it, and let's be sure that it is in the security interests of all of us. We see on this world stage now a new leader. He may make offers that sound mighty good. Let's look at them under the microscope. What we want is not to meet a deadline on the START agreement. A timetable. What we want is a good agreement that will stand the test of time.

Senator Boren: Senator Byrd is certainly right from the point of view of my responsibilities on the Intelligence Committee. Obviously, the verification requirements of a strategic agreement are substantially greater and a different kind than we have with a verification procedures for an INF agreement and so we I think have to take great care and not be rushed under any artificial time table. We must make sure, as Senator Byrd has said, that we get a good agreement and one that definitely can be verified.

Senator Warner: One further comment on the conventional talks. Again, NATO at the present time is devising the basic guidelines for the talks to be conducted by the 23 nation conference, which includes France. The Soviet Union may make some unilateral declarations, indeed others may make unilateral declarations about the asymmetries, as the Majority Leader said, on conventional weapons, my judgment is that there has to be agreement in that 23 nation forum, each nation participating, if we are to achieve any success in eliminating the asymmetries in the conventional weaponry.

Senator Byrd: Thank you.

Appendix J

Press Conference

Bonn, Germany
February 9, 1988

Welcome gentlemen. We of the Bonn press corp appreciate that you've found some time to come here to answer some questions by the German and international media. Thank you very much, Mr. Byrd.

Senator Byrd: Thank you very much and thank all of you for your presence. This delegation is visiting 5 NATO capitals this week. We want to get from those 5 capitals and leaders, a better understanding of their perception of INF, of where we go from here, and of the new leadership in the Soviet Union and how we should best approach the problems and opportunities that confront us in this atmosphere. We just had a very interesting and exciting visit with Chancellor Kohl and I feel that I can say without hesitation, and enthusiastically, that the U.S.-Germany relationship is unshakable. Unshakable. We have a mutuality of interests. We believe together that unity, cohesion, and firmness and steadfastness brought us the INF treaty.

We were not fooled at the table by Mr. Gorbachev. They walked away. But through its unity, its collaboration, collective action, and standing together, the alliance brought them back and as a result, has given us what we think is a good treaty.

Now secondly, we look forward to the opportunities and challenges. We have in the Soviet Union a dynamic, formidable, articulate, aggressive new leader. How do we accept all of this in the light of past history? I think we are in agreement. We're in agreement that the strategies that the alliance makes must result from the collective planning based on what we perceive as our mutual security interests and not based on a perception of good will or intention on the part of adversaries. In other words, let caution be the watchword as we go forward. But we must be prepared to seize the opportunities that come, not only seize the opportunities, but make the opportunities. And Chancellor Kohl feels very strongly as we do--we should go on the offensive in seeking new opportunities. And we must always keep in mind that it is the decision of the alliance, the collective decisions, the collective efforts, that will enhance our mutual security.

Thirdly, as we look at START, another treaty, let us proceed cautiously. Let us take our time. There should not be a time table, a deadline. The time for a START treaty is when we have a treaty that will serve the mutual good and security of all.

So we're in agreement. We're in agreement on all these things. And we are not here to meddle in the internal political affairs of this country. We are here to listen, to learn, and we believe that the spirit of friendship and the mutual interests of our two countries and our two peoples are most advanced when we work together in the alliance. In unity, we have seen that there is strength.

We welcome your questions.

Reporter: (can't hear question)

Senator Boren: Senator Dole is in Iowa. Senator Byrd is speaking to delegates. (laughter)

Senator Byrd: Yes, up to a point. We don't always agree, but I think we are in agreement on what we've said here.

Senator Warner: If I may say, I'm Senator Warner, the Republican, who makes this a bipartisan delegation. The leader of course, expresses in general terms the objectives we are seeking to attain in our visits. But I believe in terms of attribution, this Senator should speak for myself, although generally speaking, the leader and I are much of the same view. For example, on the question of START, my impressions having talked with the Chancellor are that President Reagan and his Secretary of State through the U.S. Ambassador here are keeping the general public well informed. As the president continues the START negotiations, the views of Federal Republic are being considered through this close consultation. And secondly, I gained, (speaking for myself) that it would be in the interest of the Federal Republic and our allies, if this agreement could be concluded under this presidency. Again I agree with Senator Byrd entirely, that the time for the agreement is when the U.S. in consultation with our allies, agree that it's the right agreement and it's in the security interest, not only of our country, but of our allies. But I think the impression I gain that it is possible, that it could well be achieved under this president.

Reporter: You earlier talked about unity within the alliance. Now there is the Montebello agreement which called for the modernization of short range weapons. There is increasing to that in this government. What will the consequences be for cohesion, and for staying here of U.S. troops?

Senator Byrd: May I ask Senator Nunn, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, to respond?

Senator Nunn: Thank you, Mr. Leader. I believe the Montebello decision has been taken in good faith by the alliance. I don't think there is any difference in concept in carrying out that decision, including the governments we've talked to—the British government and the German government. I believe that there is a feeling in the German government that the Montebello decision in concept should be carried out, but I think they want to take another look at the post-INF environment and judge where we go from here. So that the idea that was expressed to us today was to take the whole concept into account in where we're going with modernization. It seems to me that that is an understandable position and that our own government should consult very closely with our German friends and with our other NATO allies in deciding where we all want to go with modernization in the post-INF environment. I think it would behoove the entire alliance if we put the conventional side up front. I do not think we ought to ignore in any way both the opportunity and the challenge of the conventional balance. The more we seek equilibrium in nuclear weapons, both strategic and theater, the more important the conventional balance is, and we do not have a conventional balance now. So both through conventional force improvements and conventional arms control, it seems to me those ought to be priorities while we all consult very closely about where we're going with nuclear modernization. I would like to add one other point on that answer. There was no support for a third zero in the German government and also there is no support for the denuclearization of Europe. I believe that the emphasis in the German government is entirely appropriate when they say that our next step should really be to focus on conventional arms control and to get a NATO proposal that we can sit down and discuss within the spirit of unity within the alliance.

Reporter: Do you expect ratification shortly of the INF treaty? And secondly a question to which you have already part the answer, why does the U.S. call for the modernization of short range missiles before you've started to withdraw the intermediate range missiles?

Senator Byrd: Let me answer your first question with one word—yes. After very careful consideration I'll add a few words. Secondly, let me refer the second part of that question to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn.

Senator Nunn: There is a very simple answer to that question. The reason there is talk of modernization is because the modernization decision in NATO was taken in 1983 before INF. The modernization being discussed is not of the weapons included in the INF treaty. We really need to view INF as a treaty that affects the hole of the doughnut—in a logical world it might not be the most logical place to start. It is a treaty that has been signed and the alliance stuck together. But we do not, and it would be very bad for us, to consider that the INF treaty solved all of NATO's problems. We still have a serious conventional imbalance; we still must rely on the nuclear deterrent, and I think there is broad consensus on that. So modernization is a continuation of a decision made in 1983 by the alliance and I think that process should continue.

Senator Byrd: Might I call on Senator Pell, who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for a comment with respect to the first question to which I answered yes.

Senator Pell: We are preceeding with all dispatch that we can to hear the witnesses that we should to give the treaty the examination it must have. In that regard we do not intend to report it out until the Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee have given us their views in regard to the military impact of the treaty and also the verification aspects of it. It is quite likely our present schedule could slip, but I would certainly expect that by March sometime, we should get the treaty to the floor of the Senate, where it will be up to the Leader to call it up.

Senator Byrd: Senator Boren—may I have him contribute to the same question—he is chairman of the Intelligence Committee and therefore has a very important assignment.

Senator Boren: Thank you, Mr. Leader. We are proceeding on our hearings on verification, that is the aspect of the treaty that the Intelligence Committee examines. And I would say up to this point, we have not found any problem in the area of verification of the INF treaty that we anticipate would cause any problems. We do feel that we will be able provide a report to the Foreign Relations Committee early in March and unless we find something new that we haven't uncovered at this point, I would expect a favorable report. But I think again, to underline what Senator Byrd said earlier the verification problems associated with any potential START agreement are far more complex than the verification associated with INF because you are talking about reducing systems that are still potentially in production or potentially deployed. And therefore again I would underline the need to proceed with caution on START to make sure that we get a START agreement—I think all of us hope for that—but to make sure that we have a verification regime that will work and that will be protective of mutual security interests of both of our countries.

Question: (inaudable)

Senator Nunn: I'm not trying to give you what was said yesterday. I'm trying to give the impression of what was said to us today. That's all I will be accountable for in my remarks. And the concept of modernization was in no way disageed with by any of the officials we talked to. There was a statement that the NATO alliance needed to get together and decide the systems that we needed to modernize, where we are now in terms of the modernization program, and how we go forward but the concept was not disagreed with. I think everyone should understand that as long as you have weapon systems whether they are conventional or nuclear, there has to be a continuous process of modernization. And that has been a principle of military development for centuries. You cannot hold the status quo. I think in my own mind, that the highest priority in NATO should be conventional force improvement, conventional arms control of a bold nature, and also an educational kind of effort so that our public understands that as long as we have the tremendous imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO then we're going to have to continue to use the overall concept of nuclear deterrence.

What's the difference between a decision and an agreement? I consider both of them to be the same thing. I consider that Montebello was an agreement. I think there was flexibility in Montebello. I don't think everything is in concrete, but the idea was that we were going to take out weapons which have come out. I don't think many people have focused on the fact that NATO has withdrawn about 2400 weapons since 1979 of the theatre range. So we have far fewer nuclear weapons now than we had then. This process continues to evolve. There may be some other weapons that we reexamine that don't need to be in terms of suitability , survivability and effectiveness in the inventory. The ones that are here we want to make as survivable as possible and as safe as possible. and as effective as possible. As I view Montebello, it was both an agreement and a decision. I understand that the governments will stick with that, but we have to review that decision according to the German government in the post INF environment. I think that is a reasonable kind of position. Let's review it together and decide what systems we need to continue forward with , whether we need to go to systems of a higher range , how far we need to go with the shorter range systems and whether some of the systems need to be revisited in terms of their effectiveness.

Senator Boren: I think we should add that one of the reasons this Senate delegation is here is that we represent continuity. Senator Byrd has been in the Senate for 30 years. He has seen presidents, secretaries of state, come and go and the Senate continues as a continuing body and I think one of the things that we would want to express as a group again as the continuity of our policy both in terms of our commitment to be here as an American presence, a physical human presence, and our commitment to the ultimate deterrent still to be used to protect the interests of this country. Nothing has really changed from the situation we found ourselves in before we had INF deployed and before we had an INF treaty. We simply had a victory and I think alot of credit goes to Chancellor Kohl and others who had the fortitude to deploy the weapons that brought the other side to the bargaining table; we won a victory because of that determination. Now we've removed that particular threat aimed at Europe. We still have the particular need to continue the same and we have the continuity of the same policy of commitment on our part and I think we have found in our discussions today, and I hope we've been reassuring to the other side. Let me say that I think we have been reassured. I think that's always a danger that we emphasize the very few areas of which there was even a modicum of disagreement. What we really see here today is fundamental unity and agreement a condition that continues in the situation that we had before—we still face the same threat of conventional forces—where just terrible damage can be inflicted by conventional forces. They constitute a grave threat to Western Europe and I think that was a common thread emphasized very strongly. As Senator Nunn has said I think we ought to emphasize the points of agreement here and the fact that our policy continues and it's going to keep on continuing.

Senator Nunn: Let me make one other point. I know there is some concern among European allied citizens when America is deploying theater missiles. There is a concern about decoupling. When America is taking missiles out, there is a concern about decoupling. So whether we're putting missiles in or taking missiles out, a recorder comes on and says America is again decoupling. I think everyone ought to recognize that we have agreed in INF to have an on site inspection team in the heart of the Soviet Union in a place called Votkinsk. The beauty of that inspection team is to make sure that every missile that comes out of that factory is an SS-25 which can reach New York, Washington, Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles and not an SS-20 that can reach only Europe. Now if that's not coupling, I don't know what coupling is and that is the duty of that inspection team. If it's an SS 25 that can hit the U.S., fine, come on out. If it's an SS-20 that can hit only Europe, then it's a violation. That's the ultimate in coupling. I won't be making that point as strongly in the U.S. (laughter)

Question: ....Do you consider the second part of the Montebello agreement as binding as the first part? NATO has set up a schedule for the modernization process—have you discussed this schedule with our Chancellor?

Senator Nunn: We did not go into that degree of detail. I consider Montebello a decision that was made in the Alliance like any other decision in the Alliance; it can be reviewed in the post-INF environment. If we are requested to review that decision with our German friends, then I think a reasonable position for the American government—and I don't pretend to speak for that government, I'm giving only one Senator's view—but if we are asked to review a portion of the Montebello decision with our German friends and our other NATO allies, I think that should be reviewed. I repeat that I am in favor of continuing the modernization program, but the details of that seem to me must have some flexibility and a review if requested certainly would be in order. I would hope that would be discussed in detail at the summit conference which will take place in March. But I would also hope that we don't put the nuclear horse in front of the overall conventional needs. I think we need to make sure the conventional horse is out front. And in the conventional arms control arena where we have an imbalance, we don't in NATO have a proposal. So the challenge is for NATO to respond in a bold and innovative way in conventional arms control and also for NATO to undertake the force improvements necessary to form a two track system with conventional capabilities and conventional arms control similar to the two track system on INF.

Senator Warner: Could I make just a point here and I think that my good friend and colleague would agree that NATO is working hard on a framework for the conventional arms control talks. A final consensus hasn't been reached yet, but I think considerable progress has been made.

Senator Byrd: Let me close by referring to a note that Senator Boren struck. He told you that I'd been in the Senate 30 years. What he didn't tell you is that I'm running again for reelection so that I can be there 36 years. But what does that say? That says that presidents whether federalists, antifederalists, national republicans, republicans, whigs, or democrats come and go, but old Senators just fade away.

Now let me say further what that says. That says that the United States Senate is a continuing body and that under our constitution, the Senate has an equal role with any President of the U.S. in the making of treaties. And it takes two thirds of the Senate to approve the ratification of a treaty.

Chancellor Kohl mentioned this today and I've lived long enough to see it. He said we remember the helping hand that was extended by the Americans, by Herbert Hoover, who by the way, we Democrats at one point in time, hoped would run as a democrat. Our helping hand is the hand of a friend. And the German people remember that—we cherish that memory. I'm sure that neither of us will forget that we should make new friends but keep the old. Thank you.

APPENDIX K

Round Table Discussion in Paris, February 10, 1988

Ambassador RODGERS:
It's a sincere pleasure to welcome our distinguished French colleagues here this morning for this round-table discussion on security and defense policies of the United States. I don't know when we've had a more distinguished group of senators, in fact we haven't in my two and a half years, all in one group come to France. And I will just briefly since time is limited, introduce those that are with us today: Senator Claiborne Pell, state of Rhode Island, is Chairman, as you know of the Foreign Relations Committee; Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia is Chairman of the Armed Services Committee; Senator David Boren, the State of Oklahoma, is Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence; and John Warner, Virginia, is the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee. It really is a pleasure. Senator Byrd will be here in just a minute. He'll be a few minutes behind with some business. With that I would ask Senator Pell, if you will, Senator, open the meeting.

Senator PELL:
I thank you very much indeed, Mr. Ambassador. We all have been looking forward to this visit and exchange of ideas with distinguished opinion leaders, responsible ones, in France. We also appreciate the courtesy of conducting this in English parce que je sais ce que vous parlez anglais beaucoup mieux ce que nous parlons francais et pour cette raison c'est tres gentil de vous de faire les efforts en anglais pour nous (because I know that you speak English much better than we speak French and for this reason it is nice of you to make an effort in English for us). Mais, (But,) we're over here really on an expedition to see the reactions of our NATO allies to the INF Treaty, how enthusiastic they are for it, what the dangers would be if we did not ratify it, whether there is more risk in going ahead or more risk in not. In this regard, I think, my colleagues might want to contribute a thought or two. I will first call on Senator Nunn, who is really the authority in our Senate when it comes to Armed Services and defense matters.

Senator NUNN:
Thank you very much, Chairman Pell. We're delighted to be here with such a distinguished group. We also are pleased with the role that the French have played historically in the preservation of security in the West. We are very interested in your views of the post-INF period. We're interested in your views of the INF Treaty. I am particularly interested in getting a feel from you leaders here as to the French-German cooperation that seems to be

evolving. I myself have received that positively,but I'd like to know a lot more about it, when you think it may evolve. And I particularly would like to get your views on where we go in conventional arms control. So I suppose I could summarize my two questions. One would be on the future of the French-German cooperation, how that relates to the overall security and second,your views on where we should be going in the West in conventional arms control and conventional force improvements. Thank you for sharing your time with us. We are honored to be in your country and to be with this great group.

Senator PELL:
I'd like to ask Senator Boren for an opening statement. Then we can revert back to the questions that have been asked. Senator Boren.

Senator BOREN:
It's very difficult to add anything after what has been said by both of my colleagues. I think they've explained our purpose very well. We're anxious really to listen more than to talk, to hear from you particularly about the post-INF environment, specifically where Europe is headed. I think we understand the importance of your bilateral relationship with Germany. We think that is extremely important and I agree with Senator Nunn that the recent steps that have been taken are indeed very encouraging. I think that relationship has great potential impact on the degree of future unity in Europe.

I would also say that the course of your bilateral relationships with the British at the same time in terms of influencing and impacting their view of the future of Europe, their understanding of the recent Franco-German understanding is also very, very important to us. And I would agree with Senator Nunn that we all feel that it is extremely important now that we focus our attention on conventional arms control. I believe it would be a great mistake to allow the Soviets to achieve their objective of negotiating only in areas in which there is parity or a tangible US advantage while resisting meaningful negotiations on conventional forces where they have a sizeable advantage, -- an advantage which is most threatening in terms of being destabilizing and leading to a breakdown of the structured peace in Europe that we now have. So we look forward to hearing from you.

Senator PELL:
Thank you very much, Senator Boren. Senator Warner is with us. He is the ranking minority member on the Armed Services Committee and he and Senator Nunn are responsible

for the U.S.-Soviet agreement to establish Risk Reduction Centers ,which are really one of the few real advances that have been made in the last eight years in terms of reducing risks in an armed conflict. Senator Warner and Senator Nunn were responsible for that. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I'll be very brief. As we look back over the decade of history that has produced the INF Treaty, there are really two landmark decisions that brought it about. First was President Reagan coming to office and determining that a greater percentage of the U.S. defense budget must be applied to the modernization of strategic weapons. He has been very consistent in this effort, which has enjoyed the support of the Congress. The second decision was when the European allies, against very strong political winds, determined that they would place on European soil the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile systems. The Soviets, of course, walked away from the table, then returned, and now we have the INF treaty and we're proceeding to negotiate a second treaty, START.

We would be most interested in your views on the timing of a START treaty. Whether in fact we should endeavor to have that treaty signed under the presidency of Ronald Reagan or a follow-on president. That treaty, of course, must be in the interest of the security of not only the United States but our European allies.

And my second question would be: What is the French attitude towards the forthcoming talks on conventional weapons? Quite frankly, ladies and gentlemen, we receive mixed views as to the depth of the sincerity of France in these talks going forward in the twenty-three nation forum. CSCE is now formulating a mandate. Assuming that mandate will emerge sometime in the summer or early fall and the twenty-three nation talks get under way, with what sincerity and expectation does France approach those talks as a full participant? Thank you.

Senator PELL:

I should also have explained the relationship of the three committees to the ratification process. The three committees involved are Foreign Relations which has the basic jurisdiction over treaties; Armed Services, which is interested in the military aspects of this treaty; and the Intelligence Committee, of which Mr. Boren is the Chairman, which is concerned with the verification aspects of it. Both the Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee, I would hope, would have signed off on it before our action. I don't intend that we should wrap up our mark-up or even start our mark-up until we have had the report from them as to their thoughts on the military aspects and the verifiability. The time table that we're seeking to follow is that the Foreign Relations Committee will basically wrap up its hearings, we hope, in two weeks from this following Monday. With the reports from Armed Services and Intelligence, the thought is that we would mark up the treaty the following week and then have it prepared for introduction on the floor the latter part of March. There may be some slippage and we have some other problems with which you may be familiar that may delay it a little bit. But my hope is that both Armed Services and Intelligence will have given us their reports before the end of the month. The table is now open for your comments, gentlemen, and replies to the questions that we asked.

Ambassador RODGERS:
May I suggest that you please give your name and who you are representing today when you speak please.

Senator PELL:
I made a mistake, gentlemen and lady. My fault, apologies. We're in France, we must be very courteous.

General Pierre GALLOIS:
My name is GALLOIS and I represent myself alone. Some of us are very surprised by the present defense policy of your country. We have been advised in the past that the policy of Mr. Reagan was to get rid of atomic weapons and to denuclearize Europe in the same process. Now, we learn in your papers that you want to increase the defense of Europe through atomic weapons and we don't understand why so good weapons such as the Pershing II's and the Cruise Missile are going to be scrapped and they are going to be replaced by other ones which may not be as efficient as the first ones. I think there is a great wastage of money and a lot of damage has been done as far as atomic defense is concerned by your own policy. Second, you were addressing yourself to the Franco-German couple in which you have, I think, a lot of illusions. First, because the couple is not a homogenous one. The French have an atomic force, the Germans have only conventional weapons. In case of war the punishment could not be the same. The Germans may be invaded, but we may be vitrified. And we have to think twice. Second, because of the present state of the arts, as far as weapons which are existing, we think that a selective strike, probably using non-atomic

weapons, may disarm German conventional forces where they are stationed. In that case, what would be the position of the French?

Senator NUNN:
Excuse me, could you repeat that question I didn't get it, that second question.

General Pierre GALLOIS:
Well, you know better than I do, Mr. Senator, that for the time being and more in the future the various armies of the world are going to be equipped with short medium-range weapons with great accuracy, so accurate that they may use conventional warheads instead of atomic ones or very low atomic weapons, low-yield atomic weapons. And in case of a salvo of such weapons against the German deployment caught by surprise, what would be the position of the French, with an ally which has been disarmed preventively in a few minutes -- just wait or negotiate? Third, Germany... You did not get what I said?

Senator BOREN:
You're expressing your concern because of the different nature of German and French forces -- talking about nuclear France and conventional Germany, is that what you're saying?

General Pierre GALLOIS:
That was one point. The second point was the possibility to disarm, particularly the German forces and then leaving the French without any answer just to be the witness of the defeat of the ally. Third, as you know, when you introduced Pershing II's in Germany, the German government refused to have the double key system because the Germans were ready to accept Pershing II's but they don't want to be involved, didn't want to be involved, in their use against the Russian soil. And this would be the same in a Franco-German couple. And we understand the German position but we think it would be very difficult to create something very strong, very efficient in the military field with Germans because they are divided and because they don't want to compromise possible reunification, very distant reunification. But they have this problem in mind which is not our problem. We are unified, we are not divided. Then, I think, you should consider the famous Franco-German couple with some prudence. We have sacrificed already a lot. For instance we have created a so-called "Force d'action rapide" which represents three percent, four percent only of the peace time German forces which is supposed to have helicopters and you see better than I do that the role of helicopters in Afghanistan is

questionable. Finally, this force is rapid only if the railways are rapid because we have no air transport. And the railways will work only if the communist CGT is in agreement.

Senator BOREN:
So what you are really urging upon us, that we look upon this, that we not have overrated expectations of the meaning of Franco-German cooperation.

General Pierre GALLOIS:
Yes, this is my point.

Senator BOREN:
In other words that this is symbolic perhaps more than it is a fundamentally workable arrangement which in any way changes any kind of a power relationship. Is that what you're really saying?

General Pierre GALLOIS:
Exactly.

Senator BOREN:
I think we understand that, but do you think it is still worthwhile to have such a relationship even if it is principally symbolic at this point?

General Pierre GALLOIS:
Oh, as long as you are talking about symbols you are perfectly right but the French, the country has been invaded five times since 1814 and we are fed up about invasions. So we have to be careful.

Senator BOREN:
Don't you think though that with the economic developments that attract West Germany in certain directions and the problems that they have in terms of the peace movement in the country and the opposition to nuclear weapons, that France could play a key role, at least in political and symbolic terms and other ways of being a magnet?

General Pierre GALLOIS:
That was my third point, the economic attraction of the wide Russian market which is supposed to open now to the Germans as well as to you Americans. And I understand very well that the Germans will be very careful concerning an agreement, too strong a military agreement of French because they don't want to displease the Soviets. And my last point was concerning the conventional forces. I think too many illusions have been based on SALT because

if I was a Russian I would use the fact that I have the Chinese in my back, a very large country, very large country, and I have to defend it. Hence, in a commercial equilibrium between the Soviets and any country of the twelve nations of the European mosaic is a nonsense. It cannot be achieved. I'm sorry, thank you.

Senator PELL:
I think Senator Nunn may have a comment here.

Senator NUNN:
Well, on that latter point, I understand the complications that would come from the Soviets' perception of the conventional forces that they require opposite China, but I do not understand why that should in any way preclude good faith efforts in conventional arms control.

The key to European, in particular central European, conventional arms control is moving forces a long distance from the border so that any return of those forces would take considerable time and give time to the United States, Britain, Canada, France, and others to make sure that they have their forces ready if the Soviets start mobilizing in Central Europe again. The Soviet Union has very limited rail lines. You mentioned rail lines a minute ago. One of their most vulnerable points is they don't have good transportation to connect and get their forces through their own country. And from the Chinese border they have only one rail line and they're building another one -- very, very vulnerable. They also, if they move their forces back of the Urals, would have an awful lot of concentration, so they would have tremendous difficulty in moving those forces, particularly heavy forces. Therefore, the key to conventional arms control is going to be extremely difficult. It may take a long, long, long time. So I don't diminish it, but the key to it is to get Soviet forces back in asymmetrical numbers so that it would take them a long period of time to reintroduce them, would greatly increase warning time, and would give the West a chance to mobilize. I do not take that pessimistic a view although I know it's going to be extremely difficult.

On your first point, why scrap good missiles and try to replace those with other missiles? I don't know what has been in the news here but my own view, I cannot speak in any way for our government on this, I think that if we were governed by pure logic we would start arms control negotiations at the conventional level and then we would move up the scale to the shorter range nuclear systems and then the last European systems we would take out would be the longer range systems. That's my own view but that's not the way NATO worked and it's not the way the political situation unfolded.

The INF missiles were sold to the Europeans in their own governments -- Germany, Britain, Belgium, Holland, and Italy on the premise that we were putting these in as a response to the SS-20's and if the SS-20's came out we would take these out. Now there is such a thing as keeping faith with one's own public in democracies. If the NATO alliance were all of a sudden to turn around on that premise the damage being done would be very, very considerable. So the basic fundamental premise on which the Pershing II's and GLCM's were put in was a political premise rather than a military premise, but that is the deck of cards that we have to play with. And so that's why you're taking those out. As far as replacement, I do not think we ought to rush head over heels, then, to try to replace those systems. And I think the term "modernization" should be carefully defined. Modernization, as I view it, means carrying out the commitment that NATO made at the Montebello Agreement back in 1983. And that means modernizing the systems that are not covered by INF. It does not mean replacing those systems or a major new build up of nuclear weapons in Europe. It means keeping systems effective, trying to make them more survivable. I believe it also means emphasizing the longer-range that are permitted rather than the shorter-range. I've always questioned how many weapons we need with short-range. We need some, I'm not saying we don't need some, but to build up a major new element of short-range nuclear artillery, particularly considering the German situation now, would be, I believe, counterproductive politically and not very helpful militarily.

So my counsel to the Secretary of Defense, for whatever it's worth, sometimes it's not worth anything, is that he should go very slow in terms of this year's defense budget, have a summit conference in March, talk to our allies about what we need to do to modernize, and then come up with a supplemental request for modernization sometime in the middle of the summer. I support modernization. I think any time you don't continue to modernize, whether it's nuclear or conventional, you have started a slow process of unilateral disarmament. So I always believe in modernization. The question is which systems, how, and doing it in close consultation, particularly right now, with our NATO allies. The Germans are very sensitive on this point. I must say they are also sensitive and should be sensitive about any systems that won't go beyond Germany, including French systems that can't get beyond the West German border. And I think you need to recognize that as you already have. So we all need to take that into account.

Senator PELL:
Thank you very much. Monsieur.

Mr. Pierre HASSNER:
As I also like General GALLOIS represent only myself and I dare say that in most cases it is a good thing. As far as Franco-German cooperation is concerned, I think certainly the Soviet strategy is to separate the French from the Germans as it is to separate the Americans from the Europeans and to indicate that an attack on Germany can leave France intact and that an attack on Europe can leave the United States intact. But fortunately that's what the alliance is about -- to make this division impossible, or at least difficult, and both our Prime Minister and our President in recent declarations in December, and public opinion as shown by polls have indicated that one cannot separate the fate of France from that of Germany, that there cannot be two separate battles and that the French are involved from the outset in the defense of Germany. And I think this is a very positive step both for Franco-German relations and for the Alliance as a whole. There remain of course many difficulties which are there. The second point has been touched by Senator Boren. I think Franco-British cooperation is as important as the Franco-German one and here you are directly involved. There are plans for cooperation for a new standard missile, possibly a Cruise Missile, and there is a perennial problem about Franco-British cooperation, to what extent does that run counter to arrangements with the United States, to the McMahon Act, and I think here there is some thinking and some revision to be done if this development, which I think is in everybody's interest, is to go forward. I think it is in the power of the United States either to block it or to encourage it and I think it should do the latter.

Senator BOREN:
Could I ask you this question at that point. From your point of view, and it certainly will not offend me if you say no, because I think it's very important to have the Franco-British cooperation, should the United States be involved in that at all or should it be purely bilateral? Should it be trilateral or bilateral?

Mr. Pierre HASSNER:
I think it should be bilateral, but it won't happen if the United States is not favorable to it. We've been there in 1969-70 between Pompidou and Heath. There is a question of the McMahon Act whether France would be eligible or not, whether it would ask, whether the U.S. Congress would consider it. There are hosts of questions both legal, both informal. And I'm only pointing to the problem, I'm not expert enough to have a solution. But I think it should be bilateral, but of course with the tolerance, perhaps active, of the United States. Thirdly, on the INF Agreement, I believe, like General GALLOIS, like, I think, almost everybody in France that it is a bad agreement, that we went into a trap set by ourselves. And that the main function of the Pershings and Cruise was not to make up for the SS-20's but to re-couple the United States and Western Europe and to show that the Soviet territory was not taboo. I think what is done is done. By now given German sensitivities, in particular, a non-ratification would be worse than a ratification. On the other hand, I think, the effort should go in trying to undo the damage by perhaps, since it is a fact, I completely agree with you, that it's the longer-range weapons which are important for us and the shorter-range which are more destabilizing. So either to replace them in one shape or the other or to expand the range of the shorter ones. On START, I think, in principle there is much less objection in this country to a fifty percent agreement than there is either to the complete denuclearization which is an anathema or to the INF Agreement. However, quite frankly, I don't think we are in too much a hurry to see that happen and I think our main direct question is that this should not put into question the modernization of French and British nuclear forces which has to go on both for technical and for European reasons. Finally, on conventional arms control, I think, the French are sincere in not being against it. There is not the same impetus in their favor that there is for instance in Germany. And we have too great of caveats which put us more on the kosher side. One is that the process of arms control shouldn't get too much ahead of the process of negotiations on human rights. They are both linked by the Vienna Conference and we want to see the two procedures of peace to have a leverage there for progress on the human rights question. And secondly we are very concerned that to guard against nuclear disarmament and hence very concerned with dual capable weapons that through the door of conventional arms reductions one shouldn't go further a step towards the denuclearization of Europe and particularly one shouldn't involve our own forces. I personally consider both these concerns legitimate. I share them. However, I do think

that one should put a more positive emphasis on conventional arms control because precisely there is no great risk that it will succeed prematurely unless, unlike some of the other agreements. And this is where the big asymmetries are and this is where one should test these curious pronouncements from the Soviet side that they would be ready to restructure in a more defensive direction. Thank you.

Senator PELL:
Thank you very much for your comments. We move on to Mr. BENOIST.

Mr. Jean-Marie BENOIST:
Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. I think, as my colleagues have said, I think that as it has been said the challenge that we put to the INF Treaty is of a conceptual nature. We are very sad that this category of weapons has been singled out and treated in isolation when deterrence is an architecture of systems which are interdependent and it should have been better, as Senator Nunn said, to start with gradual reduction starting with the conventional level. There is also in the Pershing II, as General Gallois said, a very efficient deterrence value because it is striking surgically in a counterforce logic deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. So it is necessary, I think, that this function should be retrieved one way or another at some point and that there should be a limitation of the damages caused.

One of the damages also is the Pandora's Box which is opened in the German mind, the German psyche, as you have felt recently is now very nervous and pushing toward a sub-zero. And, I think, there should be a way of moving towards the possibility in ratification which could attach a few very restricting conditions which could be expressed in the form of sense of the Senate. It is not for me to dictate anything to your legislative power, but a safety belt might be put providing for a possible reversibility of such a treaty if conditions were different. Conditions are different from 79. You quite rightly say that the Europeans were willing to have these tit-for-tat exchanges between SS-20 and Pershing II. Unfortunately, the Soviets have moved far away from the stability or illusory stability that is always invoked as a ground for keeping our word and our bond. The SS-25, in particular, which are retargetable on Europe are putting a threat which the elimination of the SS-20 which will not magically dissipate. This is why, as Senator NUNN said, the asymmetry principle should be regarded with more care and we would wish, I think -- I would certainly express here the feeling of many Europeans -- we would wish that the wisdom of the Senate might be to put this safety belt not in the form of killing amendments because they would open the trap of and the nightmare of renegotiation and they would give the Soviets too easy an opportunity to make a propaganda effort to say that the Western world does not keep its word. But at least to attach a declaration, sent through the Senate and put an enormous effort on the verification conditions which may be offering in March 89 or summer 89 some easy, I wouldn't say way out, but at least grounds for a very careful reconsideration of the damages and real consequences of a treaty which, let it be said again, has been conceptually coming as a surprise to us because of the lack of consideration of the basic requirements of deterrence. Thank you very much.

Senator PELL:
I think Senator Boren may have something to say.

Senator BOREN:
I might comment especially on what you said about the verification aspects since we have that responsibility in the Intelligence Committee and I think it's another reason for us not to be overly hasty about proceeding with a START agreement. I think many of us were surprised at the final INF outcome and I made this point in Germany yesterday as we began to talk about the short-range systems. I'm very concerned that we have INF where we thought we were going to stop at ceilings and all of a sudden we found ourselves dropping all the way to double zero which I think surprised many of us. At the same time, I think that the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty would be a terrible mistake because of the political implications, particularly in Germany. But I think that in an ideal world we would have stopped at ceilings, not at zero. I worry if we then rush into START and get that momentum going whether what we end up with is an antinuclear momentum without an adequate defense to our own publics of the basic need for nuclear deterrence, which we must always have. I worry that if we were to rush then into short-range negotiations, on the heels of two other nuclear negotiations, the elevator which we thought was going to stop at the second floor might plunge again all the way to the basement. And we would be faced with a third zero again and then we would still not even have done anything to touch their conventional imbalance. And there we'd be, placing all the pressure on the nuclear side where we have some ability to have deterrence, with no real pressure placed on Soviet conventional superiority. It

would be the worst of all worlds.

Let me just say, I think, in terms of the START agreement we're going to urge great caution in terms of the speed with which we move on that, and verification is one of the reasons. With INF, as you've said, verification in an INF environment only is not really too difficult for this reason. Why would you hide one hundred intermediate range missiles if you have ten thousand strategic warheads that you can simply retarget? Legally you have ten thousand warheads you can simply retarget on intermediate range targets. Our Committee is going to issue a report which answers two questions. One, can INF be adequately verified in a solely INF environment? And we're very likely to say yes. Second, can INF be verified in an INF and a START dual environment? That, we're going to say, is very, very questionable. And obviously it puts a lot more pressure on national technical means of verification because when you are supposedly reducing the total number in a meaningful way of all missiles the Soviets are not going to hide illegal missiles in declared places where we have the right of onsight inspection. They're going to hide them elsewhere, and that means you must have a much more sophisticated regime including more effective technical means to spot any kind of cheating.

So, I share your concerns, both concerns that you're expressing -- one from the verification point of view to be very careful and the other that I think we'd better launch a counter-offensive with our own publics about the value of nuclear deterrence. People can just as easily be killed in conventional wars. As Mrs. Thatcher said to us, again a statement we've heard before but we don't think about it, the terrible wars we've had with the massive killings that we've had, occurred before we had nuclear weapons. And so we can't just say nuclear weapons are the blame for all of the potential killing that would come from wars.

Senator PELL:
Mr. Lellouche.

Mr. Pierre LELLOUCHE:
Since my colleagues have done it, I will spare you from further nasty attacks on the INF Treaty. I think by that time you got the message that it's not a great love affair in this country with respect to the treaty. But since it's a reality, I want to address the status after that. I think the post-INF situation brings us back in many ways to the very fundamental question of the alliance, back to the 50's where the two big issues were i.e. Germany and nuclear weapons, and the role of nuclear weapons and who takes the risk, are back on the top of the table. We have

to deal with those questions in a large extent because we have re-created them.

Certainly, we are paying in Germany right now the consequences of the treaty which by removing long-range weapons opens up the question of legitimacy of maintaining nuclear deterrence both politically and militarily when for any German it means actually fighting a war, a limited war, on German soil. Hence, the idea of singularity and so on and so forth which incidentally has been fueled further by the recent and rather unfortunate Ikle-Wohlstetter report which again deemphasizes the idea of escalation. Now in terms of future, I think the fundamental goal we have then will be to re-legitimize nuclear deterrence and strategy in the alliance. And I think, Senator, you got it just right. I think this is the major task we have to do. Stop selling the wrong message to the public like we've done with Pershing II and SS-20. And Senator Nunn, I think, was absolutely right on the dot in his analysis of where we are now. But it means also trying to restore some confidence in Germany in terms of nuclear weapons and in terms of the alliance. Clearly, the center of gravity in Germany has moved in a tremendous fashion in the last thirty years. We had a pro-U.S., pro-NATO, pro-nuclear Germany. We have a not pro-nuclear Germany at all. Pro-U.S. it's debatable, I mean, it's pro-U.S. and pro-détente at the very least. And in terms of pro-NATO, it's pro-NATO only to the extent that the Germans redesign the rules. Now, we've got a problem. You have got a problem, we have got a problem.

To fix this in the future, it seems to me, we have to understand two things. Number one, the legitimacy of short-range nuclear weapons in Germany is not going to be there unless we are able to demonstrate to them that we have a strategy that is there to strike the Soviet Union and not only the Germans. Hence, the need to go after long-range systems, airborne or seaborne. But doing, and you're right, Senator, the idea of modernizing artillery tubes is crazy and I would even go as far as putting, you know, insisting on LANCE modernization today is not a good idea. I would not foreclose it and that is where I am against the German stand on this, but I would not make it a key issue now. I mean it's counterproductive. But on the other hand, I would really insist on long-range modernization and talking about the aircraft and seeing Montebello set the context. That is, I think, very important. Number two, and this is where I respectfully disagree with General Gallois, I think the Franco-German connection there is essential. Now I am fully aware that there are many problems with it having to do with money in terms of modernizing French conventional forces; in terms of command structure, how to unite an army which is fully integrated and one which is not; relationship between France and NATO, French tactical nukes. But look, there has been tremendous progress made on fixing those issues in the last few years, and the relationship between France and Germany today is historically incredible compared to what it used to be right after the war. And I'm very confident, personally, that the new generation will carry it through. I am very confident that it will get somewhere. I think there are solutions to every one of these problems. And I think you should help, and I think you can help. Clearly, we're in a situation today where France is not asking for Germany to leave NATO, quite the contrary. We are not back to 1963 and to the German Preamble to the Elysees Treaty. But you have to help, so have you to help on the Franco-British angle which I think is essential in longer terms with respect to Germany. My friend Pierre Hassner raised the issue, I think discreetly but effectively, the U.S. Congress has in its hand to help on the McMahon business otherwise we'll have a frozen British line that will go nowhere. And I think I understand the British are interested and I think we could move ahead on this air-launch missile and so on. Now finally on arms control, since unfortunately it has become sort of a condition for defense policy.

Looking ahead, I am not married like the French Foreign Ministry on the somewhat abstract division between conventional and nuclear in the context of these negotiations. I think that these are losing battles that if we start fighting this kind of semantic battle as to whether you're going to talk only of nuclear artillery tube or dual capable we're going to lose because the Russians are better at that. And Shevardnadze in Bonn last week already started that battle with the Germans. I think, more fundamentally, we have to agree among ourselves on a basic requirement of conventional and nuclear and it is only after we have agreed on the basic minimum both in nuclear and conventional that I think we can enter into those talks. So my recommendation there would be, first of all, to clear up our minds and using the next summit in particular in March, and perhaps take this occasion at the summit to launch a kind of Harmel Two exercise to decide what is the baseline minimum of conventional and nuclear forces that the alliances need in the future and then enter into negotiation rather than be stampeded into talks which are carried along by domestic political agendas and we don't even know where we want to come out. And it's clear when you read the literature that we don't know where we want to come out in conventional, and I think you read it recently, Senator, it's terrible. We don't know where we want to come out. The START thing follows its life of its own because it's an electoral year and Mr. Reagan wants a treaty and we know the numbers aren't good. I mean when you're going to find yourselve with ten submarines you're going to look like France. And it's O.K. for France, but it's not O.K. if you want to do flexible response and extended deterrence on Japan, Europe, and so on and so forth. I'm not sure I like those numbers, by the way, but it's your business. But let's not be stampeded and let's use this electoral year, it seems to me, to work out our minds on all this.

Senator WARNER:
As we've been moving through Europe the question of stampede has been raised before. And our leader, Mr. Byrd, has always said, and I think quite properly, that the Senate of the United States has coequal responsibilities with the Executive Branch, the President, when it comes to treaties. And he has said very clearly, and we all agree with him, the United States will not be stampeded on a START Treaty. Now, in defense of the President , he is of my party , he is not going to be stampeded either. The negotiations on START at this time are proceeding along in a very careful, methodical way with adequate consultation with our NATO allies. We talked to Mrs. Thatcher, she reaffirmed -- adequate consultation. We talked with Helmut Kohl, he reaffirmed -- adequate consultation. And today we shall discuss that same issue with your president and then in the balance of our trip in Italy and in Turkey. While there may be advantages to having a START agreement completed during the course of Mr. Reagan's term, that is not an essential requirement. We will not sign that treaty until it is in the long-term security interests of the United States and those of our allies.

Senator PELL:
Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN:
I'm very interested in pursuing one issue a little bit further. I agree with much of what has been said here. The statement that there cannot be two battles -- one the battle for France, one the battle for Germany -- I completely agree with that. It seems to me there is an evolution in French thinking, I'm not suggesting a revolution. Is there anyone here that would like to tell us where France is now in its thinking about the overall military alliance and where the French see their role in the future? As part of a multilateral effort, is what I'm saying, and I'm not saying whether its de jure or de facto.

Senator PELL:
General Gallois.

General Pierre GALLOIS:
Excuse me, Senator, I am a military man and the only one here. Oh sorry, the Admiral is there. This is why I'm going to talk very bluntly. First, I'm very impressed by what you said about the two battles. That the battles were a military conception of the past in Europe. Forty years ago you could talk about two battles, not today. Today one salvo and it is finished. There is no battle. There is not exchange of strikes. One strike is sufficient. Then don't talk about battles. Our Prime Minister was talking about battles because he's young, he doesn't know what he's talking about. But militarily speaking today, taking into account the weapons of today, this has no meaning -- two battles.

And second, I would like to bring your attention to the situation of the population. You neglect it completely. But remember that Mr. Schmidt came here two months ago and wrote in the Herald Tribune in April a very important sentence. He said that should two atomic weapons explode over the German territory, the Bundeswehr would stop fighting immediately. This is a good tip for the Russian army and a good lesson for us. Because we know how to disarm the strongest commercial army of the West -- two weapons, it's enough. Hence, the Germans don't accept to take the nuclear risk, and the French accept to take the nuclear risk. And another point, which is completely neglected in your views, is the weight of the populations. The Russian propaganda is very active during forty years. Personally, I think the first victim of the propaganda is Mr. Reagan himself. But in a narrow-minded population any form of war against the Russians is tantamount to the destruction of humanity, holocaust, end of humanity and so on. Then should the Russians start something you would have in Germany, probably in France, in Holland, everywhere in Europe mass demonstrations to ask to stop fighting and to enter negotiation. You must now take into account the weight of the population and the only solution for us is to process strong means of deterrence such as no threat can be addressed to us. The idea of accepting a battle is accepting defeat, not military defeat but a political and social defeat because the population will not accept the perspective of a war with Russia. So don't talk as you said of mobilization. Mobilization was forty years ago, not now. The mobilization you may have is the mobilization against war, everywhere in Europe. Not a military mobilization.

Senator NUNN:
Well, I hear you giving us a lot of problems, and I can't disagree with the problems, but I don't hear any answers. What are the answers?

Senator PELL:
I understand there are several people who wish to speak, and I've been asked to try to jump around. But I think that we ought to do it in the order in which they are recognized. Mme. CHARZAT was the one who caught my eye first, so she should go now.

Mme. CHARZAT:
My purpose was just to ask a question. I don't know exactly what to think about the terms of conventional weapons. FOFA, for instance, needs antisatellites weapons and calls for preemptive attacks. How do you see the cooperation between allies with such kind of new weapons?

Senator NUNN:
I think technology is driving us faster than tactics and strategy have. They have not kept pace with technology. I must add though that our technology is too often in the laboratory rather than in the field. Someone said that if we could confine the next war to a laboratory, the West is certain to win, but obviously that is not going to happen. I think we've got to have more weapons cooperation. We've got to have it because we are all going through slowly but surely, I call it, unilateral structural disarmament and that is because our technology is confined in each country, and our weapons procurement is usually in each country. We have the ultimate in protectionism in military procurement.

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The NATO Alliance collectively outspends the Warsaw Pact each and every year. If you add all of our expenditures together, including the United States and its NATO allies, versus the Soviet Union and all of its allies -- every year we outspend them. Now why is it then, and our publics are going to start asking this question more and more, and I think that INF is going to lead to it. Why is it when we outspend them every year we're the ones who have to have an early, and I emphasize early, first-use policy? Why is it we have to tell our publics that when the Germans are invaded by the Soviet tanks the first thing we have to do is start shooting nuclear weapons? That's the NATO policy. I believe that that is not a good answer to that question. I think we're going to have to start cooperating more. Whether we like it or not, I think technology demands it and I think economics demands it, I think politics demands it, and I think the growing nuclear allergy demands it. And we do have a nuclear allergy in the West, less so in France probably than most any other country. So I think we've all got to cooperate much more in sharing technology. Also in making sure that technology does not flow to the Soviet Union, and we've got to cooperate more in weapons procurement. Now, our countries are cooperating more. I think it is slowly coming. Our purchase of the multiple subscriber equipment from France is an example. I think we need to do much more of that kind of thing. If we begin to utilize our technology and our military procurement in a military vein as we have in the commercial vein where we have much less protectionism, much more of a free flow, we would get tremendous payoffs in terms of our capabilities.

Senator PELL:

Thank you Senator Nunn. And I'd like to recognize myself for a second here to support everything that Senator Nunn has said and, also, to emphasize the point that many of us in America see a huge difference between nuclear and conventional warfare. There is an allergy to nuclear. The difference is that in World War II there was a dreadful conventional war. with many people killed, but civilization survived. If we go to nuclear war -- and I recognize the fondness that France has for nuclear weapons and also for nuclear power -- you would find, I think, that a joint civilization will have been destroyed. I would also add, as long as I have the floor for a second, that there is a continuous feeling, on my part at least, that the contribution of our NATO allies really should be increased because here they are much closer to the source of danger and they seem to assess the risk as less. And this is a feeling in our tight budget that we'll carry on. Now I would recognize M. de Montbrial.

M. Thierry DE MONTBRIAL:

Thank you very much. Well many of the points that I wanted to make have been made before so I shall try to be brief. First I would like to take up the question of Senator NUNN. It seems to me that France very clearly is politically ready to make some very significant moves in the next few months or years. And I think it will be the major task of the next president who will be elected in May, whoever he is, whether he be the same as today or another one. So that's a brief answer to your question, but this will depend to a large extent on what the United States will do particularly the future of Soviet-American negotiations. So now let me take up briefly a few points.

Senator NUNN:

Could you amplify that?

M. Thierry DE MONTBRIAL:
That's what I'm going to do. First, I start with an incidental remark on the British-French point which was mentioned before. If I am well informed, which is not sure at all, there are today discussions between London and Washington on this question. And today you have veto right and it seems to me, if I am well informed, that this is what you are doing. It is in fact you are, you seem to be, blocking maybe, I'm not sure to be entirely well informed, nevertheless you hold the key here. That's again a brief answer but it's a major point obviously for the future. Now, the point was raised at the outset about the enthusiasm of Europe and INF. Very clearly you realize, and I am sure you knew it before, that there is no enthusiasm, certainly not in France and I think in other European countries it is doubtful too. Although everybody recognizes that now you know you have of course to ratify the INF Treaty. There is no doubt about it. But the sequence, Senator Nunn, the sequence of negotiations is not a secondary issue. It is a fundamental one. The fact of having started like that and not the other way around is politically extremely important.

So today what is important? What is important, and this point has been made before, is to prevent this start to turn out into a debacle and a debacle that would be the failure to modernize. I don't want to go into the details, very important details that Pierre Lellouche mentioned before, whether we should modernize LANCE or other. I mean the key point is that if the Soviets de facto are able to block the modernization process, it will be a debacle. If we are not able to fill the gap of the escalation ladder it will be a debacle.

If, and this maybe is the most important point, if we are not able, when I say we I mean the Atlantic Alliance, of which we are a member, if we are not able to redefine a credible strategy which necessarily will continue to put deterrence in its center, if we are not able to do that before you continue the process of arms control with the Soviets, it might be the debacle. So this is what I call the condition. I think that the French, I am speaking here as an analyst, I have no political authority to speak for anybody, but it seems to me that even though there obviously are minority viewpoints the French are ready to contribute in a major way to that process but not if it appears that the United States is contributing to this process of nuclear disarmament to this process that would in fact amount to playing the role that the Soviets invite us to play. So I believe that, for instance the March meeting of NATO that

Lellouche mentioned, could be an important meeting. I'm not sure that it will be but it could be and it will be if it is the starting process of a positive revision of NATO strategy. And I will end with that. I agree with those who think that the French-German connection is essential and perhaps even vital but the French-German connection can work if and only if the United States is moving in the right direction. And therefore I think that there are two, in fact, key connections about the future of Europe. One is, and I apologize for taking a Eurocentric formulation, one is the French-American and the other is the French-German and the British will, of course, have a major role to play too and that is why I mentioned this question at the beginning. But our two connections the French-American and French-German for the next few months or years will be, I think, vital. Thank you very much.

Senator WARNER:
(Recording here not complete) Senator Warner calls on Michel Tatu of Le Monde to ask whether Gorbachev has the "political base in the Soviet Union to carry forward with these decisions of Glasnost, to carry forward with the willingness to do some arms control."

Michel TATU:
Thank you, Senator, for asking me such a question but which is very difficult but maybe, my impression is the following. There are big doubts about the ability of Gorbachev of making everything what he promises internally. And especially we know that there is much fight especially against Glasnost and especially what concerns internal democratization as they call it, you know. We have not the impression that there is a big fight about foreign policy at this point. My impression on the INF agreement for example was that there was some infighting at the beginning before Reykjavik and mainly between Reykjavik and February 1987. But this fight is now behind them. I think all the story about the so-called linkage between INF and SDI and ABM Treaty and so on was probably a rear guard fight of some military, not all you know because they have divisions also inside their military of people who wanted to keep their SS-20 for example. But this was behind them in February 87 when Gorbachev unlinked the package and my feeling was that since that time well, the INF Agreement is now swallowed.

It seems to me on the START process and the fifty percent agreement there is still pressure, more probably than what Gorbachev wants, on a linkage with the ABM Treaty and SDI. Maybe Gorbachev would be a little bit more compromising to have this linkage less important than some others. We will see what comes out at the next meeting Shultz-Shevardnadze and now we'll see also if Afghanistan is a problem. But it seems that also on this front, if I may so, they are ready to move. So there is big in-fighting maybe Gorbachev will be sacked. We cannot exclude that and I think we should not forget also about this possibilty. American Sovietologists are too Gorbie maniac or Gorbasmystic but at the same time there will be moves also on foreign policy. And so at this time it is a little bit, it is only on internal democracy is the real question more than foreign policy at this point.

Senator PELL:
We thank you.

Senator BOREN:
Senator PELL, I certainly agree with the last comment about being too focused on Gorbachev but I'd like to go back to what M. MONTBRIAL said just a minute ago and comment. I agree with everything that has been said by you in terms of the Franco-German relationship and also the Franco-British relationship and the importance of our reaction to it. I personally think, and I speak again only for myself, I think this is a healthy development. I think the role of France here is extremely important to avoid the fragmentation of Europe at this point. I believe you're an important magnet toward Germany and that process can't go far without an expanding relationship with Britain at the same time. And I happen to agree with the views that have been expressed here today on the question of nuclear deterrence. Nothing would be more healthy right now in terms of an influence on the United States, on the current administration than a healthy dose of French attitudes on nuclear deterrence.

This message has been sent, but I believe we need to hear it more strongly. We won't go back into all the historic reasons. I understand them but we can't change history and in many ways we would not have the French attitude which I think is a very wholesome and realistic one today had some of the things not happened twenty-five years ago that happened with General De Gaulle, so it is sort of one of the ironies, I think, of history that in terms of the way we view the world that perhaps because France went its own way we have now come back 25 years later in a way in which we perhaps feel more at home with the view being expressed here in France on security matters than any place else in the world. So it's an irony of history that going off in a separate way has now brought us closer together in our thinking than ever before. But I think there have to be some signals sent here too because there is the balance. We want to see the Franco-German relationship, and the Franco-British relationship develop. I think we should encourage it, but we cannot encourage it to the point that it might start to appear to represent a fragmentation of NATO itself -- a competing organization that would eventually replace NATO and quite frankly leave the United States on the sidelines as a sort of spurned Atlantic partner. And I realize and I think that's the reason what you said about the next president here and the way he defines this role being very important. There is not an expectation on our part that tomorrow France would jump up and immediately officially rejoin the military side of NATO. We realize that's an unrealistic assumption that with one sort of thunder clap that there would be that kind of dramatic development but I think that at the same time there should be some signals sent that there is a sensitivity toward these bilateral relationships -- not fragmenting NATO and toward trying to find an even more integrated way in which we can work together.

So, I would say I understand it is important for us to send the right signals now on your bilateral relationships and I think we should. I think it's also very important the kind of signals that France begins to send to the United States as well. And I would hope that they'd be fast in coming because I think the more you're seen to be encouraging that and finding ways to integrate more fully with us, the more influence you will have on our thinking and I think your influence is needed.

Senator PELL:
Thank you very much. In about ten minutes, we have to leave to meet with your president. But, in the meantime the following are caught by me in this order: M. Moisi, de Rose, Kosciusko-Morizet, and Besancon. So we come to M. Moisi first.

Mr. Domique MOISI:
I'll try to be brief since most of the things have been said. But I liked particularly the comments which were recently made by Senator BOREN. I think we have been concentrating lately only on the negative aspect of the INF Treaty for Europe. And when I listen to you I think there has been also pedagogic values from the treaty. We've seen the risk. We have to seize the chance which it represents to us. And it seems the chance comes in the following manner. It alludes to a different world in which for us Europeans there will be less of America in Europe less nuclear deterrence which means there has to be more Europe and you have to help us for that. And it's

very important that we should not give you the impression that we are always criticizing, shivering, and refusing to behave as adults. Now how to do it, how to do it. It's clear that when one reads "Discriminate Deterrence," the report by Ikle and Wohlstetter which has been alluded to, it gives us the feeling that an America that is relatively shrinking in the world is also an America in which Europe is shrinking in American eyes and it gives us exactly the wrong signals from what we expect. Now we are confronted with, what I would say are, major contradictions. In one way they are too many definitions of Europe. There is the Europe of geography of values which is linking us out of democratic principles. There is the Europe of geography and culture which is linking us to the other Eastern European countries. There is the Europe of technocracy which is the Common Market and which doesn't go into the field of military defense and there is also what I would say strongly the limits which we now recognize of bilateral cooperations. When the French and the Germans are looking at each other too closely in the eyes Mrs. Thatcher winkles and starts being bored and worried. When we turn a little bit toward the British the Germans are saying well are you setting into question. It shows that we need to go beyond and that there is the need for a multilateral cooperation.

Those fundamental questions are ultimately the crux of the matter, has been the link between France and Germany and it has been said that there are structural differences between our two countries which cannot be compensated for. Germany is non-nuclear and NATO, France is non-NATO and nuclear. We have to move into each other's direction. And I think at some point, and I fully share the vision which was expressed by Thierry de Montbrial, there is an evolution in this country and we may find that it will be less difficult for us to move towards not returning into the integrated military body of NATO but towards steps in that direction. Maybe as a first step going back into the planning group or whatever. I don't think this is something which can be excluded in the long run and you have to help us. You have to help us by not simply declaring yourself as Europeans or pro-European within the framework of the Alliance but as acting in favor of Europe. And there are clear manners to do so. The two-way street never worked. It should become a priority of your country. You should encourage Mrs. Thatcher not to feel divorced between the Grand large, the Atlantic, and Europe. So from that point of view I think you have a major responsibility in the Europeanization of Europe as your role in Europe is going to shrink relatively.

Senator BOREN:
Just very briefly, we did make it plain when we were there speaking as individual senators that we welcomed the British-French cooperation that seems to be emerging on nuclear issues --at least being talked about at this point. And we also welcome the French-German brigade. We said that to Mrs. Thatcher. Defense Minister Younger also said he welcomed the German-French cooperation. And as you already observed Mrs. Thatcher is watching very carefully.

Ambassador DE ROSE:
My name is Francois De Rose, a former ambassador to NATO. My point is very much along the line that Moisi has just made but from a different angle. I think that the nightmarish scenario that General Gallois has depicted is probably technically possible. He's an expert on the matter, I'm not. What I think is that it is politically most unlikely, most unlikely because the Soviets prefer indirect strategy to running the risk of a major war but their indirect strategy aims at separating the United States from Europe. Now, the INF was part of the linkage between the defense of Europe and the strategic system of the United States. Technically, it was the most important link. Now that they are removed, what is vitally important will be the presence of American forces, large American forces, in Europe. It is the chief component of deterrence because there is no Soviet leader that would believe that they could attack Europe, defeat the Germans and the Americans and so on without being involved in a major war with the United States which is what they want to avoid at all costs. And in that sense the warning given by Mr. Carlucci the other day in Munich saying that if all nuclear weapons were removed then the United States forces would leave, I think, was very, very sound. But if for one reason or another it would appear that now that some very most important American weapons, those that are vital for the strategy of flexible response and escalation, now that these weapons are removed if American forces were thinned out, seriously thinned out, then I think the Europeans and the Russians would understand that it means the United States is pulling out of Europe. Deterrence from now on will remain more dependent on the volume of American forces in Europe than on anything else.

Senator NUNN:
Can I respond briefly to that ? I think there's more than one slippery slope. One is the slope of denuclearization. The other relates to your point -- America's conventional force presence. I don't disagree with anything you've said. It is very important but the number of forces, the number of troops we have here, depends

on their military utility in the long run. And if the ammunition supplies are gone in the first few days of any war and if the aircraft that we spent huge amounts of money for in the United States get here in Europe and don't have any place to be sheltered and don't have any minimum essential facilities for refueling,we're wasting about a hundred billion dollars a year. And if we're going to be a trip-wire force,then we ought to pay for a trip-wire force. If we're going to be part of a credible conventional deterrent,then I think we ought to keep everything we've got. So really the question is in the hands of the Europeans. Do you want a credible flexible response doctrine, do you want a credible conventional defense? And if you do, I think America will play its part. If you don't, then we're on a slippery slope because we're spending a huge amount of money for a credible defense. No sense in us having forty-five days of ammunition supply or sixty days when many of our allies give out in five to ten days. France plays a critical role here. I think more than any other country in Europe or in NATO, the French will determine whether we have that credible conventional part of an overall flexible response doctrine. This does not mean getting rid of nuclear weapons ,but it means moving away from having to rely on those in the very early stages of any kind of war. And if we're going to do that,America can save one heck of a lot of money by continuing to be a trip-wire but not continuing a foolish expenditure which has no military bearing.

Senator WARNER:
As a follow-on to my colleagues' remarks, what is the sentiment among you concerning your politicians and your legislatures coming up with those dollars necessary to establish the credibility of the conventional force that Mr. Nunn has just described?

Senator PELL:
Thank you very much. I think we ought to go to Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet.

Ambassador Jacques KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET:
Yes, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, National Secretary for the Rally of the French Republic, the Party of the Prime Minister. First I want to answer the question of Senator NUNN regarding the French-German cooperation. It's true that the Prime Minister said that the battle of Germany would be a battle for France. Of course, the statement must not be taken literally because we do not want any battle in France or in Germany but for the first time, since General De Gaulle, a French official very clearly

said that the security of France was linked to the security of Germany. And we think it was very important because we know that now the weak part in the defense of Europe is Germany,. not in terms of armaments but in terms of spirit of defense. As Lellouche told now there is a crisis of confidence in Germany and especially regarding the problem, the nuclear problem. And we have to prevent Europe from being denuclearized. We can help especially with this French-German cooperation and we hope that the United States will back this cooperation which is not directed against NATO but in the contrary will reinforce NATO. And we think it's very important.

DCM Mark LISSFELT:
Ambassador, I'm sorry to interrupt but our visitors have an appointment with the President of the Republic in ten minutes and I think you would like them to be on time too.

Senator PELL:
Thank you very much. We apologize , but we must leave.

End Discussion

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

APPENDIX L

U.S. SENATORS' PRESS CONFERENCE
ANKARA, FEBRUARY 12, 1988

BYRD: Thank you and thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Let us apologize for our tardiness, but we've had a very good discussion with the Chief of Staff and his officers. First let me say that we included Turkey on our itinerary of five NATO capitals because of our realization of the importance of Turkey, the important contribution that Turkey makes to the Alliance, and the importance of the good ties that exist between the United States and the Turkish Republic. So, we've been to London, Bonn, Paris, Ankara, and we are going to Rome. And as the lady has said, we are running behind, we do have to catch a plane very soon. So you will please understand the brevity of our statements and responses to your questions. We'll have to reduce the number of questions perhaps.

We've had some very good discussions with your leaders: The Prime Minister, the President, the President of the Assembly, the Chief of Staff. Last evening we had an opportunity to talk at dinner with other very important officials and your Foreign Minister. These have been positive talks and they have covered a range of subjects. We've talked about the contributions that Turkey makes to NATO, about the economic situation, about economic security assistance, the military assistance programs, and the need for continued support for Turkey as a very valuable and dependable and strong member of NATO. We have talked about the progress that has been made by your government in many areas. The progressive proposals that have been made by your leadership, that the Greeks and the Turks sit down and reason together and that they have annual discussions to set up these committees, to have some chamber of commerce-like organization and that they resolve these problems. These things give us encouragement because we hope that these problems will be resolved, because we think that overall it will be helpful to our mutual security interest. We are also impressed by the part that your country plays with respect to the stabilization of the Middle Eastern situation; with a war between Iran and Iraq, the good offices of your government, the importance of Turkey to the Alliance, the importance of Turkey to the Arab countries to the south, and the importance of Turkey as to its geographic position vis-a-vis the Mediterranean, the European land mass, the Asian land mass and its long history of friendship with our country. Finally, we have come to assure Turkey and the other NATO countries that America's commitment to the Alliance is unshakable, unchanged and will be undiminished even with the ratification of the INF Treaty. This won't change our support. And to point out that, under the American Republic's Constitutional system, the Congress is a stabilizing factor. Parties in control of the White House may change, parties in control of the Senate and the House of Representatives may change but, under our Constitutional system, that Congress, which is an equal partner with the President, an equal partner with the judiciary, reflects the profound strength of the American people and their support for the NATO alliance. We realize that as we confront the problems of tomorrow that we have to stand together. So we want to assure the people of Turkey that America stands right where she always has, that our goodwill couldn't be better, that our friendship ties are strong, and that our commitment, as I say, to the Alliance and to Europe and to Turkey is strong and will continue to be strong. May I have one or two questions.

QUESTION: Senator Byrd, recently the people in Turkey and the United States have been disappointed by the level of aid from the United States to Turkey. Mr. Carlucci has indicated he would like to increase the level, and also Mr. Lehman, but indicating that they are in some competition between the Congress and the Administration on that matter. Rozanne Ridgway has also mentioned that they'll be looking for ways to reallocate the aid so that Turkey does receive more. Do you, or can you speculate on what channels that aid will come from?

BYRD: First of all, let me say that in the overall picture I think Turkey fared very well. The 490 million level is not as much as it was three or four years ago, but it is as much as it was the previous year. And, in consideration of our extreme budgetary problems, the triple digit deficits, our triple digit deficit and our trade problems. All of these problems have put great constraints on us, so that our own domestic programs are suffering. So, in the environment of this picture, in this environment, I think we all agree, my colleagues and I that Turkey did very well. As a matter of fact, as the legislation moved from the House to the Senate, Turkey's position improved. This new refinancing program to which you have referred is one in which the Treasury will be writing regulations and we in the Congress will do everything we can to see that the regulations are as favorable as they possibly can be to Turkey. This is a guarantee program, it will enable Turkey to roll over its debts and take advantage of lower interest. Those regulations have not yet been fully formulated but we hope that they will be positive for your country.

BOREN: Robert, could I add one point on that. I think, what our Leader just said, perhaps, after talking with some of the people up here, I don't know that this is fully understood. With our own very very difficult budget situation, nearly everything in the American budget was cut. All the programs for our own people, health, education, all the programs, when you get into foreign aid nearly every single country in the world was cut. There were only five or six exceptions out of one hundred countries we deal with, there were only five or six exceptions. Turkey was one exception which was not cut but kept at the level of last year. We hoped in Congress, in doing that, to send a signal to the people of Turkey that we understand the great contribution that they are making to our security effort. We understand, with your per capita income levels, that there is no country in NATO that is making the contribution which requires as much sacrifice as what Turkey is making. So, while I realize the disappointment that the level could not have been higher, I think it should be underlined that Turkey was one of the very few exceptions made any where in the world in terms of cuts and we are trying to send a message.....

BYRD: It was truly .... significant.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. Could I address a question to Senator Pell? Senator Pell, concerning foreign aid, are you in favor of maintaining the 7 to 10 ratio in foreign aid to Turkey and Greece? Are you also in favor of linking foreign aid to Turkey to the Cyprus issue?

PELL: Here I speak purely for myself and I think I am very much in the minority. I do favor that personally, but it is not a matter of national policy, my country is not. I would add here that I want to congratulate the Turkish government on the spirit of Davos. I think the spirit of Davos is a wonderful thing to be encouraged. I hope it will lead to the reduction of the tanks and the troops on Cyprus. It would fit Turkey not to be diverted in that direction, and for Turkey and Greece to devote their full attention to combatting the Soviet adversaries. That is where their attention should be focused.

BYRD: May I add just one thing. I think we are all pleased with the progress that is being shown. There is a positive attitude of the leadership of this country in saying let's move forward, let's have talks, let's resolve this. And I have seen a positive attitude on the part of Greece in responding to that. So, I think, we are seeing progress and it seems to me that it is in the mutual interest of us all to stand together and show the unity of purpose and the unity of vision that is being shown not only with regard to this particular problem but overall.

BOREN: Your Prime Minister is a person of immense ability, I believe. I have studied his economic policies for a long time as an economist. And I think he is also showing great understanding of the political situation, in our country as well, by the actions that he is taking. And for him to take the initiative and these positive steps to try to solve this dispute, I think, is going to do nothing but strengthen the hand, the actions that your Prime Minister has taken are going to strengthen the hand, of those who appreciate the commitment that Turkey is making to our mutual friendship. And this will strengthen the hand of the friends of Turkey in Congress. It will strengthen the hands of the friends of Turkey in the Administration, that your Prime Minister is taking this initiative.

QUESTION: Rasit Gurdilek from German Press Agency. Senator, you said in your visit to various NATO capitals, you reasserted Washington's commitment to the defense of Europe and Turkey after this INF treaty. But Herr Worner, the German Defense Minister, yesterday told you a position that United States support would be forthcoming only if Germany and the other allies agreed to the upgrading of short range nuclear weapons. And this question is also topical in Turkey. Does your emphasis of continued U.S. support involve the upgrading of these short range weapons in Turkey as well?

BYRD: Well, I cannot comment on what Mr. Worner has said. I haven't seen, I haven't read what he has said, so I will not attempt any comment along that line. I may say that we, Republicans and Democrats alike in Washington, in our Constitutional system, are supportive of the decisions of the Alliance. We maintain that those decisions are collective decisions, collective planning, and collective efforts to intensify and improve our overall military capability. So, whatever the decisions of the Alliance are, that will be our decision. That will be where I will place my support and I am sure I speak for my colleagues in that respect. But the nuclear element must continue to be an element in the strategy of flexible response if that strategy is to be credible. I don't think we should get into details here, but there is still a limitation under 300 kilometers, I believe, under 500 kilometers, and so within that limitation it would seem to me that the NATO Alliance will be discussing how they can best act to strengthen and improve and enhance the military capability of the Alliance. And so, within that limitation, speaking for me personally and that is all, I would like to see stand-off platforms which are not prohibited, but which would stay within that level and an improvement in the range of our nuclear weapons staying within that limitation. It is not for me to say what the details should be, but it is for me to say as the Majority Leader of the Senate that I am fully supportive of whatever collective decision that NATO allies reach. They will reach that decision after careful deliberation, not too much of a hurry, it takes some time. And I feel confident that that will be the right decision.

BOREN: Could I have just one point. I think Senator Nunn, who has been with us and had to return to Washington, would make a couple of points that certainly would be very consistent with what the Leader said. I would agree with them, but I think that there is a feeling on the part of many of us that the differences of opinion are being blown out of proportion. One thing is very clear, there is no kind of a threatening atmosphere developing here. The United States is here to stay, our physical presence in Germany, for example, we are going to stay there. No matter what happens, the ultimate nuclear deterrent of our long range strategic weapons is going to stay there. No one is saying if we don't get our way on everything, we are no longer going to be in the game. We are going to be in the game to stay no matter what. So, there is, I think, a misconception. That always happens. Any little difference of opinion always is blown out of proportion when the 99 percent of agreement is never emphasized. I think also the allies, and we've been to all allied, many of the allied capitals, I think they're all going to listen very sensitively to the German perspective on this matter. And so as we go into it, we're always modernizing every weapon, if we did not modernize, no system would be effective any more. You can't deal with antiques. But we are not talking about putting more nuclear weapons in, we are talking only of modernizing. And I think one of the things everyone seems to agree on is where do you start in your modernization? With those that have the longest range. In other words, you start with those that are closer to the 500 kilometer range rather than those that are closer to the zero range. I certainly think that would be a perspective that would be certainly advanced in Germany. The other thing is we all agreed everywhere that conventional must be addressed. Here the Soviets are very clever. They want to talk only nuclear, nuclear, nuclear. Why? Because we have a balance. They don't want to talk about conventional, which is a very grave threat. It is a grave threat to Turkey. It is a grave threat to Germany and all of the Western Alliance.

BYRD: And chemical.

SOREN: And chemical. Because here, they sit, for example, five to one advantage on this southern flank, and on the eastern flank of NATO where Turkey is so critical, here they sit with a huge imbalance of conventional forces, a huge advantage in western Europe. Now, we know from the past, from World War One and World War Two, it doesn't have to be a nuclear war for millions of innocent people to die. We want to get them to the table on this conventional imbalance. And there was a total agreement among all the NATO allies that we should be getting them to the table on the conventional imbalance. So, I think that what we are seeing is somewhat I guess, as the British might say, a tempest in a tea pot, a false disagreement. It is not really present. I think there is really too much being made of it. We are not talking about changing anything other than the long range decisions, orderly decisions, that NATO has been making.

BYRD: And Germany has a big voice in that.

QUESTION: You met both with Mr. Evren and Mr. Ozal, the President and the Prime Minister. Were you told of any plans of trip a to the United States, by either of them within the coming months or within this year?

BYRD: Well, we are hopeful that if and when the President can decide, that he will be able to come. He had planned to come. We will welcome his coming and we know that if and when he does, he'll have very productive discussions and be in a position to make a good case for continued modernization of the Turkish forces and the strengthening of its position within the Alliance.

Appendix M

Press Conference

Rome, Italy
February 12, 1988

Reporter: We have the opportunity of questioning four Senators, distinguished Senators, led by Senator Byrd, who you of course know is the Majority Leader, Senator Boren, Senator Pell, and Senator Warner. And you have their bios so there's no need to say anything about them.....I'll turn it over to Senator Byrd.

Senator Byrd: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. This delegation is a bipartisan one as you know. We have come in the light of the new INF Treaty that is before the Senate, to visit with the governments of five NATO countries—London, Bonn, Paris, Ankara, and Rome. We have come to assess their viewpoints concerning where we go from here as an alliance and also to state to them that America's support of the NATO alliance is constant, enduring, and will continue undiminished after the approval of the INF Treaty. We are reassured as we prepare to return to our own capital that these NATO leaders see the future as well as the present just as we do; that we must in the near future begin to plan collectively and to act collectively to present this new aggressive Soviet leadership with a plan for conventional and chemical arms control. We must view this new leadership as one that is aggressive, one that is formidable, one that is articulate, one that is imaginative. And we must understand that this new leadership has problems. And so we must view this leadership skeptically, I think, and be prepared at all times to assess its words and its actions in the light of realism, remembering always the past, as we look to the future.

We must also, as we view these things and analyze them, keep in mind that the Soviet leadership has great problems at home, and so its initial desire, I'm sure, is to solve those plaguing, chronic problems. We should also keep in mind that the Soviet Union has tried to seperate the Western powers, break down their unity and, if it can, denuclearize Europe and at least quasi-demilitarize Europe—get rid of U.S. troops at some point in the future. It will continue to try to do this.

So I'm glad to find that European leaders have seen the new leadership in the Soviet Union, have seen where we are, have seen where we need to go through the same eyes that we have seen. And so for the future we must act with unison, and in the United States regardless of what noises we may hear, as we approach this coming campaign. We have emphasized to the publics and the leaders in the countries where we have gone that under our constitutional system, the Congress is the stabilizing force. The Senate, in particular, through its role under the constitutional system, also has a voice in the making of any treaty and it requires a super majority. Finally, we work in a bipartisan way. Republicans and Democrats in the Senate, regardless of who's in control of the Senate, regardless of which party may be in control of the White House. We will work in unison always, believing that it is in our mutual security interests to stand together with the alliance, work together in planning for the future and intensify our mutual efforts to become stronger through unity, and together view the future with realism. Thank you. We'll take your questions.

Reporter: You know that there has been criticism in Europe .... on the question of modernization of tactical nuclear weapons, especially Germany. Do you think that we need a new Atlantic commitment to reestablish common goals?

Senator Byrd: We are all aware that there is that concern among the European publics, perhaps that what they have seen, the INF treaty, what they have heard coming out of Washington, sometimes some confusing voices, but perhaps they may need to be concerned about a possible recoupling and a withdrawing away from Europe and the alliance by the United States. But I don't think that feeling among the leaders is deep seated and I doubt that upon sober reflection and with a little time that the European publics will seriously believe that. I think, however, that this has been one of our purposes here. We have seen it as such and we want to underscore it now to the opinion makers and leaders in Europe that there is no thought of decoupling, that European interests are our interests, that European security is our security, and that there will be no decoupling. Our support for the alliance is here to stay; it's as strong today as it was yesterday. It will continue to be strong. I think we do have a responsibility to educate our respective publics that what we'll see may not really be what we're getting. We want to be prepared to seize the opportunities to come and the challenges, but we must not be fooled. Caution is the watchword and the United States is not about to back away from our alliance.

Senator Boren: Mr. Leader, could I add a word on that. I think that the bottom line is very simple. Nothing is really changed in this world since the INF Agreement. We're just exactly where we were before we ever started except one thing happened. Because of the determination of NATO, and Italy was a very key part of that, in having the courage to deploy, because NATO had the courage to deploy, we have forced the Soviets to eliminate the SS-20's which were a special threat to Europe. Now we're back where we were before. And it's very clear we still have the same need for America's physical presence, troop presence, in Europe, and we have a bipartisan consensus in Congress on that. We still have the need for a strong nuclear deterrent and we have a bipartisan consensus in Congress on that as well. And we've found in our travels a good deal of unity. One, on modernization, I think that we're not talking about adding new weapons, we're talking about modernizing, You have to do that with all your weapons or they could get out of date. We're just talking about modernizing and I think the general emphasis has been on modernizing as you look from zero to 500 km, modernizing those that are closer to the 500 km range, the longe range systems—that seems to be the general consensus where the greatest need exists. Second, conventional forces, and we all understand when we look back at the last two great wars that the killing, the destruction didn't come from nuclear weapons, it came from conventional weapons, and I think there was a consensus everywhere we went, let's not let the Russians fool us. They want to talk about nuclear weapons where we have a balance. They don't want to talk about conventional weapons where they have superiority. There was a common determination every place we've been to get to these conventional talks as soon as we can because that's a real threat to us, because that's where the destabilizing imbalance exists today.

Senator Warner: Can I have a word please?

Senator Byrd: Yes, Mr. Warner.

Senator Warner: Thank you very much. As we've visited with the heads of government and state, clearly we gain the impression that they are praising the President of the United States for his leadership throughout the arms control process of many many years—his leadership in having talks, at the same time working with the Congress of the United States to add credibility to America's defense posture and build it up. And secondly, the leaders have all said that the consultative process, namely, the ongoing consultations between the United States and our allies with respect to the INF treaty and now in terms of the START treaty, have been excellent. And lastly, the leaders support the modernization that goes forward within the framework that was set at Montebello, indeed, that continues in complete coordination with the NATO alliance. So, Mr. Leader, those are the points that I desire to make.

Senator Pell: I'd like to comment here that we should bear in mind that the reason for the imbalance is that the European partners in NATO do not assess the risk perhaps as highly as we do. They've not chosen to create the forces that would be a balance and my hope would be, as well, that they would contribute a larger share to the NATO forces.

Reporter: Senator Byrd?

Senator Byrd: Yes?

Reporter: You just used the words "aggressive, formidable". Are you confident you can use the same words with the Administration and especially for the next one?

Senator Byrd: I am confident that I can use the words for any administration—Democratic or Republican. The support for our combined and collective decision making in the allliance and support for unity in implementing the planning of the alliance is undiminished. I think we have to be sure the European publics understand that this is not a time for weakness or for indecision or for disunity and we have to be on guard lest our potential adversary, which has always used threats, has changed. It sees the necessity for using comforting words, and let's be careful that we do not succumb to falling asleep and taking it easy and relying upon the professed good will and intentions of this adversary. What is here to show that the objectives of the Soviet Union have changed? Where is the evidence that with this new leadership we can go to sleep or that we have reason to rest or to argue among ourselves and to break ourselves apart on the shoals?

Reporter: (inaudible)

Senator Byrd: I think that NATO must, and I am confident that it will, reassess where we stand in the light of the INF Treaty and particularly in the light of the new dynamic leadership in the Soviet Union. I am confident that with sober reflection and with careful and thorough debate, that NATO will see the right course and that it will follow that course. Now is the time, NOW is the time for sober, strong, leadership among the NATO allies. We must have a true sense of history, with a true idea of where we are going. We've got a job to do in educating our publics as to the need for unity and, as to our need, the alliance's need, for support. We must not only convince the Soviet leadership of our public support, but we have to convince our own publics that their support is needed because the threat to their liberties and freedoms is still there.

Senator Warner: If I could say a word, Mr. Leader. Nuclear deterrence kept the peace in this part of the world for longer than any other time in modern of history, 40 plus years. Today, nuclear deterrence is served by the doctrine of flexible response, and that doctrine remains stronger post-INF than before the INF. What remains for NATO now is to recognize the need to strengthen the conventional forces and at the same time go into parallel discussions within the 23 nation forum on the means by which to reduce conventional forces. I hope we follow through with a determination to strengthen and modernize, and at the same time express a willingness to talk to reduce the conventional arms because of the asymmetry between the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact.

Senator Boren: I think Senator Warner is right. The thing that has surprised me during this trip is not the level of disagreement I found. What has surprised me is the level of agreement. I think before we came we saw articles in the press, both the American and foreign press, speculating on the denuclearization Europe, the third zero, these sorts of things. We didn't find a single person in any country, any responsible leader of any government, advocating any of those things. While we found minor differences of opinion, there is still a strong commitment to flexible response, still an understanding about the need for nuclear deterrence. No one disagreed about that and everyone agreed, just as Senator Warner just said, we got rid of the SS-20's because we were unified on deployment. We see our biggest problem right now—as the imbalance in conventional forces. We need to go to work on that to reduce the balance and bring it to the bargaining table on conventional forces. I don't think there's a need for a debate about a new identity of NATO. NATO's identity, its sense of direction, is absolutely unchanged. The very surprising thing to me as a member of this delegation was what I found to be the shared consensus and the fact that what appeared at a distance to be massive differences of opinion simply do not exist. Now that's not to say that there won't be discussions of which systems may require modernization. As I say, I think there's a general agreement that we move toward first rather than those that are closer to zero. We found very little difference of opinion modernizing long-range systems.

Reporter: How do you think such potential modernization will fare in the U.S. Congress?

Sentor Boren: I think it would depend completely on whether it was a NATO collective decision. I don't think we could prejudge that, because NATO will collectively make that decision and I think what we're going to say in Congress and I ask my colleagues to comment, I can't comment on this alone, but I think we would all want to take a "wait and see" attitude on what the collective judgment of NATO is, not just to see what our government's attitude is, but what NATO wants. Then I think we would be very willing to look at what NATO collectively decided to do.

Senator Byrd: I perceived a phrase which I'm not sure the gentleman meant to say. He used the words I believe "over 500." I don't think there's any thought of replacing the INF intermediate or short range weapons with weapons that have a range of over 500. I think that NATO will want to consider, as it plans for the future, whether or not it should have nuclear weapons that would reach up to, but still a little under that restriction.

Reporter: Very briefly, what I meant was airborne and possibly sea-based even though they may have a range of over 500. Those do not fall into INF, but would ... with favor in European eyes... whereas those up to 500 don't do that. Well, maybe very marginal strategic systems reach deep into Soviet territory which maybe the highest value of the INF.

Senator Warner: As you know I'm a member of the Armed Services Committee and for 9 years I have worked on these issues. I think the leader may speak to the ratification issue momentarily, but we all anticipate ratification. The U.S. will comply strictly with that treaty but bear in mind that we have had ongoing for many years now a number of modernization programs, of the nature of which you speak, air-launch cruise, sea launch cruise and things of this nature. So it's not as if we're rushing to the starting gate to try and create a whole lot of compensating weapons as they are now categorized. These have been under design, are now in development, and in some cases in production before the INF Treaty. The U.S. is very cautiously working along in its modernization program together with its allies and has been doing so for many years.

Senator Boren: Not compensation, but modernization. There's a difference.

Senator Byrd: There's nothing in the Treaty that deals with those weapons that you're talking about. I think the allies must determine what is necessary with respect to that necessary nuclear ingredient that comes within the restrictions and boundaries of the INF treaty that is required to keep the strategy of flexible response credible.

Senator Pell: I think, following up on Senator Boren's point, that the modernization should not be taken as a backdoor way of achieving compensation. We would not be within the spirit of the treaty, even if within the letter.

Reporter: Would there be consultation between Europeans and Americans on this weapons issue?

Senator Byrd: Of course there must be always consultations with our European allies. There's strength in conference. Conference makes a ready man.

Senator Warner: As I've expressed in my second point, all of the leaders with whom we have spoken have been very praiseworthy of the consultative process between the U.S. and our allies through INF and ongoing today with START. On the START treaty, there is a general consensus that when the time is right, when an agreement that is in the interest not only of the U.S. but of all our allies has been reached, then it will be time to proceed.

Senator Boren: We have to move with caution. Let me say as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, our responsibility is verification. That's the aspect of the treaty we must look at. Obviously verification of a START agreement is a much more complex task than verification of an INF where you're at zero—here you're talking about systems that that are still ongoing in production and deployment with just reduced numbers. You obviously put a lot more stress on national technical means to verify. We all hope to have an agreement. We hope we have one in a timely fashion, but I think we all feel very strongly and we heard this from the allies, let's have a treaty when we have a good treaty, and a verifiable treaty. Not a treaty just to have a treaty, but let's make sure it's a good treaty. We don't rush into anything, we don't set any artificial time tables and of course we have heard particularly from the British and the French with their own independent strategic nuclear forces, that obviously there would be no way that our country would negotiate in a manner that would include them under ceilings without long consultations with them, so obviously there's that point as well, but there's been.... Senator Warner said from all of them we heard that the consultation has been very very close, it has been ongoing, every point of the negotiation as it is raised is being discussed with all the allies including with this government.

Senator Pell: I think we should think of the INF treaty as not being of any great military significance. It's just a change in direction. The elevator has been going up. It's now stopped and going down a bit—you have to think of INF as part of a continuum and the INF treaty comes at the right time. We consider the START treaty the same way and there are other treaties, such as the PNET and the TTBT which the Foreign Relations Committee supported last year. I see all of these things as being part of a continuum.

Reporter: I would like to pick up a remark that Senator Byrd made earlier about the need to educate our perspective peoples. I think we must educate our people that we have security. I would like to have your comments on the issue of the remaining U.S. troops in Europe.

Senator Byrd: I think sometimes things are said that should be more carefully thought out. Sometimes things are quoted out of context. Sometimes voices are heard in Washington that reflect an opinion that is not soundly based, and not universally, or broadly held. We don't believe in this linkage of which you have spoken. Europe's security is our security. Our security is Europe's security. And I hear no thought, no opinion by any segment or sector of either party, either in the executive branch or in the legislative branch, that would give substance and support to the idea that America is contemplating withdrawing American troops from Europe. We believe this American presence is here to stay. And I've said in the beginning we will be supportive of the NATO alliance tomorrow, and the next day, and the next year.

Senator Boren: I think there has been some misunderstanding of what he said. Remember this, and this is something that we stressed when we were in Germany. When you add up the American troops that are there, when you add up the British troops that are there, and you add up the civilians that are there, and the dependents that are there, the family members, there is not just Germany being threatened, there are over a million American and British citizens there, and so we're talking about concern for the security of our own people. They are going to stay there. We're really all in the same boat together. The whole point is to deter war. That's why we have nuclear weapons, so they'll never be used. Deterrence must remain strong and I think that's what the Secretary meant to stress. Germany's not isolated, there are a million Americans and British there for example. There's the Italian commitment. We all, by being a part of a common alliance, we're all targeted. Senator Nunn, when he was with us earlier pointed out something that I think is very important. He pointed out that our inspectors on location at at Votkinsk in the heart of the Soviet Union will be there to make sure that every missile that comes out of that factor is an SS25 which can reach New York or Washington or Tulsa, and not an SS20 that can only reach Europe. So there is no question of the U.S. removing its presence in Europe or of decoupling.

Reporter: What about this Franco-German brigade?

Senator Byrd: Well, I can very clearly express a firm opinion, but rather than take the chance that I'll be talking too much, I wonder if I might ask Senator Warner who is on the Armed Services Committee or one of the other Senators to respond to that. Senator Pell?

Senator Warner: There's no hesitancy on the part of any of us, but I think the Leader has pretty well covered that issue and solidarity is right there.

Senator Warner: It's an experiment and it was made clear to us that it was an experiment and it has a great deal of symbolism attached to it. This stirs old passions and old fears but it looks to the future and as the Leader has said, we view it as strengthening the alliance, the two old enemies can now sit down and have a common military force.

Senator Pell: We ought to bear in mind too, that to bring France into a cooperative arrangement with one of its NATO allies will, we hope, be sort of creeping NATO-ism that will involve more and more military in this new phase.

Senator Boren: We don't want to imply that we think that the French are going to make any dramatic gestures in regard to NATO, but I think the bottom line is that bilateral relations, good bilateral relations, are positive, and it was stressed to us again and again by the French this is not a first step toward any kind of competing organization against NATO. They're going to continue to send signals that that's not going to happen. I think we think it's good. All the magnets, not only could we be together in one group, but all the bilateral magnets, the French, the magnetism between France and Gemany, everything that binds us together, one on one, and all together—it all helps. It all helps.

Senator Pell: I guess what I would like to have said perhaps better phrased, is that I hope that France, because of this, becomes infected with creeping NATO-ism.

Reporter: ...You would see it favorably?

Senator Boren: I don't think there's any effort to expand it beyond bilateral. This is purely for matters of history and symbolism important between France and Gemany. I don't think they view this as anything that would be expanded beyond that. Because we have NATO otherwise for multilateral...

Senator Byrd: There is some talk about England.

Senator Boren: Well, that's bilateral. Not joining the brigade.

We have time for one more question.

Reporter: What about the Administration's letter you have received concerning the interpretation issue of the Treaty?

Senator Byrd: I think that this does indicate progress on the part of the Administration to meet the Senate's concerns with respect to the authoritativeness of Administration witnesses who will appear before the Senate committees in explaining this treaty. They will not challenge their statements as anything other than the official record. As far as I'm concerned, I'm looking at the present. I'm looking at this within the context of the INF treaty. I trust that that answers your question. I don't think there will be any delay in the work of the Senate on this treaty. I think there's a mutual sense of understanding now that is developing and I'm pleased to see the Administration letter. I think it goes a long way toward making it possible for us to act reasonably, expeditiously.

It is been said already that this country understood its responsibilities and accepted them in the deployment of cruise missiles in the beginning. Italy has been steadfast in standing by those commitments as we have moved toward the achievement of a treaty. And it should also be said that this country is fulfilling its responsibility to meet that 3 percent requirement in real terms.

We're pleased that this country has indicated its willingness to consider accepting the F-16's here and as I understand it would accept their location here. This is not a U.S.-Italy issue, but a NATO issue. Contrary to the report we read in a newspaper in Turkey, the Senate, and I am confident the same can be said for the House, will look favorably upon supporting a solution agreed to by NATO.

APPENDIX N

Washington Post
February 28, 1988



28 Feb '88

Turkey-U.S. Bases Pact

■ ANKARA—Turkey announced that it has ratified the extension until 1990 of a pact allowing U.S. air bases and monitoring stations along the Soviet border in return for aid.

A letter setting out terms for continuation of the 1980 agreement was signed by Washington last March, a Foreign Ministry statement said. Turkey, angered by congressional resolutions on the Armenian issue and proposed aid cuts, had only initialed the letter. But a decree on ratification will be published in the Official Gazette today, the statement said.

APPENDIX O

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1988

Dear Senator Byrd:

I am writing in response to letters by yourself and Senators Nunn, Pell, and Stevens, and by Senator Wilson and a group of fifteen Senators concerning the question of Senate access to the negotiating record for the INF Treaty. I am gratified that we have now reached an understanding on the way in which the Senate and Administration will proceed in this regard.

I believe that the INF Treaty text is a clear and accurate statement of the obligations of the United States and the Soviet Union. In accordance with international law, we should of course, look first to this text to answer any question about the meaning of these obligations. But I also recognize that the Senate, in discharging its important Constitutional role of considering advice and consent to ratification, may wish to review the negotiating record.

Therefore, we are pleased to provide the Senate access to materials upon which treaty interpretation is based. These include records of the INF negotiations conducted in the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, and in ministerial and summit meetings. We will provide access to cables and memoranda of conversation reporting discussions with the Soviets in Geneva, all Joint Draft Texts, U.S. and Soviet prepared texts exchanged at plenaries and other working meetings, and all other documents exchanged between the parties. We cannot provide internal Executive Branch deliberative material that was not provided to the Soviets because such material does not reflect mutual intent of the parties, and therefore, cannot be used as a basis for interpretation of obligations.

The documents we will provide are classified and sensitive. Their disclosure could jeopardize current arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, I am pleased that we have agreed on ground rules for Senate access which will suit our purposes and yours. The attached Terms of Access is a simple, one page agreement on procedures for access, custody, storage appropriate to the classification of the documents, and their eventual return to the State Department. With this understanding we are prepared to deliver the INF negotiating record to the Senate immediately.

The Honorable
Robert Byrd,
United States Senate.

Of course, we remain prepared to respond to any further questions by the Senate as to the content and effect of the INF Treaty negotiating record on particular issues of interest. Our responses will give a full, comprehensive and authoritative account.

I believe that our understanding will make it possible for the Senate to proceed expeditiously with its consideration of the INF Treaty. I understand that the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Senator Dole agree with this understanding. I am sure we will be able to resolve any further questions that may arise in a spirit of cooperation and accommodation, and I look forward to working with you on the INF Treaty in the coming weeks.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

Attachment:

Terms of Access.

cc:

Senator R. Dole

Terms of Access to INF Negotiating Records

The Administration has agreed to make available to the United States Senate records of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on the INF Treaty. Since these documents are the property of the Executive branch and involve classified and sensitive information, they will be made available only at the secure facility at Room 901, Hart Senate Office Building -- the Senate Arms Control Treaty Review Support Office (Support Office). Only Senators, designated staff members, employees of the Support Office and designated members of the Executive branch shall be permitted to enter this secure location. The names of the designated staff members and Support Office employees shall be provided, in writing, to the Department of State prior to their being given access to the documents; and the names of the Executive branch officials shall be provided, in writing, to the Senate. A record of all persons entering and exiting the secure location shall be maintained.

Access to these documents will be limited to Senators and 30 designated staff members. The Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will each designate 6 staff members (3 from each party as agreed to by the Ranking Minority Member) and the Majority Leader and the Republican Leader will each designate 6 staff members. Employees of the Support Office shall have access for administrative purposes; their number shall be kept to a reasonable minimum. Such employees and the designated staff members must have all necessary security clearances.

These documents may be reviewed at the secure location only; no copies may be made and retained (working copies may be made for the convenience of the Senators and staff but shall be accounted for and destroyed; they shall not be removed); and no documents may be removed. Any notes derived from classified materials shall be treated as classified and classified documents shall not be referenced in open session.

Within 30 days of the Senate's final vote on advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty, or adjournment sine die of the 100th Congress, whichever occurs first, the documents will be returned to the Department of State.

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISSISSIPPI
J. JAMES EXON, NEBRASKA
CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
JEFF BINGAMAN, NEW MEXICO
ALAN J. DIXON, ILLINOIS
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
ALBERT GORE, JR., TENNESSEE
TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, COLORADO
RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA

JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA
STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA
GORDON J. HUMPHREY, NEW HAMPSHIRE
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
DAN QUAYLE, INDIANA
PETE WILSON, CALIFORNIA
PHIL GRAMM, TEXAS
STEVEN D. SYMMS, IDAHO
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA

ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STAFF DIRECTOR
CARL M. SMITH, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

February 5, 1988

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We have received your letter outlining the agreement between the Senate and the Administration on Senate access to the INF negotiating record. We are pleased that we have been able to reach agreement on this matter and look forward to your delivery of the documents identified in the letter. In particular, we welcome your recognition that internal, executive branch deliberative material "cannot be used as a basis for interpretation of obligations" and therefore need not be submitted to the Senate.

This agreement removes one obstacle to prompt consideration by the Senate of the INF Treaty. We deeply regret, however, that your letter is silent with regard to the three key principles we have been discussing over the last two months concerning the relationship between the Senate and the Executive Branch as treaty-making partners. Our agreement on the negotiating record can only be truly effective if it is accompanied by an agreement on these three principles:

(1) The testimony of all Executive Branch witnesses and any submissions for the hearing record by the Executive Branch on a Treaty can be regarded by the Senate as authoritative.

(2) The meaning of the Treaty as presented to the Senate can be regarded by the Senate as authoritative without the necessity of the Senate's incorporating that testimony and material in its Resolution of Ratification through understandings, reservations, amendments, or other conditions.

(3) A meaning for the treaty different from that presented to the Senate by the Reagan Administration cannot be adopted without the approval of the Senate.

As you know, our concerns stem from statements made on this subject by Judge Sofaer, the State Department's Legal Adviser, over the last two years. For example, in response to a question asked by Senator Nunn during a November 21, 1985 Armed Services Committee hearing, Judge Sofaer stated:

> The Senate held extensive hearings to develop a detailed understanding and assessment of the two SALT I agreements. Although this process may have helped to answer questions in particular Senators' minds, it could not result in authoritative clarifications of any ambiguities in the Treaty, because statements made during the hearings were unilateral.

Judge Sofaer has suggested that the testimony of some top Nixon Administration witnesses, including Secretary of Defense Laird and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. John Foster, was not authoritative. Moreover, on March 26, 1987, Judge Sofaer told the Senate Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees:

> When it [the Senate] gives its advice and consent to a treaty, it is to the treaty that was made, irrespective of explanations it is provided.

Under this doctrine, if the Senate is misinformed by Executive Branch officials as to the meaning of a treaty, that is simply too bad. Unless modified, Judge Sofaer's views put the Senate on notice that if it relies upon the testimony of the Administration as to the meaning of the INF Treaty, it will do so at its own risk.

Since you have not assured us that the meaning of the Treaty as presented to the Senate by Administration witnesses is authoritative and that such meaning will be respected in the future even if the Senate has not embodied its understanding of the Treaty in the Resolution of Ratification, we must assume that we will have to review the negotiating record exhaustively, compare it to all Executive Branch testimony, and prepare understandings, reservations or amendments addressing every point of interpretation in the Treaty. At best, such an approach would be unwieldy and time consuming. At worst, it could undermine the treaty ratification process.

Based on our meeting last Monday, we were of the opinion that we were close to reaching a satisfactory resolution through a letter from you addressing the three principles. It is most unfortunate, therefore, that you have apparently changed your mind and do not intend to provide us with such a letter.

The Armed Services Committee had intended to conduct hearings on the Treaty with Administration witnesses over the several weeks and complete its hearings by the end of the month. This plan was based on the expectation that the testimony of Executive Branch witnesses on the Treaty would be in accord with the three principles. However, the Armed Services Committee now has no choice but to clarify the Reagan Administration's position on these questions before hearing from other Administration witnesses. We regret the inevitable delay this will cause.

In an effort to resolve this impasse and avoid undue delay in hearing the Administration's testimony on the Treaty, Senator Nunn hereby requests that you appear before the Armed Services Committee as soon as possible after the February recess.

We hope that we can quickly get these serious questions behind us.

Sincerely,

Robert C. Byrd

Sam Nunn

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1988

Dear Senator Byrd:

I am responding to your letter of February 5 concerning the INF Treaty. I am pleased that we have resolved the question of Senate access to the INF negotiating record. I believe that we can also resolve the remaining questions posed by your letter in a manner that accommodates the interests of all concerned and serves the national interest.

Your letter asks for our agreement on three points. Your first point is that the testimony of all Executive Branch witnesses and any submissions for the hearing record by the Executive Branch on the Treaty can be regarded by the Senate as authoritative. We agree. All INF testimony of Executive Branch witnesses, within their authorized scope, is authoritative. We will inform the relevant Committee of any instance in which a witness' testimony is not authoritative in any respect.

Your second point is that the meaning of the Treaty as presented to the Senate can be regarded by the Senate as authoritative without the necessity of the Senate's incorporating that testimony and material in its Resolution of Ratification through understandings, reservations, amendments, or other conditions. Again, we agree. Administration testimony and materials for the record can be regarded as authoritative, as described above, without the need for the Senate to incorporate them in its Resolution of Ratification.

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C.

Your third point is that a meaning for the Treaty different from that presented to the Senate by the Reagan Administration cannot be adopted without the approval of the Senate. I can assure you that the Reagan Administration will in no way depart from the INF Treaty as we are presenting it to the Senate.

I hope that this letter will help us resolve these important questions.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

George P. Shultz

cc: Senator Robert Dole

ROBERT C. BYRD
WEST VIRGINIA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, DC 20510-7010

For Immediate Release
February 10, 1988

Contact: Linda Peek
Marsha Berry
224-2939

Joint Statement by Senators Byrd and Nunn
commenting on Secretary Shultz's
February 9 letter on the INF Treaty

12:45 EST Press Conference
Hotel Tallyrand
Paris, France
February 10, 1988

"The letter from Secretary Shultz provides important assurances with regard to key principles which must govern the relationship between the Senate and the Executive branch in the treaty process. While there are some aspects of this understanding which may require further consideration in the course of the Senate's action on the INF Treaty, the letter enables the Senate Armed Services Committee to resume hearings on the Treaty next week with Administration witnesses."

APPENDIX P

COMITE D'ACTION POUR L'EUROPE

MAX KOHNSTAMM
SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL

KEVIN WALSH
ASSISTANT AU
SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL

TRANSLATION

19 January 1988

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN PILLAR WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1.Strengthening Europe's contribution to its own defence by establishing a European Pillar within the Atlantic Alliance

1.1 For 40 years, the Atlantic Alliance, by virtue of the joint efforts of both the Americans, Canadians and the Europeans, has ensured peace and security in Europe.

1.2 To give form to a true European identity the European countries who are members of the Alliance should establish a framework within which they should coordinate and enhance their endeavours in defence matters. The coordination and strengthening of these efforts will ensure a proper balance within the Alliance to which Europe will make a more effective contribution.

1.3 This solidarity in defence and security matters requires that our nations accept that in these matters they are inseparable and therefore accept that each one's security extends to the borders of its partners.

1.4 The creation of a European Pillar requires agreement as to its structure and the composition of its forces as well as setting out precise commitments to be undertaken by all participating countries, and concertation with the non-European members of the Alliance.

The members of the Working Group are Messrs:
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Chairman, Egon Bahr, Markus Berger, Alfred Dregger, François Fillon, Gérard Fuchs, Michael Heseltine, General Lacase, Giorgio La Malfa, Manuel Medina, Hans Van Mierlo.

2. Rôle of the European Pillar and obligations of its members

2.1 The Working Group has noted with satisfaction the "Platform on European security interests in defence and security" adopted in The Hague on 27 October 1987 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Western European Union (WEU). This body appears for the moment to be appropriate for the organisation of the European Pillar. The Treaty of the WEU ought to be rekindled in order to establish a European identity in security matters. For this purpose, the WEU should be open to all European countries who are willing to undertake stringent obligations, including the equitable sharing of their budgetary efforts in matters of defence and security.

2.2 Within this framework, the European countries will endeavour to adopt common positions on strategy, on arms control and arms reduction, as well as on external European security problems, and the necessary contributions to these efforts. These positions should become the basis for discussions, within the Alliance, particularly with the transatlantic allies.

2.3 The establishment of this pillar will enable Europeans, should they deem it useful, to take the necessary initiatives and to participate at all negotiations directly involved with their security.

2.4 The European Pillar should seek through a strengthened I.E.P.G. to standardise the weapons used by its members for the equipment of their armed forces. This will require coordination of basic military research and the adoption of common industrial programmes and the opening up of armaments markets. The organisation of common programmes should take full advantage of the increasingly competitive base of the integrated European market and insist on effective leadership of cooperation programmes.

2.5 There should also be coordination and common funding of research and development programmes including the construction of a European network of reconnaissance, early warning and communication satellites, an effort which is also linked to the necessity for Europe to master space technology.

3. Relevant Military Forces

3.1 As is stated in the Platform of the Hague, "for the foreseeable future ... the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an appropriate combination of nuclear and conventional forces, of which the nuclear element is the only one which poses an unacceptable risk to an eventual aggressor".

3.2 This document goes on to restate the irreplaceable rôle, to European defence, of the conventional and nuclear forces of the United States which underline the American commitment towards Europe and constitute the link with the US strategic deterrence forces.

3.3 The more effective the European contribution to the Alliance, the more secure the American commitment. Thus, Europe ought to be in a position to ensure a greater responsibility for her own defence within the Atlantic Alliance. But European defence interests are not limited to the deterrence of the Warsaw Pact. Europe's interests are worldwide and the European Pillar must take this into account. It should operate at all times for political as well as strategic matters.

3.4 The European Pillar is based on the conventional forces of the European countries and the nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom.

3.5 The conventional forces of the European countries within NATO are under the authority of SACEUR. Those of France and Spain will join them in times of crisis.

3.6 In the context of an overall concertation within the Alliance towards improving the balance within it and adapting its strategy, the organisation of the structures will have to be examined.

4. Special Contributions of France and the United Kingdom as European nuclear powers.

4.1 France and the United Kingdom, being the only countries possessing nuclear weapons, have as much responsibility for Europe's security as for their own.

4.2 In conformity with their very nature, French and United Kingdom nuclear weapons will remain under national control.

4.3 France and the United Kingdom should coordinate their nuclear forces on the operational level, and the planning of nuclear systems as regards their conception and their uses, in order tomaintain an effective deterrent.

5. Special position of the Federal Republic of Germany.

5.1 In order to fulfill her obligations in WEU, the United Kingdom will continue to maintain its commitment of 55 000 troops and forward air force bases in the Federal Republic of Germany.

5.2 The United Kingdom should also continue to provide facilities for the rapid reinforcement of American troops in Europe, and the base for American nuclear forces essential for the defences of Europe.

5.3 Belgium, France and the Netherlands must also maintain their WEU commitments towards the Federal Republic of Germany.

5.4 In a European community of destiny, France does not have the option of "non-belligerence" in times of crises. Furthermore, she has already stated that, should the Federal Republic of Germany ever become the victim of an aggression, her essential interests thereby becoming directly concerned, France's commitment would be immediate and without reservation. France has therefore stated her determination to fully comply with her obligations to contribute to deterrence in Europe.

5.5 In this context, the territories of France and the Federal Republic of Germany constitute a common territory for manoeuvres and especially for European logistical requirements to be defined in common.

5.6 In the intervening period, France must examine with her allies the harmonisation of procedures and ensure the compatibility of equipment. To this end, the increase in the number of joint manoeuvres between NATO forces and those of France would be very useful.

5.7 As regards the planning and the rôle of her non-strategic nuclear weapons, France - as she has begun to do with the Federal Republic of Germany - should inform and consult her European partners, in the same spirit as those consultations which are currently performed by the United States and the United Kingdom.

5.8 The Federal Republic of Germany, which possesses the longest common border with the countries of the Warsaw Pact must be defended at her Eastern borders. Consequently, she bears a special burden for the common defence of Europe. She therefore must accept the stationing of strong and important contingents of allied forces on her territory.

Taking into consideration the prevailing situation, the Working Group has concentrated on the "Central Front" whilst remaining fully conscious of the importance of the situation pertaining to the Northern and the Southern Fronts.

COMITE D'ACTION POUR L'EUROPE

Paris, 19 January 1988

Translation

Declaration of the Action Committee for Europe adopted at its meeting on 18 and 19 January 1988 in Paris

Last year was marked, in economic matters, by the dramatic fall in the value of the dollar and of stocks and bonds; in defence and security matters, by the signature of the I.N.F. Treaty.

Opinions diverge on what the consequences of these events will be, save for one point: these events demand the intensification of cooperation between our nations.

On the global scale, these events have shown that as long as our countries will not form a true union, their influence on the course of events will remain weak and our destiny will depend upon the action of others.

Under these conditions, the Committee is of the opinion that our countries must undertake a qualitative leap towards their union by widening the horizon of 1992: complete the internal market without frontiers certainly, but at the same time establish in economic, monetary and social matters, as well as in defence and security matters, the essential basis to achieve this union.

According to the Committee, this implies in economic matters:

1. Putting our house in order.

1.1 The threats which recent events pose to our economic future require more than ever that order be put on the affairs of Community.

1.2 This refers in particular, to the Common Agricultural Policy, to which adaptations are necessary. These should take into account the different functions of agriculture within our communities and the international economic environment. A Working Group of the Committee will study the reform of the CAP and present its proposals.

1.3 The Committee calls on the European Council to take those decisions at its forthcoming meeting in Brussels in February, which it failed to do at Copenhagen in December.

2. Completing the Internal Market without frontiers

2.1 Without the full implementation of the programme proposed by the Commission "Making a Success of the Single Act", the Community will not achieve by 1992 a border-free market.

2.2 The completion of the internal market must be accompanied with the strengthening of economic cohesion between the different regions of the Community, the development of technological cooperation, and must also take into account social policy. The implementation of the cooperative growth strategy must have as its principal goal, a significant and lasting reduction in unemployment. The social dialogue, which is an important part of the Community's strategy for growth and employment, must be continued and deepened.

3. Achieving Monetary Union

3.1 The proper functioning of the internal market without frontiers requires exchange rate stability in the countries involved because important fluctuations in these tend to make rational business strategies illusory, particularly concerning investments and exports and thus deprives free movement of goods and services of its raison d'être.

3.2 In the absence of a strengthening of the European Monetary System, free movement of capital, an essential element of the internal market, risks becoming a potential factor of monetary instability.

3.3 The uncertainties which have followed the demise of the Bretton Woods system clearly show that once capital moves freely - as will be the case in the Community at the end of 1992 - exchange rate stability and the avoidance of the recurrence of inflation require a monetary authority capable of taking the necessary decisions. It is therefore essential to strengthen the European Monetary System in this way to avoid having the free movement of capital, and with it the functioning of the internal market, periodically called into question.

3.4 Within GATT, the Community, based on its common external tariff, speaks with one voice and consequently has an influence proportionate to its rôle in the world economy.

3.5 In monetary matters, this will not happen as long as the Ecu has not become a true currency and our countries do not dispose of a common authority to manage it.

3.6 It is therefore as much in the interest of the proper functioning of the internal market as of being able to contribute to greater stability in world exchange rates, that our Governments must envisage the establishment of a common monetary authority.

3.7 The Committee is aware that the establishment of such an authority poses serious difficulties. It will probably necessitate the amendment of existing treaties or even the adoption of a special treaty.

3.8 A Working Group of the Committee will study these issues and make its proposals.

3.9 These proposals will be based on experience gained within the framework of the European Monetary System and will take into account the memorandum circulated by M. Balladur to his colleagues, the Ministers for Finance of the Member States of the European Communuty, and the debate which it will give rise to, as well as the proposals which will shortly be made public by the Committee for Monetary Union, which is chaired jointly by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt.

4.In defence and security matters (1)

4.1 At its meeting in Rome in March 1987, the Committee declared: "... in the longer term there cannot be economic and social solidarity if it does not also extend to security through the implementation of a common defence policy." The declaration of the W.E.U.(2) emphasises: "We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, which we all signed as members of the European Community....the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not also include security and defence."

4.2 The current perspectives with regard to arms reductions and arms control underline the necessity for the creation of a European Pillar; in fact, such a Pillar, encompassing those European countries who wish to intensify their cooperation within the framework of the Alliance, will enable them to elaborate together their strategic conceptions and to contribute in a constructive manner to the process of arms reduction and arms control.

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(1) The Irish members point out that, as their country is not a member of the Atlantic Alliance, the references in this declaration to a common defence policy are not committed to it.

(2) "Platform on European security interests" adopted in the Hague by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the W.E.U. on 27 October 1987.

4.3 These common views would then serve as the basis for discussions within the Alliance with the other allies, notably the transatlantic allies. The Committee noted with satisfaction the annexed document drafted, at its request, by a Working Group chaired by Jacques Chaban-Delmas (1), as well as the Platform of the W.E.U. adopted in the Hague on 27 October 1987. **The Committee notes that the declarations of many Governments, together with these two documents, are clear evidence of a development in the thinking of our countries in favour of the establishment of a European Pillar.**

4.4 The goal of European security and defence policy will be analogous to that already set out 20 years ago in the Harmel Report: to create in Europe a peace order which would enable it to surmount its divisions and which would be based on the respect for human dignity and human rights.

4.5 The ultimate goal, within the Atlantic Alliance, continues to be the prevention of war and the preservation of peace through deterrence based on an appropriate combination of nuclear and conventional forces, as well as through participation as an equal partner at disarmament and arms control negotiations, to which Europe will make a constructive contribution. The European Pillar must in fact ensure that Europe be able to participate with equal rights as the US and the Soviet Union at future negotiations insofar as these affect her security.

4.6 It is now necessary to specify the duties and obligations to which the Member States of a European Pillar must subscribe, as well as its organisation.

4.7 The Committee recalls that in comparable circumstances, a report drafted under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak led to the successful outcome of the Conference which drafted the Treaty of Rome.

4.8 **The Committee calls in particular on the Governments of the Member States of the W.E.U. to adopt the appropriate procedures so that the ideas and proposals of the"Platform" of the Hague and in the document drafted at the request of the Action Committee for Europe under the chairmanship of Jacques Chaban-Delmas be assembled and specified in a report. This should form the basis for an Intergovernmental Conference to draft the necessary changes in the W.E.U. Treaty to specify the rights and obligations of the European Member States who desire to create together the European Pillar, which will operate within the Atlantic Alliance.This report could also form the basis for a concertation with those countries seeking accession to the W.E.U.**

4.9 The Committee has requested the working group chaired by Jacques Chaban-Delmas to follow develements in this area, and if necessary, to formulate its own proposals.

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(1) The members of the Working Group are:
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Chairman; Egon Bahr, Markus Berger, Alfred Dregger, François Fillon, Gérard Fuchs, Michael Heseltine, Giorgio La Malfa, Manuel Medina, Hans Van Mierlo.